




The Dissertation Committee for Gleb Domnenko
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Essays in Dynamic Experimentation
Committee:
Maxwell B Stinchcombe, Supervisor
David S Sibley, Co-Supervisor
Thomas E Wiseman
Andrew B Whinston




Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
August 2017
Acknowledgments
I acknowledge the help provided by my advisors, Maxwell Stinchcombe and David Sibley, and
my committee members, Thomas Wiseman and Andrew Whinston. I am especially indebted to
David Sibley, this work would not be complete without his patience and support.
I am thankful to the participants of the writing seminars at the Department of Economics at
the University of Texas at Austin for their critique and suggestions. In particular, Venkataraman
Bhaskar got me interested in the dynamic experimentation literature, and Dale Stahl offered a
suggestion, which resulted in the writing of the chapter on crowdfunding.
I benefited a lot from the conversations with invited scholars, and I would like to express my
gratitude to Sven Rady and Nicolas Lambert for their encouragement and interest in my work.
The Department of Mathematics became the place I frequently sought advice at during the
last several years. I am grateful to Gordan Žitković for his immense help on many mathematical
problems I faced and to Xavier Ros-Oton for the help with differential equations.
I wish to thank my peers and colleagues, in particular, Hassan Afrouzi, Jessie Coe, Jessica
Fears, Thomas Roderick, Yiman Sun, and Peter Toth for providing suggestions, support, and com-
pany.
All remaining errors are my own.
iv
Essays in Dynamic Experimentation
by
Gleb Domnenko, PhD
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SUPERVISORS: Maxwell Stinchcombe and David Sibley
Innovation and knowledge are critical for the development of the modern economy. I design and study
dynamic models for the funding of new research under different economic conditions.
In the first essay, I develops a model for the funding of R&D initiated by an entrepreneur. In the model,
the funding is undertaken by a large homogeneous pool of investors. The entrepreneur can bank present
investment funds for either future experimentation or diversion. R&D activities are not observable. There
are two main conclusions. First, even when entrepreneurs have full bargaining power, commitment and
incentive problems imply that R&D is usually inefficiently funded. Second, stronger reporting enforcement
can be welfare enhancing and improves the outcomes for the entrepreneur.
In the second essay, I study funding of the projects at the early stages of the startup development. I
search for the best feasible contract that can be signed by the entrepreneur and the investor. The contract
provides dynamic incentives to work on the risky project in the presence of convex effort costs, private
valuations, and developed credit markets. I reveal that the best feasible contract satisfies three main prop-
erties: funding is provided independent of the project failure or success; private valuations are internalized;
and the work on the project does not stop until the project succeeds.
In the third essay, I study how venture capitalists provide funds to entrepreneurs to finance risky
projects that exhibit diminishing returns to scale. I show that the funding rates strictly decrease in time in
the full information and the observable but unverifiable information environments. In the unobservable




List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Chapter I. Crowdfunding Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Overview of the Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5. Forms of Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6. The JOBS Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.7. Crowdfunding Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8. Fraud in Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9. Theoretical Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.10. Crowdfunding Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.11. Contribution to the Crowdfunding Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.12. Structure of the Rest of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1. Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2. Game Structure and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3. Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4. Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vi
2.5. Equilibrium Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6. Key Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. The Efficient Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2. The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3. Properties of the Efficient Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4. The Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1. Phase Two of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2. Phase One of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3. The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4. Properties of the Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5. Efficient Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5. Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6. Reporting, Audit, and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.1. Phase Two of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.2. Phase One of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3. Reporting and Audit Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Chapter II. Funding Experimentation by Angel Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.1. Stages of the Startup Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.2. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.3. Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.4. Structure of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.1. Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3. Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
vii
2.4. Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5. The Economics of the Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.6. Equilibrium Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3. The First Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2. The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3. Properties of the Efficient Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4. The Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1. Phase Two of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2. Phase One of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3. The Best Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.4. Alternative Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5. Comparison of the Contractual Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Chapter III. Funding Projects with Diminishing Marginal Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1.1. Relevance of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1.2. Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
1.3. Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
1.4. Main Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1.5. Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
1.6. Structure of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.1. Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2. Renegotiation and Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.3. Information Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.4. Game Timing and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.5. Equilibrium Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
2.6. Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.7. Players’ Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.8. From Discrete to Continuous Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3. The First Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.2. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4. The Equilibrium: Observable but Unverifiable Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.2. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5. The Equilibrium: Unobservable Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.2. Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6. Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.1. Change of Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2. Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3. Ignorance is Bliss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7. Possible Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.1. Venture Capital Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.2. Hazard Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Common Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A. Probability of No Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B. Payoffs and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C. Evolution of Beliefs and Critical Experimentation Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
ix
Chapter I. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
I.A. The Generalized Control Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
I.B. The Efficient Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
I.B.1. Existence and Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
I.B.2. Properties of the Efficient Experimentation Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
I.C. The Equilibrium with the Binding Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
I.C.1. Phase Two of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
I.D. Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
I.D.1. Policy Function Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
I.D.2. Parameter Changes Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
I.E. Audited Reporting in Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Chapter II. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
II.A. The Generalized Control Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
II.B. The Efficient Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
II.B.1. Existence and Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
II.B.2. Properties of the Efficient Experimentation Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
II.C. The Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
II.C.1. Binding Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
II.C.2. Incentives to Experiment and Conditional Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
II.C.3. Phase One Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
II.C.4. The Best Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
II.C.5. Properties of the Best Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
II.C.6. The Contract with Conditional Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Chapter III. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
III.A. From Discrete to Continuous Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
III.B. Evolution of Beliefs and Critical Funding Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
III.C. The First Best Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
x
III.D. Observable but Unverifiable Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
III.E. Unobservable Effort Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
xi
List of Tables
I.1 Example of a Benefits Menu Offered to the Project Backers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
I.2 Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
I.3 Effects of the Parameter Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
I.4 Reporting Sums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
II.1 Stages of the Startup Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
II.2 Example Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
II.3 Financing Outcomes by Project and by Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xii
List of Figures
I.1 Global Crowdfunding Market Size and Structure (Data from Massolution, 2015) . 8
I.2 Crowdfunding Game Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
I.3 The Efficient Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
I.4 The Equilibrium and the Efficient Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
I.5 Effects of an Increase in the Project Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
I.6 Effects of a Hike in Marginal Monetary Cost of Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . 50
I.7 Effects of a Raise of Discount Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
I.8 Effects of a Decrease in the Prior Belief that the Project is Good . . . . . . . . . . 52
I.9 Evolution of Beliefs and Experimentation Path Under Audited Disclosure . . . . . 59
II.1 Game Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
II.2 The Efficient Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
II.3 The Best Contract: Induced Experimentation Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
II.4 The Contract with Conditional Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
II.5 The Renegotiable Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
III.1 U.S. Venture Capital Market Size (Data Source: PwC and NVCA, 2016) . . . . . . . 102
III.2 Game Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
III.3 Instantaneous Efficient Funding Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
III.4 The First Best Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
III.5 Observable but Unverifiable Effort Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
III.6 Unobservable Effort Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
III.7 An Example of the Policy Function with a Decreasing Region . . . . . . . . . . . 135
xiii
III.8 Comparative Statics: Low Surplus, Patience (Top) and Impatience (Bottom) . . . . 136





Givingmoney to somebody on the Internet for the chance of receiving something they do not yet
have but promise to produce with the help of your funds sounds rather risky. And yet this is how
crowdfunding works. Crowdfunding is a new form of project financing. It allows entrepreneurs
to receive funds from large numbers of people on the Internet. Entrepreneurs promote their
ideas, solicit funding, and communicate with the public by the means of special websites. These
websites are called crowdfunding platforms. Professional and amateur investors called backers
visit crowdfunding platforms in search of interesting ideas. Backers fund projects in exchange
for products, gifts, equity, or just out of goodwill. Crowdfunding platforms act as financial in-
termediaries between backers and entrepreneurs. They transfer money from the backers to the
entrepreneurs while keeping a small fee and administering basic oversight.
Crowdfunding poses several challenges from the perspectives of economic theory. First,
crowdfunding environment is susceptible to moral hazard as investors have little control over
how the funds are spent by entrepreneurs. Second, entrepreneurs may not have enough incen-
tives to work on their ideas efficiently when they need to share the benefits of their projects with
investors. Third, the crowdfunding environment is restrictive and limited. Working on a crowd-
funding project is a dynamic learning process that involves risk. Writing a contract between the
founder and the backers of the project is complicated as there are many important details to be
described. However, crowdfunding platforms aim to be accessible to general public, who are not
1
willing or not able to get too deep into the details about the projects. They will not have time or
desire to write and sign complex contracts. Thus crowdfunding is prone to be inefficient.
The first and the second challenge can be taken up by simply using the models of static moral
hazard. To rise up to the third challenge, the dynamic learning problem, using the static models
would not suffice. Over the years, dynamic models of moral hazard have evolved to account for
the learning component of environments with continuous time and hidden actions. Therefore,
the models of dynamic moral hazard, or, as they are also called, dynamic agency models, should
be the perfect fit for describing the crowdfunding environments.
The main theoretical problem, then, is to use the dynamic agency framework to discover the
contractual and regulatory instruments that can alleviate the inefficiency of crowdfunding, when
it exists. To solve it, I create a crowdfunding model within the dynamic agency environment.
Then, I (a) characterize the efficient outcome, (b) solve the model to produce the equilibrium, and
(c) describe an alternative mechanism that may shift crowdfunding market closer to efficiency. I
also compare different forms of crowdfunding. In the end, I reveal that the current crowdfunding
regulation in the U.S. can only aggravate the inefficiency of crowdfunding, when it is present.
However, it is possible that market-based mechanisms will emerge to alleviate the inefficiency,
because the founders of the crowdfunded projects will benefit from improved efficiency the most.
In any case, stronger reporting enforcement in crowdfunding is needed.
1.1. Motivation
The crowdfunding industry is new and growing. With the recent emergence of the equity crowd-
funding, its role in the process of innovation will only become more important. A viable theo-
retical model of crowdfunding is needed to predict how the market will respond to the changes
in crowdfunding practices and evolution of a regulatory framework. When enough data are ac-
cumulated to perform the effective empirical study of crowdfunding, the theoretical model will
provide a structural framework for empirical analysis. An immediate outcome of the theoretical
modeling of crowdfunding is twofold. First, it reveals which forms of crowdfunding are ineffi-
cient. Second, it allows testing possible mechanisms that may curb the inefficiency.
Methodologically, the crowdfundingmarket presents a good opportunity to apply and expand
2
the framework of dynamic agency. In particular, the models of dynamic experimentation, a sub-
set of dynamic agency models which deal with the process of financing of innovation, look very
attractive to use in the modeling of crowdfunding. There are several reasons for that. The inter-
action between entrepreneurs and investors in crowdfunding has a clear pattern. Thus modeling
it from the perspectives of game theory is straightforward. Also, crowdfunded projects are risky
and require time, money, and effort to complete. Such projects have been described in dynamic
experimentation literature extensively. Therefore, crowdfunding can be modeled well within the
dynamic experimentation paradigm. I expand this framework by assuming the property of di-
minishing returns to experimentation effort and the possibility of intertemporal reallocation of
funds.
This work is the first to model crowdfunding as a dynamic continuous process. Crowdfunding
is usually described as a static stage game. By applying the dynamic experimentation framework
to crowdfunding, I reveal the need to model the dynamic learning process about the project un-
dertaken by the entrepreneur. Static models of crowdfunding capture only the moral hazard
aspect of the inefficiency. Consequently, they tend to recommend static solutions. If it were a
case, then financial hostages (see Williamson, 1983, for the explanation of how financial hostages
fascilitate commitment), for example, could be used to eliminate inefficiency. However, in the
dynamic setting, financial hostages would not work as intended, because incentives evolve from
time period to time period based on learning. Dynamic experimentation models expose the com-
plexities of moral hazard, adverse selection, Bayesian learning, and incentives in the process of
innovation. Therefore, to create a viable model of crowdfunding, dynamics must be taken into
account.
1.2. Main Results
There are three main results:
1. The first finding of this chapter, which has pragmatic and policy implications, is that au-
dit of crowdfunding expenditures can be both socially desirable and beneficial to the en-
trepreneurs. Audited reporting works as a commitment device for the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur knows she will have to reveal her expenditures accumulated over a report-
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ing period. She can pre-commit to reach a certain level of aggregate expenditures at the
time of the reporting or suffer punishment if she does not. This way, it becomes possible
to alleviate the moral hazard by having a target expense rate for every reporting period
and demonstrating that these targets are being reached. The entrepreneur can set these
targets such that it improves the experimentation rates for her benefit. I show that the
entrepreneur captures the social surplus, therefore, what is beneficial to the entrepreneur
is socially beneficial as well.
The implication is that we should expect the emergence of the audited expenditure report-
ing practice in crowdfunding in the near future. There are two ways it could happen: either
the regulators would require it for all crowdfunded startups, or the market for the audit ser-
vices targeted at the needs of crowdfunding develops. Right now, the second option looks
more viable, because the regulation is heading in the opposite direction.
The introduction of the JOBS act—the main piece of crowdfunding regulation—relaxed the
reporting requirements. The act was supported by the entrepreneurs and startup owners
and criticized by the investors. The best explanation for this is that the costs of reporting
in crowdfunding currently outweigh the benefits of transparency. If this is the case then
requiring the mandatory audited reporting of expenses in crowdfunding may be damaging
to the industry.
Recently, audit firms started offering services tailored to crowdfunded startups’ needs. This
is a positive trend suggesting that audited reporting of expenditures might eventually be-
come a standard in crowdfunding. Given that crowdfunded startups are small, the complex-
ity of the audit should not be an issue. The services will be limited in scope to expenditures
related to particular projects, so the costs of the audit should be relatively low. Therefore,
from the current perspectives, it is likely that the market solution will prevail over the
regulation.
Obviously, the audited reporting of expenditures alone will not be sufficient to maximize
welfare in crowdfunding. In fact, reporting will foster the culture of underexperiment-
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ing at the beginning of the reporting cycle and overexperimenting closer to the end of it.
However, if the costs of reporting are relatively low then reporting is welfare enhancing.
2. The second finding is that most forms of crowdfunding are inefficient. The inefficiency
stems from the unobservability of the entrepreneur’s actions, the riskiness of the project,
and the need to share the future surplus of the project with the investors. The riskiness
and unobservability of the actions make it impossible to solve the inefficiency problem by
writing incentive contracts. The need to share the surplus affects the entrepreneur’s ex post
incentives to experiment. Having promised to give away part of the project surplus, the
entrepreneur does not feel motivated enough to efficiently conduct the experiments. There
are projects that should be funded because they have the potential to generate surplus, but
they will never be funded because they will be considered too risky by the investors and
the entrepreneur.
Some forms of crowdfunding, however, are efficient. In particular, if the project involves
unconditional payments, then it can be efficient in theory. Unconditional payments imply
that the project founder receives the funds upfront, the amount of funds is sufficient to carry
on with experiments even if the project keeps failing, and that the backers only receive
unconditional rewards just for participating. This way, pure donation-based crowdfunding
and crowdfunding models that promise participation rewards independent of the project
success can be deemed efficient. Obviously, in real world, misallocation of funds can still
happen, and the possibility of fraud cannot be excluded. However, given that fraud is rare in
crowdfunding, the donation-based and participation-based rewardmodels in crowdfunding
can be classified as being as close to efficiency as it is possible.
3. The third contribution is in enhancing themodels of dynamic experimentation. I contribute
to the dynamic experimentation literature by offering the model with convex effort costs
and an intertemporal budget constraint. Convex effort costs allow me to concentrate on
the interior solutions and present the effort as having the property of diminishing returns
to scale. This way, I avoid the complexity of classifying the conditions associated with the
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binding or relaxed incentive constraints typical for the traditional dynamic experimenta-
tion models. Intertemporal reallocation of capital is needed to model the crowdfunding
market where investments are usually received upfront and in full. As a modeling tool, the
intertemporal budget constraint permits the entrepreneur to be more flexible than with the
interim budget constraints of traditional models.
Overall, convex costs and the intertemporal budget constraint are needed to model the
crowdfunding market. Without the first property, the audited reporting of expenditures
would lead to full efficiency, which is not the case in my model. Also, the equilibrium
experimentation path will be trivial, coinciding with the efficient path until the project
stops before it should in the efficient case. I show that this is not the case and that the
equilibrium experimentation path is everywhere inefficient. Without the second property,
I would not be able to model the process of receiving the funds upfront, which is essential
in crowdfunding. The model I introduce is non-trivial, but analytically tractable to the
point of characterizing the main properties of equilibrium time paths of all the essential
variables.
1.3. Additional Results
Additionally, I characterize the properties of the efficient and the equilibrium outcomes in crowd-
funding. First, the entrepreneur’s budget constraint binds, which means that the entrepreneur
asks for just enough funds to carry on with experiments even if the project keeps failing, but no
more than that. Second, the experimentation rates in the efficient case and in the equilibrium
decrease over time until they become negligible. However, the project never gets abandoned
completely. Finally, there experimentation rates tend to increase the more the project promises
to deliver, decrease as themonetary costs of experimentation rise, and increase when the discount
rates go up.
I show that the entrepreneur’s budget constraint binds, meaning that the entrepreneur will
ask for enough funds to continue experimenting even if the project yields no success. The en-
trepreneur can save money in this money, so the funds that she receives from the backers at the
beginning will be spread throughout all the experimentation sessions she will need to conduct in
6
the future if the project keeps failing. In the event of the project success, the entrepreneur will
keep the remaining funds for her personal consumption. The sum the entrepreneur receives from
the backers is more than she actually expects to spend on the project, because the project might
succeed at some point in time. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is expected that some of the funds will
be spent on the entrepreneur’s personal consumption, which is a waste from the perspectives of
efficiency.
I reveal that in the efficient case and in equilibrium, the entrepreneur experiments with de-
creasing rates over time if she keeps seeing no success. Experimentation never really stops if the
project keeps yielding no success, but eventually decreases to being negligible. In equilibrium,
the entrepreneur begins with lower experimentation rates than she should to achieve efficiency,
therefore, learning happens slower. It means that the posterior belief that the project is good de-
creases at a slower rate in equilibrium than it does in the efficient case. The parties stay optimistic
about the project longer than they should.
I show that experimentation rates improve in the surplus size of the project and in the level
of impatience, and decrease in marginal monetary costs of experiments. It means that, as it
is expected, the projects with higher expected returns or lower costs will be worked on with
greater enthusiasm. The role of impatience, represented by the discount coefficient is also clear.
Relatively more impatient players will not be willing to wait long until the event of success,
their current experimentation rates will be higher. These are the main comparative statics of the
crowdfunding model.
1.4. Overview of the Market
In the following sections, up to the literature review, I describe the crowdfunding process, forms
of crowdfunding, crowdfunding regulation, and fraud in crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is an al-
ternative to traditional practices of project financing. According to World Bank, “crowdfunding
is an Internet-enabled way for businesses or other organizations to raise money in the form of
either donations or investments frommultiple individuals.” (InfoDev, 2013) It emerged during the
financial crisis of 2007–2008 as banks, venture capitalists, and angel investors, faced with uncer-
tainty and liquidity constraints, were less willing to fund projects and ventures. Crowdfunding
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Figure I.1. Global Crowdfunding Market Size and Structure (Data from Massolution, 2015)
revolutionized capital markets by allowing general public to directly participate in risky projects
and benefit from their success together with entrepreneurs.
At first, crowdfunding was a simple extension of funding by friends, family, and community
members into the sphere of the Internet. Over the years, crowdfunding practices expanded, al-
lowing startups to be funded by individuals from all over the world. According to Massolution
(2015), global crowdfunding market, as measured by the total amount of raised funds, has grown
from $1.5 billion in 2011 to more than $34.4 billion in 2015 (see Figure I.1). In comparison, the
total amount of venture capital raised globally in 2011 was $51.7 billion, and it reached $148 bil-
lion by 2015 (EY, 2015). So in 2011, crowdfunding market was smaller than 3% as compared to the
venture capital market, but by 2015, it became as big as 23% as compared to it. Unsurprisingly,
North America amounts for about a half of the global crowdfunding market.
Crowdfunding is a multi-billion-dollar industry that is only expected to grow bigger. It al-
ready changes the investment environment and affects how ideas receive public attention and
funding. Understanding crowdfunding and its problems from the perspectives of economic the-
ory is important, as it will shape our view of the policies and best practices in the R&D industry.
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1.5. Forms of Crowdfunding
There are several forms of crowdfunding, which can be broadly classified into two groups: donation-
based models and investment-based models.
Donation-based crowdfunding : includes models of pure donations—with little to no value to
the donors,—and reward-promising donations, which guarantee some specific benefits to the
donors, from stickers and t-shirts to the products that will be developed by the founders.
Investment-based crowdfunding : includes equity-based models, in which backers receive eq-
uity instruments in exchange for their contributions; peer-to-peer lending, when debt instru-
ments are sold to many private lenders online; and other models, which may constitute the ex-
change of derivatives, portfolios of instruments, or some other forms of investor compensation.
As it is clear from Figure I.1, lending-based instruments are responsible for almost three-
quarters of the global crowdfunding market in 2015. Donation and reward-based models together
account for about 16% of the market, and equity-based models comprise about 7% of it. Despite
that the numbers for the equity-based form of crowdfunding are relatively modest, with the in-
troduction of the JOBS act, equity-based crowdfunding model in the U.S. is expected to take off.
It is a viable and fledgling alternative to current investment practices for many unaccredited and
accredited investors1 that simplifies the process of buying equity by getting entrepreneurs and
investors closer and removing financial consultants, mutual fund managers, and personal invest-
ment managers out of the way.
1.6. The JOBS Act
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (SEC, 2012), or the JOBS act is amajor attempt to regulate crowd-
funding industry and provide a legal framework for the equity-based crowdfunding. Before the
JOBS act, to raise capital, a U.S. startup would have had to either ask a bank for a loan, solicit
donations from friends and family, or sell securities. Selling securities, in general, requires the
issuer to register the securities offering with the Securities and Exchange commission (SEC) and
1To become an accredited investor, an individual must have a net worth excluding the primary residence higher
than $1 million, or they must have a stable income of more than $200,000 a year ($300,000 for married couples).
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to become a public company. There exist a number of exemptions, which allow a startup to forgo
the registration and remain private.
To be exempt from SEC registration, a startup must satisfy certain requirements, but usually,
a small company that intends to raise capital from a small number of accredited investors qualifies
for one exemption or another. Companies that qualify for the exempt status are not required to
publish audited annual reports as opposed to public companies. They just need to submit some
general information about their securities offerings to SEC. The JOBS act eased the requirements
to be exempt from SEC registration and provided legal grounds for soliciting capital online from
both accredited and unaccredited investors.
Title I of the JOBS act reduced the disclosure requirements for emerging growth companies
(companies with annual revenues lower than one billion dollars) and allowed them to advertise
before potential investors prior to registering with SEC. This piece of regulation applies to all
emerging growth companies, not only the crowdfunded ventures, providing them with relaxed
conditions to raise capital.
Title II of the act allowed startups to be exempt from registration while raising unlimited
amount of money from the accredited investors online and also advertising the investment offer-
ings publicly. This section is important as it allowed companies to legally solicit capital online
without registering offerings with SEC and only informing the Commission after the fact within
two weeks of receiving the first transfer of funds.
Title III is the most important part of the JOBS act as it allowed startups to raise up to a
million dollars annually from unaccredited investors online via crowdfunding portals registered
with SEC. The disclosure rules imposed by Title III are mild (for example, principals’ tax returns
are not disclosed in full, only annual company financial reports must be reported, and neither
an audit nor a review of the financial statements are required), but the information disclosed by
startups must be available to all investors no matter how small. There are also caps on how much
an unaccredited investor can spend buying shares in a startup: broadly, from 5% to 10% of annual
income depending on income and net worth. This piece of legislation made equity crowdfunding
model legally possible, resulting in a mini-revolution in the investment world.
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Titles IV, V, VI, and VII continued the logic of deregulation and eased the requirements for
low-scale IPOs, allowed access of unaccredited investors to such IPOs, raised the number of share-
holders a private firm or a bank may have before they are required to register as public, and so
on.
As opposed to small crowdfunded ventures, large firms acquiring capital through traditional
IPOs are still subject to the same strict and precise rules regarding disclosure and capital acqui-
sition as before the JOBS act. They still need to publicly disclose quarterly reports, they are still
required to have audited and independently reviewed annual reports made available for every-
one. In practice, it means that large, knowledgeable professional and institutional investors are
guaranteed to have access to more information than small inexperienced unaccredited investors
trying to gain by crowdfunding an emerging startup. This disproportion of power and this dis-
continuity of information is problematic, as people who need to be protected the most from the
risks associated with the investment process are left with the least protection after the JOBS act.
Despite the claims that entrepreneurs and startup founders are most interested in the suc-
cesses of their projects, without proper control from the investors, the temptation to misallocate
the capital after actually receiving it may be hard for the entrepreneurs to resist.
1.7. Crowdfunding Market Structure
Crowdfunding markets, being it donation-based or equity-based crowdfunding model, consist of
three major elements. First, there are startups that seek capital. Second, there are potential in-
vestors, or backers, who are interested in funding certain startups. Third, there are online portals,
or platforms, that act as intermediaries between the startups and the investors by providing the
required infrastructure for advertising the offerings, sending and receiving the funds, posting the
reports, and for other related activities.
Under the JOBS act, portals do not share responsibility for the fraudulent behavior of the
startups, however, they are required to do their best to weed out fraud. Unlike software platforms
like Apple AppStore or Google Play, crowdfunding portals have little to no influence over the
pricing decisions of the startups. In my model, I abstract from their existence and concentrate on
the interactions between the investors and the startups founders.
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The competition between crowdfunding portals, however, is potentially an exciting topic.
Viotto (2015) is the first to attempt to look at crowdfunding platforms in the light of platform
competition theory (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003). It is apparent today that crowdfunding por-
tals tend to specialize and occupy certain niches of the market. For example, one of the biggest
crowdfunding portals, Kickstarter, tends to post offers only from projects that have a prototype
or a working concept, while their biggest competitor Indiegogo accepts riskier projects (see In-
diegogo, 2014, for one of the many examples of risky projects). This product differentiation by
crowdfunding portals is a promising theoretical and empirical research topic as well.
Crowdfunding process in simple. A startup founder, or the entrepreneur who seeks to obtain
funds from the public designs an offering web page that will advertise the project the founder
undertakes. The page is posted online on a crowdfunding portal. As a part of the offering, the
entrepreneur reports the total sum of the funds she expects to raise and explains the benefits
of contributing to the project for a typical investor based on the amount contributed. Usually,
the offer constitutes a menu, an example of which for some imaginary project is presented in
Table I.1. Potentially, the process of creating a menu of crowdfunding offers is an interesting re-
search topic, and indeed, there are papers that seek to describe this process. For example, Hu et al.
(2015) analyze product differentiation and pricing decisions in the crowdfunding market with
heterogeneous agents. They describe how the optimal menu of contracts must be constructed in
such an environment.
Table I.1. Example of a Benefits Menu Offered to the Project Backers
Donation Availability Reward
$10 Not Limited Thank-You Email
$20 100 A Postcard from Our HQ
$150 50 Early Access to the Product
$1,000 10 Exclusive Add-Ons to the Product
$2,000 1 Early Prototype of the Product Signed by the Founder
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After the offer page is completed, the funding stage starts, and the startup begins collecting
the money from the investors. Online investors who participate in crowdfunding activities in-
vest relatively small amounts of money, sometimes less than ten dollars and rarely more than
several thousand dollars. If the founder achieves their funding goal, the project is considered to
be “funded”, and so the founder can begin spending the acquired funds on the project to make it
a success. In general, the portal keeps accepting additional funds from investors after this phase
in exchange for more benefits or in donation form only. If, on the contrary, the project fails to
reach the funding goal, then the money raised is returned to the investors, and the startup needs
to seek alternative sources of capital or quit.
Due to lax regulatory framework, neither investors, nor online portals knowwhat the startup
company actually does with the money after the project is funded because crowdfunding is built
on trust and the assumption that the entrepreneurs know better what is best for their projects
and are motivated enough to achieve success. This not only creates opportunities for all sorts
of scam and fraudulent behavior, but also decreases the incentives for the honest startups to do
their best because the temptation to divert the funds directly influences their financing decisions.
1.8. Fraud in Crowdfunding
In 2015, in its first case in history involving crowdfunded projects, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) took a legal action against a project creator who sought capital to finance the production of
a board game, but instead diverted some of the funds and used them on himself (see FTC, 2015).
It is tempting to think that the project was fraudulent from the beginning, but it may also be the
case that the entrepreneur actually wanted to deliver a good product ex ante, but the availability
of freely accessible funds, the lack of control, and the absence of credible commitment were the
factors that made him divert the money ex post.
A different case, in which another federal commission, SEC, was involved, happened in 2015
in Texas, when company Ascenergy raised $5mln from different crowdfunding platforms to drill
oil wells on various leases in Texas, which the company claimed it had evaluated and secured.
However, it turned out that the leases had neither been evaluated nor secured, and that the owners
had attempted to divert the funds to their personal needs (see SEC, 2015).
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There are many minor similar cases of potentially fraudulent campaigns which failed to keep
the promises to the investors. In many cases, the problem is the lack of proper investigation
and disclosure: in the Ascenergy case, for example, no law firm would have accepted calling the
project “low risk”, while that is exactly what the company had called it on the crowdfunding
portals’ pages. If the companies were required to disclose more information or if the investors
were willing or able to learn more about the projects they wished to back, then the number of
such cases would have been significantly lower.
In general, however, despite the claims of crowdfunding projects being prone to fraud, World
Bank admits that “crowdfundingmarkets have been operating inmany countries for several years
with few reported instances of fraud.”2 Unfortunately, there exist nowell known empirical studies
of fraud in crowdfunding so far, and performing a search on the Internet reveals that the number
of projects people believe to be potential crowdfunding frauds is pretty low (Cornell and Luzar,
2014). However, any empirical analysis of fraud in the crowdfundingmarket is complicated by the
fact that crowdfunding, as any other form of investment, involves significant risk, and so when
a crowdfunded project fails, it is hard to determine if this outcome was due to the fact that the
funds were misallocated and so the project was not properly worked on, or because all the honest
attempts by the entrepreneur to make the project work did not succeed. This unobservability of
the entrepreneur’s behavior is at heart of the model in this chapter.
It may not be the fraud per se, which is responsible for the problems of the crowdfundingmar-
kets, but the temptation to divert the funds and the need to provide some compensation to the
backers, which create tensions between the investors and the entrepreneurs who wish to crowd-
fund the project. Relaxing the disclosure requirements and easing the process of soliciting funds,
introduced by the JOBS act, only jeopardized the possibility to crowdfund projects efficiently.
1.9. Theoretical Literature
The model I develop in this chapter belongs to the class of models of dynamic experimentation,
which is a subclass of bandit models. Dynamic experimentation models present the process of
innovation as a sequence of costly experiments that may or may not succeed in the future. These
2InfoDev (2013), p. 10.
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models were developed to explain the dynamic nature of the agency problem in the sphere of
entrepreneurship and to demonstrate that static models of moral hazard alone are not sufficient
to capture the important features of the problem of innovation and learning. Dynamic exper-
imentation models became popular at the beginning of the XXI century and have a small, but
prominent group of researchers working on them.
This chapter describes an extension of the model by Bergemann and Hege (2005) with some
additional features. First, instead of linear effort costs, I use convex effort cost. Second, I use an
intertemporal budget constraint in the model as opposed to the static budget constraint. Third, I
solve the model in continuous time, not in discrete time. Finally, in my model, the negotiations
between parties happen only at the beginning, funds are received upfront, and the shares are not
subject to change over time as opposed to renegotiable shares and funding every time period.
It is widely accepted that the first paper that started the trend of using bandit models to
explain different economic environments is Rothschild (1974). He constructed a model of a firm
facing an uncertain demand and experimenting with different prices to learn about the demand
properties. Themodel became popular and soon the whole body of literature emerged based on it.
Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) provide an overview of the important models developed within
this framework.
Entrepreneurship process was first modeled within the bandit framework by Bergemann and
Hege (1998) and then further developed in Bergemann and Hege (2005). They assumed that there
is an entrepreneur who has a project which may or may not succeed in the future. The en-
trepreneur does not have capital to finance the actual research on the project. Every period, the
entrepreneur asks an investor for the funds in exchange for a share of the possible surplus, and
the investor provides funds to the entrepreneur to conduct experiments. Experimenting is needed
to find out if the project is viable, thus dynamics are essential to the learning process. In their
paper, probability that the project succeeds linearly depends on the amount of money spent on
experiments. The main problem they specifically addressed is that since the investor does not see
what the entrepreneur is doing with the money, the entrepreneur may decide to divert the funds
and pretend to conduct experiments while actually shirking. The authors showed that under cer-
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tain parameter values the model may predict that the funds will be provided at a constant rate,
at a decreased rate (“frontloading”), or at an increased rate (“backloading”), but in any case, the
funding schedule will be suboptimal.
Hörner and Samuelson (2013) confirmed the findings of Bergemann and Hege (2005) by ana-
lyzing essentially the same model in continuous time, but with the full bargaining power given to
the investor. Their approach to continuous time is different from the one employed in this chap-
ter, because they consider that the agent can choose the length of the delay between decision-
making points, while I allow the agent to control the experimentation path at every time period
without delays. For the discussion of different approaches to modeling continuous time in game
theory, see Simon and Stinchcombe (1989). Hörner and Samuelson (2013) assumed that the prob-
ability of success of each experiment is given, and so the cost of each experimentation session is
fixed. Their model revealed that the funding rate may increase or decrease in time under Marko-
vian decision-making assumption, and this fact prompted them to consider alternative equilibria
concepts.
Another paper that studies strategic experimentation, albeit from slightly different perspec-
tives, is Keller et al. (2005). It focuses on cooperation and competition between many identical
experimenters, not on contracting between the investors and entrepreneurs. Instead of one ex-
perimenter, there are multiple agents, with replica two-armed bandits. One arm is the “safe” arm
that produces a predictable payoff, the other arm is “risky”: it may or may not produce a surplus if
worked on. The authors characterize equilibria strategies for cooperative and strategic cases and
show that free riding plays a crucial role in curtailing efficiency of the strategic experimentation
with many experimenters.
There are not many papers that employ convex effort costs in dynamic agency models. Mason
and Välimäki (2015) analyze the behavior of the dynamic agency model in the presence of convex
costs under the assumption that parties have dissimilar discount rates, but they only consider
projects that are certain to succeed. Another model that also analyzes the dynamic moral hazard
with convex effort costs is by Bhaskar (2013). He studies optimal contracting schemes between
a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent in the presence of public signals and unobserved
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actions in two time periods. His paper also contains great discussion about the problems that
arise in the environments in which players make both continuous and discrete choices and what
role indifference has to play in such problems.
There is a paper with dynamic moral hazard and convex costs properties that belongs to a
slightly different branch of literature. This branch addresses career concerns of workers who
might influence their future benefits by taking unobserved actions today. Hörner and Lambert
(2016) study the model, in which an agent of unknown type takes unobserved actions in continu-
ous time to produce a stream of output. The output depends on the agent’s type and actions, but it
also has a random component to it. The output is consumed by the market who compensates the
agent for it. The market receives its information from an intermediary via some rating system.
The authors demonstrate that in the dynamic career concerns model with convex effort costs and
ratings supplied by an intermediary, “excessive information depresses career concerns and dis-
torts the agent’s choices”3 ultimately making the full disclosure environment suboptimal. They
discover the optimal rating scheme that produces better results than full disclosure and describe
equilibria with passive and active intermediary.
In this chapter, I build upon the main results of the previous papers on dynamic experimen-
tation and provide additional results applicable to crowdfunding in the environment with convex
experimentation costs and an intertemporal budget constraint.
1.10. Crowdfunding Literature
The economics of crowdfunding is still a fledgling topic since crowdfunding markets are still new
and rapidly developing. Agrawal et al. (2013) describe some basic economics of crowdfunding
admitting that “to economists, the recent rise of crowdfunding, … which offers little oppor-
tunity for careful due diligence, … is initially startling.” Among the other observations, they
show that with the introduction of crowdfunding, financing projects is no longer geographically
constrained; funding tends to be skewed (on Kickstarter, 1% of all projects raised 36% of funds);
propensity to fund increases with accumulated capital, which may lead to herding; and that back-
ers and creators are initially overoptimistic in the outcomes. The authors were also among the
3Hörner and Lambert (2016), p. 2.
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first to admit the main problem of crowdfunding: the entrepreneurs have more information than
the backers, and so “the information asymmetry problem is exacerbated in the case of early-stage
ventures raising capital in a lightly regulated environment where funders are remote and have
limited opportunity to perform due diligence in person with the creator.”4
In a following empirical study by the same authors (Agrawal et al., 2015), they discover that
“local and distant funders exhibit different funding patterns.” In particular, the effect that in a
similar study Lin and Viswanathan (2015) call “home bias”—the higher propensity of the projects
to be financed locally despite being advertised online to a broader audience,—still exits and is
especially strong for the initial stages of funding, indicating that offline social ties still play an
important role in the outcomes of crowdfunding campaigns.
Microeconomics of crowdfunding has been studied by few authors so far. Chemla and Tinn
(2016) look at the initial crowdfunding process of raising capital as learning about the market
demand by observing the funding rates. They admit the presence of moral hazard, but believe
there exist platform-level mechanisms like limited campaign lengths and measures to improve
transparency to alleviate the negative effects of moral hazard.
Strausz (2016) studies reward-based crowdfunding models from the perspectives of mecha-
nism design and shows that raising capital by pre-selling the products to future consumers has
important efficiency aspects that offset the threats of moral hazard. However, he admits that
these efficiency gains may not be easily realizable due to incentive problems. He then describes
mechanisms that can be implemented to improve the incentives and achieve efficient outcomes
at least in some particular cases.
Empirical studies of equity crowdfunding are rare, but slowly start to emerge as the mar-
ket develops. Ahlers et al. (2015) conduct empirical study of signaling in equity crowdfunding
and conclude that “retaining equity and providing more detailed information about risks can
be interpreted as effective signals,” while social and intellectual capital seem to have little im-
pact on funding outcomes. Hornuf and Neuenkirch (2016) analyze the pricing schemes of 44
equity crowdfunding campaigns conducted in Germany between 2011 and 2014. They discover
4Agrawal et al. (2013), p. 20.
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that “campaign characteristics, investor sophistication, progress in funding, herding, and stock
market volatility influence backers’ willingness to pay,” that is, all these variables are important
signals that determine the success of the crowdfunding campaign at early stages.
There are papers that study the behavior of the investors, in particular, how they reveal their
identity and how it affects the crowdfunding process. Burtch et al. (2016), for example, demon-
strate that the decision by the backers to hide their identity negatively influences the likelihood
to donate of the subsequent contributors and peer-pressures them to hide their own identity as
well.
On the other hand, there are studies of the entrepreneurs’ behavior in the crowdfunding
market. Gerber and Hui (2013) analyze the motives and deterrents to crowdfunding participation
among the project creators and supporters. They classify the motivations and deterrents into
broader groups based on the questionnaire designed by the authors.
Some other papers that describe the economics of crowdfunding include Belleflamme et al.
(2010), who uncover the problems of crowdfunding from the Industrial Organization perspectives,
Belleflamme et al. (2015), who describe the economics of crowdfunding portals, Morse (2015),
studying peer-to-peer lending, and Meer (2014), who look at donation-based crowdfunding as a
model of charitable giving.
1.11. Contribution to the Crowdfunding Literature
The main focus of the theoretical papers on crowdfunding so far has been on studying of the
funding stage. It implies looking at crowdfunding from the perspectives of static moral hazard
and thus suggesting traditional solutions from the mechanism design and screening literature
that are mainly concernedwith the development of the optimal menus of contracts. I complement
these studies by shifting the focus to the experimentation stage and simplifying the funding stage.
I implement the framework of dynamic agency models to show that the incentives become more
important after the project is funded as lack of transparency and control and the temptation to
divert the funds significantly influence ex post incentives and thus affect the ex ante efficiency
of crowdfunded projects. As the result, I show, projects tend to be underfunded, have higher
expected time to reach success, and typically involve waste of funds.
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1.12. Structure of the Rest of the Chapter
The chapter continues with the description of the crowdfunding model. After that, I describe the
first best scenario, when the social planner decides how to work on the project. Then, I explain
how the equilibrium is different from the efficient solution and characterize some comparative
statics. In the end, I analyze the environment in which the project founder commits to submit
audited reports of the aggregate expenditures every now and then, after which I conclude.
2. The Model
The crowdfunding model I construct belongs to the class of dynamic experimentation models.
It shares some common features and results with basic dynamic experimentation models, but
it also has some unique properties. Due to the presence of convex costs, it produces smooth
experimentation paths, as opposed to experimentation paths with kinks typical for traditional
models. Having an intertemporal budget constraint means there is no need to satisfy budget
limits each time period, which results in a solution, which is more flexible.
Broadly, the model is a two-phase game. The first phase consists of the entrepreneur receiving
funds from the investors and agreeing to share the project’s success with them. The second
phase—of the entrepreneur spending funds and effort on the project to try to succeed. There are
no actions by investors at the second phase, and at first phase they act as price takers.
2.1. Players
There are two players in this game: the entrepreneur and a mass of investors.
The entrepreneur : the entrepreneur, or the founder, is risk neutral and she is the primary player
as she holds full bargaining power at the first phase of the game, when she makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, and is fully responsible for the outcome of the second phase of the game, when she
determines the equilibrium experimentation paths.
The investors : the investors, or backers, are risk-neutral and behave as a single player who can
either agree to the offer at phase one or disagree and take the outside option. The investors have
no role in the second phase of the game. Such interpretation of investors as a single unity reflects
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the fact that online backers in crowdfunding have little negotiation power (they can either con-
tribute or not) and almost no possibility to coordinate or play strategically against other backers
due to distances that separate them and small sizes of their contributions.
2.2. Game Structure and Actions
The game is pictured in Figure I.2. The entrepreneur (E) has a project, or venture, that she wants
to work on, but does not have funds to do so. This is why the entrepreneur solicits funds from the
investors (I). Before the game begins, nature (N ) determines if the project is good or bad. This
move by nature is unobserved by the players, but the players agree that the prior probability of
the project being good is α0. After nature made the initial move, at time t = 0, phase one of the
game begins.
The entrepreneur publishes information about her funding campaign on a page located online
on some crowdfunding portal’s website. The page contains three parts which are important for
this model:
1. A description of the project. In this model, the description consists of a single component:
α0, probability that the project is good. If the project is bad, it will never succeed no matter
how hard the entrepreneur tries. If the project is good, then it might succeed eventually if
the entrepreneur exerts effort and spends money on experiments.
2. The amount of funds the entrepreneur seeks to raise, or the funding goal, denoted by P .
Figure I.2. Crowdfunding Game Graph
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3. The rewards promised to the backers. If the project succeeds, it generates a certain surplus,
and the entrepreneur receives share s of it. The rest will be given to the investors.
This public announcement is essentially a take-it-or-leave-it (“fill or kill”) offer to the in-
vestors. The investors, acting as a single unity, observe the offer and decide whether to fund the
project given α0, s, and P . If they decide to reject the offer (choice r on the graph), the crowd-
funding campaign fails, and the game ends with parties receiving zero payoffs. If the investors
agree to fund the project (choice a), then the entrepreneur immediately receives funds P , and the
second phase of the game begins.
The second phase of the game is devoted to the entrepreneur’s attempts to make the project
a success. Every time period t ě 0, the entrepreneur decides upon experimentation rate ϵt. After
this, nature makes a move and determines if the project succeeds at time t. If the project is good,
then the higher the experimentation rate is, the higher the chances that the project succeeds. If
the project is bad, then success never happens, even if ϵt is very high. If success does not happen
in period t, time advances to the next period.
If at any point in time the project succeeds, then it generates a certain surplus, which parties
share according to s, and the game ends. Otherwise, the game continues indefinitely. So the
entrepreneur’s pure strategy is a collection of maps:
Phase 1: (s, P )
Phase 2: ((s, P ) , A) ÞÑ (ϵt, t ě 0) ,
whereA P ta, ru is the investors’ acceptance or rejection. In phase one, there is no history, so the
entrepreneur just select her offer (s, P ). In phase two, the history consists of the offer in phase
one and of the investors’ acceptance or rejection of the offer. The investors’ pure strategy is
Phase 1: (s, P ) ÞÑ A.
The history for the investors consists only of the entrepreneur’s offer.
2.3. Information
There are two degrees of information asymmetry in this game:
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Information about the project : neither the entrepreneur, nor investors know if the project is
good or bad.
Information about the entrepreneur’s actions : only the entrepreneur knows her level of ex-
perimentation, her lever of effort, and how much she spends on the project each time period t.
To the investors, this information is unobservable, so there is no way to write contracts contin-
gent on experimentation rates, effort level, or project expenditures.
The only publicly observable and verifiable event regarding the project is the event of success.
So all possible contracts in this game can only be contingent on success or no success.
Given that the project is uncertain, both parties have beliefs about the project being good. At
the beginning, both parties believe that the project is good with probability α0. This is enough
to define the equilibrium for the game, but it is convenient to define the posterior beliefs that the
project is good to simplify the problem statement.
The posterior beliefs that the project is good evolve over time according to the Bayes’ Rule.
Probability that no success is reached by time t is given by









but has been failing
,
or equivalently (see Appendix A),
P (no success by time t) = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
Notice the similarity with the exponential distribution. In fact, the exponential distribution de-
scribes the arrival of success in this game when the project is certain (α0 = 1) and the experi-
mentation rates are constant (ϵt = λ, for all t). Posterior probability that the project is still good
at time t conditional on no success reached so far is
αt ” P (project is good | no success by time t) =
project is good,











no success by time t
,
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and it evolves in time according to
dαt
dt ” α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) .
Observe that it means that when the experimentation rates ϵt are positive, the posterior belief
that the project is good will only decrease. The higher the experimentation rates are, the higher
the decrease in the posterior belief will be.
The entrepreneur observes experimentation rates ϵt perfectly, so the entrepreneur knows αt
at any point in time. The investors do not see ϵt at any point in time, they can only expect the
entrepreneur to experiment at certain rates and best respond to what they believe the experimen-
tation rates will be when they agree or disagree to the crowdfunding offer. Since the investors
have no roles in the second phase of the game, the evolution of posterior belief αt only matters
for the entrepreneur. The investors simply calculate their expected payoffs from accepting the
offer at phase one and decide accordingly.
2.4. Payoffs
The players’ expected payoffs will depend on the offer made, (s, P ); its acceptance or rejection
in phase one, A P ta, ru; on the experimentation rates exerted by the entrepreneur in phase two
of the game, (ϵt, t ě 0); and on players’ belief that the project is good, α0. One obvious thing
to notice from the description of the game in Figure I.2 is that if the offer is rejected, then both
parties get nothing, independent of their other actions:
πE ((s, P ) , r, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = πI ((s, P ) , r, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = 0,
where πE (¨) is the entrepreneur’s payoff function, and πI (¨) is the investors’ payoff function. If
the other was accepted, however, the payoffs are a bit more complicated.
Each experiment requires funding (that is why the entrepreneur raises funds in the first place)
and effort. Money and effort are complements, so each experimentation session, at every point in
time t, requires ϵtc inmonetary expenses and f (ϵt) in effort costs to produce experimentation rate
of ϵt. These costs are carried out by the entrepreneur, the investor does not observe neither the
entrepreneur’s expenses, not the resulting experimentation rates. The total cost of experimenting
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at rate ϵt is
f (ϵt) + ϵtc.
Function f (ϵ) is strictly increasing, strictly convex for ϵ ą 0, and at least twice continuously
differentiable. Also, f (0) = f 1 (0) = 0, while f2 (0) ą 0. For convenience, I assume f3 (x) ě 0.
I can easily combine the monetary and the effort costs into one convex function, say,
g (ϵt) = f (ϵt) + ϵtc,
to simply account for the total costs of experimentation at time t at rate ϵt. However, in order
to balance the entrepreneur’s budget constraint I need to know her monetary expenses for each
time period. This is why I keep the effort and monetary costs separated.
Convex effort costs in continuous time reflect the fact that keeping the experimentation rate
high for prolonged time is harder than keeping it low. Also, it indicates that increases in exper-
imentation rates better be spread over longer periods of time rather than shorter. In the end, it
guarantees that experimentation rates will be smoothed, without kinks and jumps. One obvious
result of having convex costs is the implication that the entrepreneur would be better off shar-
ing the tasks with other people. Potentially, this is an interesting research topic with tradeoffs
between the efficiency gains and losses due to unobservability of the actions. However, in this
chapter, I assume that the entrepreneur does a unique job and cannot delegate it to anyone else.
Therefore, all the costs are incurred solely by the entrepreneur.
If the experiments are conducted at a positive rate and the project is good, it may eventually
succeed at some random finite time T and produce the surplus of size R. The event of success is
public and there is no way for the entrepreneur to hide it. If the project is bad, T = 8, and the
surplus is never produced.
Future benefits and costs are discounted at rate r, and the rate is common for the parties. The
entrepreneur has an opportunity to save funds every period at rate r, which is the same as the
common discount rate. Thus the entrepreneur can freely reallocate funds between different time
periods without any utility effects. The entrepreneur’s expected payoff valued at time t = 0 if
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her offer is accepted is





e´rt (f (ϵt) + ϵtc) dt
]
,
where the expectation is taken over random success time T . The investors’ payoff is simpler:
πI ((s, P ) , a, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = E
[
e´rT (1 ´ s)R
]
´ P ,
since they do not need to exert any effort to receive benefits from the project.
Equivalently (see Appendix B), the payoffs of the parties at t = 0 can be expressed as





0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt,





0 ατ ϵτ dταtϵt (1 ´ s)R dt ´ P .
The model works best for the equity-based crowdfunding; the interpretation of s then is
straightforward: it’s just a share of the surplus the entrepreneur retains while giving the rest
to the backers. However, if share (1 ´ s)R is the investors’ share times the surplus the project
is expected to generate, then this whole term can have an interpretation of the total value of re-
wards the backers will receive upon the project success. Alternatively, (1 ´ s)R can be treated as
the amount of debt plus percentages the peer-to-peer lenders will get when the project succeeds
(assuming the entrepreneur will not be able to return the debt if she fails completing the project).
Thus this model can apply to different forms of crowdfunding, not only to the equity-basedmodel.
2.5. Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept is Sequential Equilibrium in pure strategies. The common prior that the
project is good, α0, does not depend on the game paths, it remains a prior on and off equilibrium.
The game is of imperfect information, where Nature moves first and determines if the project is
good or bad. This move is unobserved by the Entrepreneur and the Investors, but since Nature
is not a strategic player and always selects the project as “good” with probability α0 and “bad”
with probability 1 ´ α0, then along all possible equilibria paths and also off the equilibria paths,
players have the same beliefs regarding this Nature’s move, and these beliefs are consistent.
To satisfy the requirement of sequential rationality, the game is solved using backward induc-
tion. At phase two of the game, when the offer is accepted, the entrepreneur determines optimal
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sequence of experimentation rates, (ϵt, t ě 0) believing that the project is good with probability
α0. At phase one, expecting the entrepreneur to behave rationally in the future, the investors
observe the offer and decide if they want to accept or reject it based on their belief α0 and their
expected payoffs in case of acceptance. Finally, knowing which offers the investors will accept
and which reject, and how she will behave in case of acceptance, the entrepreneur makes the
take-it-or-leave-it offer that is the most beneficial to her.
2.6. Key Assumptions
The goal of my analysis is to reveal why crowdfunding is inefficient and how to deal with inef-
ficiency. I ignore some properties of crowdfunding markets in order to concentrate on this goal.
Some important limitations of the model are:
Transaction costs are negligible : this assumption is typical for most economic models. Here,
it implies that there are no costs of writing a contract and transferring funds. However, some
transaction costs are built in themodel: it is prohibitively expensive tomonitor the entrepreneur’s
actions and it is impossible for any party to learn if the project is good or bad. It is also very costly
for the investors to coordinate and play strategically against the entrepreneur to improve their
bargaining outcomes. Finally, complex conditional contracts are out of reach as well, due to the
limitations of the current crowdfunding practices.
Crowdfunding portals are passive : the role of the crowdfunding portal in this model is passive.
I assume that portals do not receive any benefits from the interaction between the entrepreneur
and the investors, and they do not play strategically. In actual crowdfunding environments, por-
tals receive fees from every successful campaign, and they may influence the funding process by
removing the projects from their web sites, by blocking funding, or in many other ways. How-
ever, I believe their role is limited and for the purposes of this model, it can be deemed passive and
the fees they collect can be ignored. The structure of the interaction between the entrepreneur
and the investors reflects the rules set up by the portal.
The funding stage is trivial : the initial stage of collecting the funds and advertising the project
is simplified in thismodel. The purpose of thismodel is to show that the entrepreneur experiments
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at inefficient rates. So I ignore all the complexities of the funding phase as it only matters for the
experimentation phase if the entrepreneur manages to raise enough funds. The questions of why
projects receive enough or not enough funds, what role does herding behavior play in investors’
decisions, and how to design the optimal offers are potentially interesting, but out of scope of my
research.
3. The Efficient Outcome
3.1. Problem Statement
The efficient solution must be reasonable enough to act as a benchmark, which, at least theoret-
ically, can be reached. This is why the treatment of efficiency in this game entails that even the
social planner is uncertain about the project being good or bad. Otherwise, the outcome is trivial:
bad projects should not be worked on at all, and good projects should be worked on at a certain
constant rate until success happens. This level of efficiency is only achievable if there was some
way to know that the project is good, but not knowing that the project is good or bad is not just
some flaw of the information distribution between the agents. In this model, it is a fundamental
property of the project, and the only way to find out if the project is good is to work on it and
achieve success.
The utility functions are transferable in this game, so to produce the efficient outcome, it is
enough to combine the expected utility functions and maximize the resulting “social” expected
utility. Effectively it means that the contracting phase of the game, or phase one, becomes irrel-
evant as instead of two entities trying to agree on transfers and shares, we just have one who
has the project and the funds to finance it. Therefore, the problem boils down to determining the
efficient experimentation path, (ϵ˚t , t ě 0).
The combined expected utility is


















0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt.
To write the problem of finding the efficient solution in the form of a control problem, I need
the expression inside the integral to be of form
I (xt, ut, t) ,
where xt is a vector of state variables, and ut is a vector of control variables. I only have one
control variable, ϵt for every period t, but the state vector is more complicated. One of the state
variables is the posterior belief that the project is good, αt. Another state variable is the proba-
bility that the project will succeed in the future, at random time T (including mass at infinity),
Mt = P (T ą t) = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
The trajectory of the state variables is characterized by equations of motion that give the time
rate of change for each state variable:
α̇t ”
dαt




Notice that both equations ofmotion do not depend specifically on time t, so both are autonomous.





e´trMt [αtϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
(I.1)
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t (1 ´ s)R dt ´ P ě 0,
so that both parties will be better off participating. This is just a matter of determining transfer
sizes and it is not an issue as long as there is a positive expected surplus to gain. Because of this,
I only concentrate on characterizing the efficient experimentation path.
3.2. The Solution
The solution to the control problem exists (see Appendix I.B.1), it is unique, stationary (does not
depend on time explicitly), and it is characterized by differential equation
r [αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c] = α [f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) + (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α)]






There is a simple interpretation for the boundary condition. Since α is the posterior belief
that the project is good, then c
R
= α is the lower bound on the belief level. If α ą α, then it may
be reasonable to experiment. If α ď α, then the only reasonable thing to do is to abstain from
experimentation completely, that is to have ϵ˚ (α) = 0, because the immediate net benefit from
experimentation,
αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ă
c
R
ϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = ´f (ϵ)
will be negative, for any α ă c
R
and ϵ ą 0. Since the posterior belief that the project is good can
only decrease in time, then having positive experimentation rates in any time period after the
belief level of c
R
is reached will be wasteful. Alternatively, α can be a measure of the optimism
level, with α = 0 indicating no confidence in the project, α = 1—complete confidence, and some
less-than-complete confidence in between.
3.3. Properties of the Efficient Solution
Important properties of the efficient experimentation rate are summarized in Proposition I.1 and
pictured in Figure I.3.
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Proposition I.1. The efficient outcome in dynamic crowdfunding models with convex experimenta-
tion costs satisfies:
Some projects are not worth the risk : if α0 ď cR , then the project is better left alone.
Staticity at the top : the experimentation rate for sure projects (α = 1) is stationary.
The experimentation rate strictly decreases in time : the policy function strictly increases in α.
Experimenting never stops : despite that experimentation rate strictly decreases over time, exper-
iments only stop if success happens, otherwise, experimentation rate is always positive.
Proof. Complete proof can be found in Appendix I.B.2. I only provide the intuition here:
Some projects are not worth the risk : some projects are so bad that it is unreasonable to spend
any effort on them. Suppose it was worth funding the project with prior α0 ď cR . If the prior
belief that the project is good, α0, is lower than cR , then the posterior αt can only be lower than
that as it decreases over time when no success happens: αt ď α0 ď cR . So for every time period
t, if ϵt ě 0,
αtϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ď
c
R
ϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc = ´f (ϵt) ď 0.
Figure I.3. The Efficient Outcome
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
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0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt ď 0.
There is a better strategy: conducting no experiments will yield zero. Receiving nothing is better
than suffering losses. Therefore, there is no point in trying to make a project with α0 ď cR a
success. Notice that c
R
is also the lower bound on the posterior belief level. It means that if α0 ą
c
R
, there is still an opportunity to make the project a success as initial efficient experimentation
rates will be strictly positive.
Staticity at the top : for sure projects, with prior α0 = 1 ą cR , posterior αt stays fixed no matter
what: αt = α0 = 1. The efficient experimentation rate must satisfy
r [R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ´ c] = f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ϵ˚ (1) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) ,
which is just a simple equation with the unique solution, given convexity of f (¨). Therefore,
the experimentation rate stays strictly positive, finite, and constant for every time period if the
project is sure to succeed.






, experimentation rate increases
in α. Posterior belief αt strictly decreases over time observing no success, so the efficient exper-
imentation rate, ϵ˚t , decreases in time.
The proof is by contradiction:
• the efficient experimentation rate is continuously differentiable;





= 0 and ϵ˚ (1) ą 1, provided that c
R
ă 1;






: see Figure I.3;






, then there must be at least one local maximum in this
interval;






can only be local minima, because having a
local maximum is incompatible with the differential equation that characterizes the efficient
policy function;
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• this is a contradiction to the function decreasing on the interval;







The efficient experimentation rate increases in posterior belief level α and, consequently, de-
creases in time.






, efficient policy function
ϵ˚ (α) is strictly increasing and is everywhere below critical function ϵ̄ (α) from Appendix C.
The critical function is constructed in such a fashion to ensure that if it is followed, then the
experiments stop in finite time. Any function that is strictly below the critical function, but






, does not provide enough experimentation effort to stop in finite
time. Therefore, efficient experimentation should not stop until the project succeeds.
4. The Equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction and show thatmost forms of crowdfunding are inefficient.
Then I describe the solution and some important properties of the equilibrium experimentation
path.
4.1. Phase Two of the Game
I begin solving the game from phase two. At the beginning of phase two, the entrepreneur has
received the funds, P , and agreed to provide share s of the surplus the project generates if it
succeeds to the investors. The investors have no more roles in the game, so it is up to the en-
trepreneur to decide what to do next.
The entrepreneur is ready to begin experimenting. Suppose that she devises a plan to exper-
iment according to path ϵt. Then each time period t, her costs will be
f (ϵt) + ϵtc,
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of which ϵtc is the monetary part. If success happens at time T , then the total amount of funds




Assume that it is possible to save funds at a rate which is exactly equal to the discount rate r.
Then the total amount of funds that the entrepreneur needs to have to successfully finance the




Unfortunately, the entrepreneur does not know for sure when the project succeeds. So she may
theoretically run intro a situation when she still planned experiments in the future, but ran out
of money. Therefore, she needs to receive enough funds to finance the project under assumption
that it never succeeds. Otherwise, if she expects to run out of money at time T , there is no reason
to plan any experiments past time T . She might just assume ϵt = 0 for all t ą T . If it happens
that the project succeeds, but she still has some funds left, she may just use the funds for her
personal consumption.





where P is the total amount of funds given to the entrepreneur by the investors. The problem of
finding the equilibrium path is then a problem of maximizing the entrepreneur’s payoff function







e´trMt [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
]








α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
It is hard to determine if the budget constraint binds in equilibrium, so I need to consider two
cases, when it binds and when it does not. Assume, for now, that the budget constraint does not










e´trMt [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
s given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
In this form, the problem looks remarkably similar to the problem of finding the efficient experi-
mentation path, (I.1). The solution must be somewhat similar as well. The only difference is that
surplus R is premultiplied by share s, which is just a number at phase two of the game.
Thus, if the budget constraint does not bind at phase two, the solution is characterized by first
order differential equation similar to (I.c), but with “sR” instead of just “R”:
r [αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ c]






























α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
P, s given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
This problem is solved in Appendix I.C.1. The solution in terms of policy function is characterized
by first order differential equation
r
[










c (1 ´ α0) + cλ
sR (1 ´ α0) + cλ
)
= 0.
The only difference between this condition and the one with the non-binding budget con-






So when λ ě 0 (the budget constraint binds) and α ď α0 (posterior belief that the project is good
can only be lower than prior α0), the policy function for the case with the binding constraint
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is always below than the policy function in the non-binding-constraint case, other things equal
(see Appendix I.D.2). Having to satisfy the budget constraint is similar to having the cost of
experimentation increasing over time. This is not surprising, and it provides clear interpretation
of λ as a cost of satisfying the budget constraint.
4.2. Phase One of the Game
I have the solutions to the second phase of the game for the cases when the budget constraint
binds and when it does not. In order to find out if the constraint matters, I derive the solution
for the first phase of the game, keeping in mind the results for phase two. I show that the bud-
get constraint binds, but the entrepreneur will want to keep the multiplier associated with the
constraint as low as possible.
First, consider the acceptance stage of the game. The investors will accept the entrepreneur’s









t (1 ´ s)R dt ´ P ě 0,
where ϵ˚˚t is the equilibrium experimentation path produced at phase two of the game depending









t (1 ´ s)R dt ´ P ą 0.
Then for any share s, asking for more P is a good idea. If the budget constraint does not bind,
the equilibrium path will not be affected, but the entrepreneur will enjoy having more funds to
herself. If the budget constraint binds, having more P will mean more relaxed constraint and,










t (1 ´ s)R dt.
As expected, the entrepreneur will make investors break even and indifferent between accepting
or rejecting the funding offer.
To find out if the budget constraint matters at phase two of the game, I will check two cases:
when it does not bind, and when it does. Suppose that the budget constraint does not bind in the
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α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
where ϵ˚˚t is the equilibrium experimentation path calculated at phase two based on share s.
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subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵ˚˚t (1 ´ αt) ,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] .
The objective function is similar to the objective function from the problem of determining the
first best experimentation path, (I.1). The only component that depends on s is experimentation
path (ϵ˚˚t , t ě 0). Without any more constraints, the solution to this problem is straightforward:
setting s = 1 allows the entrepreneur to capture the maximal social surplus and achieve first










t (1 ´ s)R dt = 0,
so the entrepreneur will receive no funds from the investors if she does not offer anything in
return. This would work if she did not have to ask the investors for funds to begin with. Without
funds provided by the investors, she will not be able to experiment. Thus the budget constraint
must bind.
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(I.2)
Notice that, as in the case of the unconstrained problem described earlier, the objective function is
the same as for the problem of finding the efficient experimentation path. It captures the fact that
the entrepreneur receives all the surplus produced as the result of the experimentation. However,
this time, share s is included in two components: it affects the equilibrium experimentation path,
(ϵ˚˚t , t ě 0) and it is included directly in the budget constraint. Therefore, the solution is not as
obvious as it was in the case of ignoring the budget constraint. Lemma I.1 establishes that the
budget constraint binds at phase two, but the Lagrange multiplier associated with it is equal to
zero.
Lemma I.1. In dynamic crowdfunding models with convex experimentation costs and intertemporal
budget constraints, the entrepreneur asks for exactly as much funds as she needs to carry on with
experiments even observing no success (budget constraint binds). However, the constraint will not be
restrictive in the sense that the entrepreneur will not have to limit her experimentation rates due to
the risk of running out of funds (Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint is zero).
Proof. I already established above that the budget constraint binds. What is left to show is that
in equilibrium the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, λ, is zero.
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For the sake of contradiction, suppose that λ ą 0. The interpretation of λ as a shadow cost
implies that there is a strictly positive marginal utility of relaxing the budget constraint to be
realized at phase two. From the perspectives of phase one, it means that the entrepreneur can
ask the investors for a little bit more funds in order to improve her utility at phase two. To










t (1 ´ s)R dt,
binding, the entrepreneur will have to share part of the additional utility produced at phase two
with the investors. It is possible because λ ą 0 implies that there are strictly positive gains
from relaxing the budget constraint even by a very small amount, so there is always a room
for sharing. Practically, it will result in a small reduction of the share, s˚˚, offered. Given that
the entrepreneur receives the whole surplus at phase one, she will ultimately capture the whole
increase in the surplus by directly benefiting from having a more relaxed budget constraint at
phase two and by receiving more funds at phase one.
When λ ą 0, the entrepreneur can improve her utility by asking the investors for more funds,
P , in exchange for a slightly lower share, s, for herself. Thus situation when λ ą 0 cannot be an
equilibrium, it would be a contradiction. Because of that, in equilibrium, the budget constraint
binds at phase two, but it is not restrictive and the Lagrange multiplier, λ, associated with it is
zero.
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium share, s˚˚ P (0, 1), that makes the budget con-
straint bind, but keeps the Lagrange multiplier λ equal to zero. The entrepreneur neither wants
to increase s˚˚ because it will result in a lower surplus, nor wants to decrease it because then the
budget constraint will no longer bind and so it will be optimal to increase the share.
4.3. The Solution
The equilibrium of the game in pure strategies is characterized in a series of equations. En-
trepreneur’s equilibrium strategy at phase two is
((s, P ) , A) ÞÑ (ϵ˚˚t , t ě 0) ,
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c (1 ´ α0) + cλ (s, P )
sR (1 ´ α0) + cλ (s, P )
)
= 0.
The boundary condition in this form is not easily interpretable, but the usual reasoning suffices:
there exists a belief level after reaching which it is unreasonable to continue with experiments. In
this case, this belief level accounts for the shadow costs of having to satisfy the budget constraint
and it also includes the prior belief that the project is good. Multiplier λ (s, P ) ensures that the
budget constraint is satisfied. It is positive when it binds.
The equilibrium strategy for investors at phase one of the game is simple. They accept any









t (1 ´ s)R dt ´ P ě 0,
and reject all other offers.
Finally, the Entrepreneur’s equilibrium strategy at phase one is to offer (s˚˚, P ˚˚) such that
λ (s˚˚, P ˚˚) = 0,
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The first condition means that the budget constraint will be satisfied on the boundary of being
binding, so that no extra waste happens due to shadow costs of satisfying the constraint. The
second condition guaranties that the budget constraint is satisfied and the entrepreneur asks
for exactly as much as the investors are willing to provide. The third condition shows that the
entrepreneur will ask for exactly the amount she needs to have in order to carry on with the
experiments even if the project keeps yielding no success over time.
Given that λ (s˚˚, P ˚˚) = 0, along the equilibrium path, the policy function is determined by
differential equation
r [αs˚˚R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ c] =








which together characterize the unique experimentation rate for every posterior belief level α.
4.4. Properties of the Equilibrium
The important properties of the equilibrium experimentation rate are summarized in Proposi-
tion I.2 and pictured in Figure I.4.
Proposition I.2. In dynamic crowdfunding models with convex experimentation costs, the equilib-
rium outcome satisfies:
Inefficiency : the equilibrium policy function, ϵ˚˚ (α), is everywhere below efficient policy function
ϵ˚ (α).
Wastefulness : the entrepreneur receives more funds than she is expected to spend on the project.
Some projects are not worth the risk : if α0 ď 2cR , then the project will not be funded.
42
Staticity at the top : sure projects (α = 1) are worked on with the constant rate.
The experimentation rate strictly decreases in time : the equilibrium policy function strictly in-
creases in α.
Experimenting never stops : the experimentation rate is always positive.
Proof. Most of the important steps of the proof have been described during the description of the
equilibrium path. I rely on these intermediate steps here.
Inefficiency : inefficiency is the direct result of the equilibrium policy function being lower than
the efficient policy function.
Observe that the only difference between (I.3) with the corresponding boundary condition and
(I.c) with its boundary condition is that surplusR is multiplied by s˚˚ for the equilibrium outcome.
Given that s˚˚ ă 1, s˚˚R ă R, and thus the equilibrium policy function is everywhere lower
than the efficient policy function (see Appendix I.D.2 for the effects of a change in R on the
policy function). Appendix I.D.1 establishes that if one policy function is everywhere lower than
the other policy function then it generates lower total expected revenue. Therefore, the total
Figure I.4. The Equilibrium and the Efficient Outcome
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
43
expected revenue from experimentation in equilibrium is always lower than the efficient total
expected revenue. Consequently, the total expected surplus must be lower as well.
Notice that inefficiency does not imply that equilibrium experimentation rate is always lower than
the efficient experimentation rate in time (refer to the middle picture in Figure I.4). This is due to
the fact that in equilibrium the posterior belief that the project is good evolves more slowly than
in the efficient case (rightmost picture in Figure I.4) and so at some point in time, Entrepreneur
will be more optimistic than she should be in the efficient case and thus her experimentation rate
may be higher. This indicates that experimentation rates at particular points in time may not be
very informative for a crowdfunding analyst.
Wastefulness : this is the inevitable consequence of receiving funds upfront. The entrepreneur
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and she will be free to use them any way she pleases. This transfer of extra funds is not Pareto
decreasing per se in this game, but it lowers the incentives of investors to fund the project, which
hampers the efficiency of experimentation. Unfortunately, the effect of receiving funds condi-
tional on no success may be a bad idea because it might create incentives to delay succeeding
in experiments in order to receive funds in the future. In any case, crowdfunding with upfront
payments is wasteful.
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Some projects are not worth the risk : If the prior α0 is lower than 2cR , then it is not worth for
the entrepreneur to experiment and it is not worth for the investors to fund the project.
For the project to be worked on, it must be the case that:
αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ě 0.
So it must be the case that (see proof of Proposition I.1)




For the project to be funded, it must be worth it to fund at least the very first experimenting
session:
α0ϵ0 (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ0c ě 0,
or





All the subsequent experimentation sessionswill only promise lower difference betweenmarginal
expected revenue αt (1 ´ s)R and marginal monetary costs c because αt only decreases in time.









are satisfied. The lowest α0 that ensures both these conditions apply is α0 = 2cR . Notice that this






will not be crowdfunded despite that they have the potential to generate
surplus from the perspectives of Pareto efficiency.
The other properties : the equilibrium policy function defined by (I.3) with its boundary condi-
tion is similar to the efficient policy function defined by (I.c) with the corresponding boundary
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condition. The only difference between the two is that project revenue R is multiplied by share
s˚˚ for the equilibrium policy function. It does not change the general properties of the experi-
mentation path. Refer to the proof of Proposition I.1 to see why the experimentation rate will be
static at the top, strictly decreasing in time, and why experimentation rate will stay positive until
success happens, or forever.
4.5. Efficient Crowdfunding
I established that crowdfunding models in which funding is received upfront in exchange for the
share of the surplus or other benefits conditional on the project success are inefficient. Does it
mean that all forms of crowdfunding are inefficient? I argue that some forms of crowdfunding
may be theoretically efficient. In particular, pure donation-based crowdfunding can be said to be
efficient.
Investment-based crowdfunding is inefficient in general. This is due to the fact that backers,
or investors, expect to receive benefits conditional on the project success. This is the primary
reason they fund the project, the project founder will have to share part of the surplus with the
backers. As demonstrated above, this implies that the experiments will be carried out ineffi-
ciently because the entrepreneur’s ex post incentives to experiment will be lower than in the
efficient case. Donation-based crowdfunding that promises conditional rewards is inefficient for
the same reasons: a part of the surplus will be spent to provide benefits to the backers lowering
the entrepreneur’s incentives to experiment.
If the rewards are unconditional (provided independent of the project success or failure),
however, or if the backers are willing to fund the project without expecting anything in return,
then crowdfunding can be theoretically efficient. There still may be some misallocation of funds
in practice, of course, but within the described model, such forms of crowdfunding will be effi-
cient because the entrepreneur will be the sole recipient of the surplus generated by the project.
The entrepreneur’s individual incentives to experiment will be closer to the social incentives to
maximize the total surplus.
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Additionally, allowing the backers who are willing to donate funds for the sake of develop-
ing the project without expecting anything in return is beneficial since they must receive some
utility out of just participating in the project. The same is true for the unconditional rewards-
based crowdfunding. If the investors are willing to pay for the rewards more than it costs the
entrepreneur to provide these rewards, then it is beneficial for the parties to trade regardless of
the project success.
Therefore, some forms of crowdfunding are efficient in theory. For example, most of the
projects on the GoFundMe platform belong to the pure donation-based category because they
involve individuals collecting money for personal or charitable projects without offering condi-
tional benefits. This form of crowdfunding is welfare-enhancing, but it is also prone to fraud due
to the fact that backers are not interested in the actual outcomes of the projects, they just receive
participation prizes (see Fredman, 2015). These types of crowdfunding projects have their own
set of problems despite being potentially efficient, but analyzing them is behind the scope of this
chapter as I concentrate on crowdfunding models that promise backers conditional benefits in
return for their donations.
5. Comparative Statics
It is important to understand how the parameters of the model affect the equilibrium and efficient
outcomes. It allows predicting which crowdfunding projects will be worked on more intensely
Table I.2. Model Parameters
Parameter Description
R sharable part of the surplus the project generates upon success
c marginal monetary cost of experimentation
r discount coefficient, the measure of impatience
α0 prior belief that the project is good
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Table I.3. Effects of the Parameter Changes
Change s˚˚ P ˚˚ Expected Surplus
Baseline 0.59 7.03 14.63
R Ò 0.69 8.33 23.63
c Ò 0.42 9.21 11.94
r Ò 0.60 6.76 14.33
α0 Ó 0.63 2.98 5.72
and which projects will be farther from efficiency. The main parameters of the model are de-
scribed in Table I.2. They include the total surplus the project generates upon success, R, the
marginal monetary cost of experimentation, c, the discount coefficient, r, and the prior belief
that the project is good, α0. These parameters affect the first best and the equilibrium results
through the changes in policy functions, which, in their turn, result in changes in the experi-
mentation paths, the posterior beliefs, and the total surplus produced by the interaction between
investors and the entrepreneur.
Appendix I.D.2 contains the argumentation for why certain changes in parameter values re-
sult in certain movements of the policy functions. Here, I summarize the directions of these
effects and show the results on the graphs. The effects are calculated based on a particular base-
line model, but they are illustrative for the general case as the direction of the change does not
depend (with the exception of the change in the prior beliefs that the project is good) on the
choice of the effort function or parameter values.
I assume that the effort cost function is f (x) = x2 and the initial parameter values are:
R = 20, c = 2, r = 0.05, α0 = 0.95.
Differential equations are solved numerically and graphs are created using Python scripts5.
5Source files are available upon request.
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Figure I.5. Effects of an Increase in the Project Surplus
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
The results of parameter values adjustments are summarized in Table I.3. The baseline pa-
rameters result in the total surplus of size 14.63, the investors donate a total of 7.03 monetary
units and this is exactly howmuch they expect to receive in return agreeing that the entrepreneur
keeps 59% of the surplus of 20 generated in the event of the project success. Given the high prior
of 95%, patient players (r = 0.05), and low monetary experimentation costs of 2, this project is
expected to be quite successful. The total expected surplus of 14.63 is not that far from the total
surplus of 20 the project might generate in the event of success.
First, consider an increase in the surplus the project generates upon success, R. In practice, it
means that the project will be expected to be more profitable than prior to the change. Suppose
that R increases from 20 to 30 monetary units. The effect of this change on the experimentation
rates and the posterior belief evolution is pictured in Figure I.5. An increase in R results in both
policy functions, the efficient policy function and the equilibrium function, moving upward (pic-
tured on the left hand side of the figure). Both efficient and equilibrium experimentation rates
will be higher for each belief level. Consequently, posterior beliefs will evolve faster, and thus
the posterior evolution paths shift downward (pictured on the right hand side): the parties will
become pessimistic about the project faster because the entrepreneur will devote higher effort
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Figure I.6. Effects of a Hike in Marginal Monetary Cost of Experimentation
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
to completing the project. As expected, equilibrium share s˚˚ increases: from 59% to 69%. The
amount of funds the entrepreneur requests at equilibrium rises from about 7.03 to 8.33, and the
total expected equilibrium surplus increases from 14.63 to 23.63. Overall, the experimentation
rates will get higher at early stages of the project development, but since the pessimism now set-
tles faster, after some time, the experimentation rates may become lower than before the change
(middle part of the graph).
Second, consider a hike in the marginal monetary cost of experimentation, c, from 2 to 4mon-
etary units. It means that each experimentation session will be more expensive, and increasing
experimentation rates will cost extra. The effect it causes on the efficient and equilibrium policy
functions is almost exactly the opposite of the effect of increasing R. It is pictured in Figure I.6.
The efficient policy function and the equilibrium policy function, both, move downward (pictured
on the left hand side). This results in lower experimentation rates for every belief level, which
means that parties become pessimistic about the project slower: belief evolution paths rotate up-
ward (pictured on the right hand side of the Figure). Equilibrium share s˚˚ decreases to 42% and
the amount of funds requested rises to 9.21monetary units. The total expected surplus generated
by the project drops to 11.94. Effectively, the experimentation rates decrease at early stages, but
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Figure I.7. Effects of a Raise of Discount Rates
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
given that the parties stay optimistic longer, the experimentation rates increase later in time as
compared to the situation with lower marginal monetary cost (the middle part of the graph).
Third, suppose that a discount rate changes from r = 0.05 to 0.07. It will indicate that the par-
ties will be relatively less patient, and so they will be less likely to wait for the project to succeed
in the future and will be more likely to want to exert higher effort now. The effect of this change
on the experimentation rates and beliefs is demonstrated in Figure I.7. The efficient policy func-






. Thus, after the change, Entrepreneur wants
to experiment more for higher belief levels, but this desire contracts as she gets more pessimistic.
The equilibrium policy function behaves differently: it also rotates counter-clockwise, but it also






moves to the left. These effects can be seen on the left hand side of the graph. Otherwise, the
result is similar to the effect of an increase in surplus R: the beliefs evolve faster (right hand side
of the figure), experimentation rates increase at the early stages and decrease at the later stages
as compared to the case with the more patient players. Equilibrium share s˚˚ slightly increases
to 60%. The amount of requested funds decreases to 6.76. Despite that experimentation rates
are now higher for every belief level, the total expected surplus actually declines to 14.33. Thus
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Figure I.8. Effects of a Decrease in the Prior Belief that the Project is Good
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
having lower patience causes the parties to work harder, but expect to receive less because the
success still happens in the future, and the parties are less willing to wait.
Finally, suppose that the entrepreneur and the investors are not as optimistic about the per-
spectives of the project at the beginning of the game: instead of believing the project to be good
with probability α0 = 95%, they believe it to be good with probability of only α0 = 55%. The ef-
fects of this change are demonstrated in Figure I.8. The efficient policy function does not change
because it is stationary. The equilibrium policy function only moves because the equilibrium
share changes. The direction of the change is unpredictable, but the magnitude is expected to be
small. Since the parties begin as less optimistic, the belief evolution paths and the experimen-
tation paths shift downward. Equilibrium share s˚˚ increases to 63% in this example, but given
different baseline model, it might decreases as the effect is undetermined in general. The amount
of funds requested and received drops to 2.98 and the total expected surplus declines to 5.72. The
project becomes riskier, thus the parties’ expectations about the surplus and the amount of funds
they are ready to invest in it decrease.
Therefore, higher surplus R, lower marginal monetary costs of experimentation c, higher pa-
tience, or higher optimism level will result in projects with bigger expected total surplus. Projects
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with higher surplus, lowermarginalmonetary experimentation costs, and participants with lower
patience levels will produce higher experimentation rates. It must be noted that the baseline pa-
rameters presented here are pretty favorable, and thus the project was not that far from being
efficient. Projects with lower benefits to experimentation costs ratios and project with lower
priors will result in experimentation paths which will be much farther from the efficient paths.
6. Reporting, Audit, and Efficiency
The model described so far explained why most forms of crowdfunding are inefficient. The main
cause of the inefficiency is the inability of the entrepreneur to commit ex ante to the efficient ex-
perimentation path due to low ex post incentives to experiment. After the entrepreneur receives
the funds from the investors, her remaining incentives to experiment depend only on the share
of the project that she kept for herself. Since the share is lower than one, the entrepreneur is
reluctant to exert efficient effort levels. There exists no easy contractual fixes to inefficiency in
this model.
If it were a simple one-periodmodel, it would be possible to introduce a contract with financial
hostages, for example. Financial hostages are assets of a certain value that will be given by the
entrepreneur to the investors at time t = 0 and returned to the entrepreneur only in the event of
the project success. Carefully calibrating the value of the financial hostages allows to align the
entrepreneur’s incentives to experiment with the efficient levels: the entrepreneur will be more
motivated to experiment because she will want the assets back. Unfortunately, in the dynamic
setting of the model I describe, with evolving belief levels and convex effort costs, it will require
having the assets with values that evolve over time in a predictable and deterministic way so that
the incentives are aligned with the efficient levels at each time frame, t. Not only this requires a
well-developed securities market and complex quantitative skills on behalf of the parties, but it
is also contractually incompatible with the modern crowdfunding practice. It is simply hard to
imagine that the crowdfunding project founders and hundreds of online backers will get together
to write and execute a complicated contract that involves financial hostages, let alone financial
hostages with the evolving values. A more practical way to improve incentives is to facilitate
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commitment by making unobservable expenditures partially observable by the means of audited
reporting.
I argue that ex post audited disclosure of aggregated experimentation expenditures can im-
prove efficiency. Committing to disclose the amount of money spent on experiments means that
the entrepreneur will have to hit certain milestones after she received the funds and be account-
able for not reaching themilestones. Given that the entrepreneur receives all the expected surplus
in the game, if it allows to improve the overall efficiency, it is beneficial to the entrepreneur. Thus
project founders will actually benefit from being accountable.
The entrepreneur will write a simple plan, in which she will outline how much she plans to
spend on the project between different dates in the future. Then she will commit to report these
expenditures at certain dates and make sure that the reports actually demonstrate the amounts
spent on the project. It can be done, in particular, by hiring an auditor to verify the reported
amounts and by committing to a certain crippling punishment scheme in case of violations. This
way, committing to spend the same amount as in the efficient case will be Pareto improving.
Committing to spend the efficient aggregate amounts of money on experiments is not the
only imaginable way to improve efficiency, and it is most probably not the optimal reporting
mechanism. However, it is simple and practical and it can work in the constrained contractual
environment of crowdfunding, inwhichwriting complex contracts between founders and backers
is next to impossible. There are several ways to make it work in practice. The forceful way
would be to change the legislation by forcing the crowdfunding project founders to submit regular
audited reports of the expenditures on their projects. Another way is to make the crowdfunding
portals responsible and accountable for ensuring that the funds transfered to the entrepreneurs
are only spent on the projects and not on something personal. An alternative way is to wait
for the emergence of the market mechanisms: auditors may decide to offer cost audit services
specifically tailored and priced for the needs of the crowdfunding industry.
Looking at the consequences of the JOBS Act from the perspectives that audited reporting
improves efficiency, I can conclude that in its current form JOBS Act supports the crowdfunding
industry, but it also fosters inefficiency in the market. On the one hand, reporting is costly, so
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Table I.4. Reporting Sums













. . . . . .
deregulating the industry and reducing the reporting requirements for startups may have been a
good idea as it helped finance the projects that otherwise would have been prohibitively expen-
sive. On the other hand, aiming at reducing the reporting and auditing costs and fostering the
emergence of crowdfunding audit market may have been a better idea as it would have allowed
the crowdfunding industry to emerge as more efficient and trustworthy. The actual economic
impact of the JOBS Act will only be determined as enough data is available to make the empirical
analysis possible.
6.1. Phase Two of the Game
Suppose that the reporting requirements exist, reporting is costless, time is in years, and by the
end of every year the entrepreneur released the audited reports of the total amount of funds
she had spent on experiments over the year. Then the reported amounts will be calculated as
in Table I.4. Suppose the entrepreneur commits or is required to commit to spend the efficient
amount of funds on the project in aggregate terms every year, that is, it must be the case that, for


























Requiring the entrepreneur to spend a certain amount of funds every time period is equivalent to
requiring her to reach specific levels of posterior belief αt+1 by the end of the period. If at time














































which is exactly the same level of belief she would have reached if she had conducted experiments
efficiently.
Suppose that the entrepreneur and the investors agreed on a certain share, s, and a funding
level, P . Following the logical reasoning similar to the basic equilibrium case described above,
I can state that the budget constraint must be satisfied and the multiplier associated with the
constraint must be zero. I ignore the constraint at phase two of the game. Given share s, the
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subject to α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt)
and α0, α1, α2, . . . given.
Given that certain belief levelsα1, α2, . . .must be reached by the end of each year, the problem
is separable for every audited reporting period. For each disclosure period that begins at time T1
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,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt)
and boundary conditions that are specified by the level of beliefs at the beginning of the disclosure
period, in this case, αT1 , and at the end the disclosure period, αT2 . Notice that this is the same
system that describes the time-paths of the experimentation rates and the posterior belief levels
in the basic equilibrium case. The only difference is that for the basic equilibrium case, it is
defined for the whole interval from the beginning to the end of time, with boundaries of α0 and
α8 = α =
c
s˚˚R
, and for the reporting case, it is defined separately for each reporting period.
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6.2. Phase One of the Game
At phase one, the entrepreneur asks for share s and enough funds to finance the experiments
at phase two. Everything that was derived about this phase for the basic equilibrium without
audited expenditures applies in this case: the entrepreneur will want to have share s as high as
possible until the budget constraint binds, then she will want to have the constraint as relaxed as

















α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
keeping in mind that at phase two she will have to report her aggregate expenditures every year,
the reports will have to show expenditure levels equal to the aggregate efficient expenditure
levels for the corresponding periods, and that her experimentation rate at phase two will follow
a certain path depending on the share.
The solution involves constructing the experimentation path depending on a given share and
then finding the share that satisfies the budget constraint. An example of the evolution of the
posterior belief α over time and the experimentation rate produced when the entrepreneur is
committed to experiment at efficient aggregate levels as measured by an auditor cumulatively
at the end of each reporting period is shown in Figure I.9. It clearly shows that committing to
reach certain efficiency belief levels at equally displaced intervals is efficiency-promoting as the
entrepreneur who is most interested in experimenting at the efficient rate is actually required
to reach certain posterior belief milestones. Notice, however, that the graphs reveal rushing na-
ture of work under strict deadline requirements. At the beginning of the reporting period, the
entrepreneur starts at a rate lower than the efficient rate. However, by the end of the reporting
period she reaches the rates that are higher than the efficient rates. This is because at the be-
ginning of the period the chances that success happens before the end of the reporting period
are relatively high: the entrepreneur can slack off. By the end of the period, the entrepreneur
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needs to experiment more to compensate for the lack of experimentation effort at the beginning
to satisfy the reporting targets. Another reason for this is cost optimization: shifting costs to later
periods reduces the total experimentation costs. However, it is clear that reporting more often is
better than reporting less frequently, and that reporting does not solve the inefficiency problem
completely in this crowdfunding model with convex effort costs.
Under some circumstances, optimal share in the audited reporting case can become negative.
This will most likely be true for cases with low prior belief that the project is good, low surplus
R, and high marginal monetary costs c. This is due to the situation in which total requested
funding is higher than the expected total revenue the project generates. It will never be possible
in the basic equilibrium cases because shares lower than zero mean no ex post incentives to
experiment. In the audited reporting case, however, the entrepreneur will still have to experiment
because she will have to report the total expenditures on the project every period. Technically,
a negative share means that the investors will provide credit to the entrepreneur, and when the
project succeeds theywill receive the whole surplus produced by the project plus some funds they
provided to the entrepreneur back. The entrepreneurwill not receive any benefits from the project
itself, but since she will get more funds upfront than the project is expected to ever generate, she
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will be better off when the project succeeds as she will still keep some of the remaining funds for
herself.
The main findings of studying the audited reporting case in crowdfunding can be summed up
in Proposition I.3:
Proposition I.3. If the entrepreneur’s effort costs are convex, reporting is costless, the entrepreneur
is required to truthfully disclose her audited aggregate project expenditures periodically, and she
is committed to efficient levels of aggregate expenditures by the end of each reporting period, then
reporting is Pareto improving but still inefficient.
Proof. The main portions of the proof are located in Appendix I.E. The intuition is simple.
The audited reporting is still inefficient because the experimentation paths produced by solv-
ing the maximization problem for the periodic audited reporting and the first best cases can only
coincide if the share offered in the reporting case is equal to one. This is impossible as then the
investors will not receive anything when the project succeeds and so they will not be willing to
finance the project.
The audited reporting is Pareto improving when the costs of reporting are ignored because
then the maximization problem the entrepreneur solves at phase one involves constraints on
belief levels that coincide with the first best levels. In this sense, the constraints are more relaxed
than the deterministic belief level constraints of the basic equilibrium case, and so the maximized
value function is higher.
6.3. Reporting and Audit Costs
Costless periodic reporting improves efficiency, but what if there are costs involved? It is obvi-
ous that in realistic situations there must be some positive costs associated with the audit and
reporting. However, the role of the costs is simple: as long as the costs of reporting are lower
than the efficiency gains from reporting, the entrepreneur is better off committing to the aggre-
gate efficient levels of experimentation and to credible reporting of these levels. I show that the
reporting costs do not affect the experimentation paths directly when the reporting periods and
targets are set.
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Suppose that, like in the situation described above, time is in years, audit happens at the end
of each year, and the entrepreneur commits to report the aggregate experimentation levels equal
to the efficient levels. Suppose that the costs associated with the preparation and audit of a single
yearly report are K . Then the total costs of audited reporting are
e´rM1K + e
´r2M2K + e
´r3M3K + . . . .
The costs are multiplied by e´rtMt, t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., because it is possible that the project succeeds

















+ . . .
]







where α˚t is the belief level that is reached at time t when the efficient experimentation path
is followed. I established above that committing to reach certain aggregate experimentation or
expenditure levels that equal to the aggregate levels of the efficient rates over the same period of
time is equivalent to committing to reach the efficient levels of beliefs at the ends of the reporting
periods. Therefore, the reporting costs are not affected by the experimentation rates, as α˚t is
fixed for all t = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The expected audited reporting costs are treated as fixed.
It means that the entrepreneur can simply determine the gains from audited reporting ignor-
ing the costs and then compare the gains to the costs calculated above. If it is worth it, then
she should go with the audited reporting, if not—stick with the basic equilibrium. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to determine the optimal reporting schedule that allows to maximize
the gains from reporting given the reporting costs, K , but this problem can be easily solved by
considering different lengths of the reporting period and picking the best reporting scheme.
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7. Conclusions
Crowdfunding is a new Internet-enabled way to fund startups. Recent changes in the regulatory
requirements, in particular, the JOBS act, provided the legal grounds for equity crowdfunding
while significantly deregulating the market and reducing the disclosure requirements. I show
that the forms of crowdfunding based on the conditional rewards are inefficient and wasteful. I
also demonstrate that imposing regular strict disclosure requirements can be Pareto improving.
Therefore, lifting the disclosure requirements is expected to be harmful to the industry per se.
However, due to possible high costs of reporting and audit, it may be beneficial to facilitate the
development of specific auditing products that are affordable to project founders and satisfy the
needs of crowdfunding industry.
I develop amodel of interaction between the entrepreneur and investors in crowdfunding. The
model includes convex effort costs and savings. I show that crowdfundingwith conditional share-
based rewards is inefficient. Even if the entrepreneur has full bargaining power and is willing to
maximize the ex ante total surplus, the impossibility to commit to experimenting at an efficient
rate ex post undermines all the efforts to achieve efficiency. The main reasons for inefficiency
are liquidity constraints: the entrepreneur needs to receive money from the external sources
upfront; the need to compensate the investors by offering them a share in the project surplus,
which directly affects the ex post incentives; the riskiness of the project and the unobservability
of the entrepreneur’s actions. I show that in equilibrium experimentation rates decrease in time
and that the equilibrium policy function is everywhere below the efficient policy function.
I show that deregulation of investment industry and loose reporting requirements can jeopar-
dize the effort of the entrepreneurs to achieve efficiency. In fact, entrepreneurs may benefit from
stricter regulation and reporting requirements as they will be able to use mandatory reporting
as a commitment device and improve the ex post experimentation rates. This result will largely
depend on the costs of reporting and auditing. If the auditors can come up with specific products
tailored to the needs of the crowdfunding industry provided at reasonable price, then it will be
the best outcome that does not involve regulatory intervention.
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I reveal that the entrepreneur’s will ask for enough funds from the investors to continue ex-
perimenting even if the project yields no success. In the event of the success, the entrepreneur
will keep the remaining funds for her personal consumption. The sum the entrepreneur receives
from the backers is higher than she actually expects to spend on the project, because the project
might succeed at some point in time. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is expected that some of the
funds will be spent on the entrepreneur’s personal consumption, which is a waste from the per-
spectives of efficiency.
I reveal that the entrepreneur experiments with the decreasing rates over time if she keeps
seeing no success. Experimentation never stops if the project keeps yielding no success, but
eventually decreases to being negligible. In the equilibrium, the entrepreneur begins with lower
experimentation rates than she should to achieve efficiency. It means that she learns about the
project at a slower rate and stays optimistic about the project longer.
I reveal some comparative statics properties. The experimentation rates improve in the sur-
plus size of the project and in the level of impatience, and decrease in the marginal monetary
costs of experiments. It means that, as it is expected, the projects with higher expected returns
or lower costs will be worked on with greater enthusiasm. The role of impatience, represented
by the discount coefficient is also clear: more impatient players will not be willing to wait long
until the event of success, their current experimentation rates will be higher.
There are some aspects of the model that might reveal more about crowdfunding in the fu-
ture. It will be interesting to study how entrepreneurs can attract more funds by the means of
marketing, and how projects are funded if the funding goals are not satisfied or surpassed. Fu-
ture research directions also include models with unobserved private valuations of the parties,
and analyzing optimal procurement problems with shadow costs of regulation.
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Chapter II
Funding Experimentation by Angel Investors
1. Introduction
The successful funding of startup firms is crucial to the dynamism and health of the economy.
Angels investors play important roles in the success of startup firms by providing funding at
the early stages of startup formation. Angel investors are wealthy individuals who meet the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission definition of an accredited investor: they must have
an individual net worth excluding the primary residence higher than $1 million, or they must
have a stable income of more than $200,000 a year ($300,000 for married couples). They finance
startups on their own or in groups. Angels provide funds to startups at early stages filling the gap
between funding by friends and family and funding by venture capitalists. Employing the theory
of dynamic experimentation, I recover the best contract that the entrepreneur can agree on with
an angel investor when the entrepreneur has a unique project and has a power to make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the investor. I show that the optimal contract involves funding unconditional
on the project success or failure and dynamic shares. I compare experimenting paths and funding
outcomes under the optimal contract with the results of signing two other contracts: the contract
that involves conditional payments and the contract that is renegotiated every time period.
1.1. Stages of the Startup Development
The process of creating of a new product can be separated into three main stages shown in Ta-
ble II.1. At each stage, key goals of the startup founders and the dominant funding sources are
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Table II.1. Stages of the Startup Formation
different. The focus of this chapter is on the “validation” stage of the startup, in particular, on the
phase where the startup is funded by the individual investors.
At the very beginning, a startup is nothing but an idea of a product, an idea which exists only
in the imagination of the startup founder. As the idea matures, becomes less abstract and more
concrete, the founder begins to incur costs associated with making the idea into something real.
Self-funding and funding by friends and family are the main sources of capital for the fledgling
startup at this stage. The uncertainty is high, and the funds are often provided just as a sign of
support, without expectations of any significant return.
After experimenting with the idea for some time and working on the project seriously, the
startup founder eventually reaches the stage when she needs to develop a “minimum viable
product,”—a scaled-down version of the potential product that retains only the most important
aspects of the original idea—to prove to herself and to the future investors that the project is
potentially feasible. Usually, at this stage, it is still too early for the venture capitalists to en-
ter since they need to be sure that the idea is definitely working before they invest. At the same
time, at this point, the possibilities to raise additional capital from friends and family are typically
exhausted. This is the time when angel investors come into play.
Attracted by the possibility of high gains (seeking to return about ten times the invested capi-
tal in five years), angel investors typically invest between $25,000 and $100,000 individually into
the project in exchange for equity. Some angels unite in a pool to fund the project together. The
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risks associated with this stage of investment are high and originate in technical and marketing
spheres: the product may be hard or expensive to create, or the consumers may be reluctant to
buy it in large numbers. Angel investors tend to perform some background checks of the project,
but the investigation is usually not thorough. In some cases, angel investors participate in the
startups as board members or even employees, but usually they are only interested in the success
of the business and not in the control of the firm.
The last stage of the startup formation is scaling. The product, or the prototype, exists and it
is marketable. The startup begins to receive revenue, it has customers, and it is ready to expand.
At this stage, venture capitalists tend to be the main source of funding for the startups, as angel
investors are no longer able to satisfy the growing needs for capital. Venture capitalists invest
on the magnitude of millions, investigate startup documents comprehensively, and the level of
control is typically high. They can make hiring and firing decisions, and in some cases may
even decide to get rid of the original founder of the startup firm. The risks are lower than at the
previous stages, but still exist, as the project may or may not be scalable.
The attention of this chapter is concentrated around the “validation” stage of the startup for-
mation and around the entrepreneur’s incentives to conduct experiments. Being funded by the
individual investors with scant oversight and control affects the incentives of the experimenting
entrepreneurs with convex effort costs, an ability to reallocate funds in time, and an opportunity
to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the investors. The main question of this chapter is what is the
best feasible contract that maximizes the incentives for the entrepreneurs to experiment. There
exist several problems that must be solved to address this question.
First, there must be constructed a model of interaction between the entrepreneur and indi-
vidual investors that captures the important properties of such an interaction in the economy.
Second, it is important to know how the efficient interaction between the entrepreneur and in-
vestors unravels in time, and what makes it efficient. Third, it must be understood what the best
contract is and how it is different from the efficiency and other possible contracts.
The solutions to these problems provide the grounds for the main results of this chapter.
66
1.2. Main Results
The first contribution of this chapter is in solving the dynamic experimentation model from the
perspectives of time zero. I uncover the best possible contract that the entrepreneur and the
angel investors can sign in the case of developed credit markets and convex experimentation
costs. This contract provides a benchmark for the other possible contracts that can be signed in a
more realistic environment: a contract with conditional funding, and the constantly renegotiated
contract.
The second contribution is in showing that conditional payments are detrimental to the ef-
ficiency and should be avoided as they create the incentives to delay experimentation in the
unobservable effort environments. The practical recommendation here is that projects should
be funded upfront or unconditionally over time, such that the entrepreneur does not have addi-
tional incentives to delay experimentation. In practice, this is how angel investors actually fund
the startups: they just buy shares in the project and wait until it succeeds or fails.
I demonstrate that even in the best possible scenario, the entrepreneur with convex effort
costs, ability to reallocate funds in time, and full bargaining power has insufficient incentives to
finance the project efficiently when funded by individual investors. Despite having full bargain-
ing power ex ante, the entrepreneur is unable to commit to the efficient experimentation path ex
post as her actions are unobservable, the project is risky, and she must share the future surplus
of the project with the investors. The need to share the portion of the surplus in order to obtain
funding decreases the incentives to conduct experiments efficiently ex post. The riskiness and
unobservability of the actions make it impossible to solve the problem using contracts alone.
Finally, I show that if the project results in private externalities for the investor of the en-
trepreneur, then these externalities will be completely internalized in the contract. It means that
what matters for the contract is the total social surplus generated by the project, not the private
valuations of the project outcomes per se.
1.3. Related Literature
The model produced in this chapter is a model of dynamic experimentation. It describes the
process of R&D as a sequence of experiments that may or may not succeed over time. Themodels
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of dynamic experimentation help capturing the dynamic nature of the moral hazard problem in
the area of entrepreneurship and research. Dynamic experimentation models became popular at
the beginning of the the century and are well known within the field of economic theory.
In this chapter, I construct an extension to the model by Bergemann and Hege (2005). I keep
its main properties while adding more. First, instead of the linear effort costs used in the original
model, I use convex effort cost. Second, I add an intertemporal budget constraint to the model as
opposed to the static budget constraint of the original. Third, I allow the entrepreneur and the
investors to have individual valuations of the surplus the project might generate. Finally, I solve
the model fully in continuous time from the perspectives of the moment the contract is signed,
not in discrete time, and not using Markov equilibrium. The main differences in the results arise
from having these additional properties.
Using convex effort costs allowed me to smoothen the experimentation paths and unsure
that the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint always binds. In Bergemann and Hege (1998), the
incentive constraint may or may not bind, creating the wide variety of paths, with kinks and
jumps, depending on the parameters of themodel. In mymodel, the entrepreneur has an ability to
relocate funds over time. It means that instead of satisfying the budget constraint every instance
of time, the entrepreneur just needs to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint when the
contract is signed. These properties allow the entrepreneur to write a contract that offers much
more flexible incentives to experiment resulting in smooth continuous experimentation paths.
Themain focus of Bergemann and Hege (1998) is on the Markov sequential equilibrium, while
I concentrate on the Sequential equilibrium constructed from the perspectives of time zero. There
are difficulties with long-term contracts in the environments without convex costs that stem from
the fact that projects get abandoned in finite time. This is why some equilibria become tricky to
sustain. In my model, the experimentation never stops until success happens, so there are no
problems with commitment to the terms of the contract. I include the discussion of renegotiable
contracts in the analysis to demonstrate the differences in the contractual outcomes between the
optimal contract described in this chapter and the renegotiable contract.
I already discussed the important examples of the dynamic experimentation and convex costs
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literature in the previous chapter. In addition to these, I need to mention Heidhues et al. (2015),
who model individual valuations in bandit models. The model in their paper is significantly
different from my model, however, as it aims to develop a different branch of bandit literature—
experimentation in teams.
1.4. Structure of the Chapter
I characterize themodel of funding by angel investors. After that, I describe the first best scenario,
when the social planner decides how to fund the project. Then, I explain how the equilibrium is
different from the efficient solution, after which I conclude.
2. The Model
This model is a further development of the models of dynamic experimentation.
2.1. Players
Two players interact in this game: the entrepreneur and the angel investor.
The entrepreneur : the entrepreneur is risk neutral. She has a promising project and seeks funds
to finance it. The entrepreneur does not have funds of her own to spend on the venture. She holds
all the bargaining power to make a financing offer to the investor in this game. This is due to the
assumption that there are many identical individual investors who are eager to participate in the
project. The entrepreneur is solely responsible for conducting experiments after the contract with
the angel investor is signed. Everything the entrepreneur will do to make the project a success
will not be observed by the investor.
The angel investor : the investor is risk neutral. He is a wealthy individual and has enough
funds to finance the project in exchange for the share of the returns. The investor can either
accept or reject the offer proposed by the entrepreneur. Otherwise, the investor’s role is rather
passive. He just provides funds to the entrepreneur and hopes to receive good news regarding
the project success (and his share of the surplus) some day in the future.
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2.2. Actions
The flow of the game is presented in Figure II.1. Time is continuous and infinite. Before the game
begins, Nature (N ) determines if the project is good or bad. This move is unobservable to the
other players, and even the social planner cannot know if the project is good or bad. However,
there is a common belief that the project must be good, α0, the prior probability. After it has been
determined by Nature if the project is good or bad, the first phase of the game begins. At phase
one, the parties design and sign a funding contract.
To understand the logic of the first phase, I need to explain what happens at phase two of the
game because the terms of the contract that can be designed at phase one depend on the outcome
of the second phase of the game. At phase two, only the entrepreneur can take actions. Based
on the terms of the contract, the prior belief that the project is good, and other parameters of the
model, she produces the optimal experimentation (or effort) path (ϵt, t ě 0). The experimentation
path and its elements cannot be observed by the investor or any third party.
If the project is good, then it can succeed every period for which the experimentation rate
is non-negative. This is indicated as another move by Nature in Figure II.1. This move happens
every period t, right after the entrepreneur exerts effort ϵt, based on the intensity of it. The
higher the experimentation rate, the higher the arrival rate of success. If the project succeeds, it
generates a surplus. Since all the possibility to benefit from working on the project is exhausted
Figure II.1. Game Scheme
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the moment it succeeds there is no need to continue experiments after that. Therefore, the game
ends with the project success.
At phase one of the game, the entrepreneur (E), who has a project but does not have funds
to finance it, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the angel investor (I). The set of the offers the
entrepreneur can propose to the investor can be rich. However, due to the unobservability of the
entrepreneur’s actions, there only two types of contingency possible in this model: contingency
on time and contingency on the project success. Also, the entrepreneur’s actions cannot be a part
of the contract: the entrepreneur can pick them on a whim, without any consequences. Hence,
within the game setup, the only terms that can be included in the contract are transfers that can
depend on time and success of the project.
Contingency on success is simple: since success happens only once, and the game ends after
the project succeeds, then it is enough to define transfers for every t conditional on success
happening at t. Another component of the contract is the stream of transfers that happen before
the project succeeds. Suppose that the stream of contingent transfers from the entrepreneur to
the investor is a mapping
(t,X) ÞÑ z (t,X) ,
where t is time and X is a variable that takes the value of the time the project succeeds after it











´γtc, if X = t,
(1 ´ st)R, if X ă t,
0, if X ą t.
The transfers look the way they do for the reasons described below. For now, they can be treated
as just numbers. Without loss of generality, the contract the entrepreneur proposes contains
these components:
1. A description of the project, which in this model is just α0, the probability that the project
is good.
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2. The stream of payments the entrepreneur receives from the investor before the project
succeeds (γt, t ě 0). The implicature is that the funds will be used by the entrepreneur to
conduct the experiments.
3. The description of the transfer that the entrepreneur promises to the investor upon success,
(1 ´ st)R, defined for every time t.
Notice that the only components that depend on time are γt and st, everything else is fixed and
known. Therefore, it is enough to just describe these components in the contract. This contract is
a take-it-or-leave-it offer that the entrepreneur makes to an angel investor. It the offer is rejected,
the game endswith zero payoffs for both players. This is an indication of the full bargaining power
of the entrepreneur in this model. It is certainly a limiting assumption, but it can be justified by
assuming that the entrepreneur faces many potential angel investors. Another explanation is the
fact that angel investors typically do not receive a large share in the business and usually do not
participate in everyday startup operations. This is also a very pragmatic assumption. It allows me
to demonstrate that even if the entrepreneur has full bargaining power, the interaction between
the parties is still not efficient.
Thus the entrepreneur’s pure strategies are
Phase 1: Z = ((γt, st) , t ě 0)
Phase 2: (Z,A) ÞÑ (ϵt, t ě 0) ,
whereA P ta, ru is the angel investor’s acceptance or rejection of the offer. There is no history in
phase one of the game, the entrepreneur can select any offer Z . In phase two, the history consists
of the offer and of the investor’s acceptance or rejection of the offer.
The angel investor’s pure strategy is simple:
Phase 1: Z ÞÑ A.
The history for the investors consists only of the entrepreneur’s offer Z .
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2.3. Information
There are two components of the information asymmetry in this game:
Information regarding the project : neither the entrepreneur, nor the investor know if the project
is good or bad.
Information about the entrepreneur’s actions : only the entrepreneur knows her level of ex-
perimentation and how much she spends on the project each time period t. This information is
unobservable to the angel investor.
Given that the project is uncertain, both parties have beliefs that the project is good. At t = 0,
both parties believe that the project is good with probability α0. In the current formulation of the
game, this is sufficient. However, it is convenient to define the posterior belief that the project is
good as well.
The posterior belief that the project is good evolves over time according to the Bayes’ Rule.
Probability that no success is reached by time t is given by









but has been failing
,
where ϵt is the intensity, or rate, of experimentation at time t. Notice that if α0 = 1 and ϵt = λ
for every t, then
P (no success by time t) = e´
şt
0 λ dτ = e´λt = 1 ´ Fexp (t) ,
where Fexp (t) is the cumulative distribution function of the exponential distribution. Therefore,
the distribution of the arrival time of success in this game resembles exponential distribution
with varying rates of arrival and possibly positive mass at infinity (when α0 ă 1).
Take, for example, two moments in time, t and t1 ą t. Then the probability that the project
succeeds in-between times t and t1 is



















Suppose that ϵτ = 0 for every τ P [t, t1]. Then the probability that the project succeeds between
time t and time t1 will be zero. Now, suppose that the entrepreneur increases experimentation
rates every period and tries really hard to succeed, so hard that
şt1
t
ϵτ dτ Ñ 8. Then the proba-
bility that success happens between t and t1 approaches α0e´
şt
0 ϵτ dτ . It shows that the probability
to produce success at any given interval of time positively depends on the experimentation rates
exerted during this time.
Equivalently (see Appendix A), the probability of reaching no success by time t can be ex-
pressed as
P (no success by time t) = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ ,
where αt is the posterior probability that the project is good at time t, conditional on no success
reached by t. It is calculated according to the Bayes’ Rule:
αt ” P (project is good | no success by time t) =
project is good,











no success by time t
,
and it evolves over time according to the expression:
α̇t ”
dαt
dt = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) .
The entrepreneur observes her experimentation rates ϵt perfectly, so she knows αt at any
point in time. The angel investor does not observe ϵt ever. He can only expect the entrepreneur
to experiment at certain rates and best respond to what they believe the experimentation rates
will be when they agree or disagree to the funding offer.
2.4. Payoffs
The players’ expected payoffs will depend on the offer made, Z , its acceptance or rejection in
phase one,A P ta, ru, and on the experimentation rates exerted by the entrepreneur in phase two
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of the game, (ϵt, t ě 0). Another component of the payoff function is the players’ belief that the
project is good, α0. When the offer is rejected, then both parties get nothing:
πE (Z, r, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = πI (Z, r, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = 0,
where πE (¨) is the entrepreneur’s payoff function, and πI (¨) is the investor’s payoff function. If
the other is accepted the payoffs require more attention.
Conducting experiments at rate ϵt at time t will cost the entrepreneur ϵtc in monetary costs
and f (ϵt) in effort costs. Parameter c is the marginal monetary cost of experimentation. Function
f (¨) is strictly convex and increasing. It indicates that the higher the experimentation rate the
more taxing it is for the entrepreneur to conduct experiments. The properties of function f (¨)
are as follows:
f (0) = 0, f (x) ą 0 for x ą 0,
f 1 (0) = 0, f 1 (x) ą 0 for x ą 0,
f2 (x) ą 0, f3 (x) ě 0.
The entrepreneur’s total cost of conducting experiments at rate ϵt at time t is just a sum of the
two cost components:
ϵtc+ f (ϵt) .
These costs are incurred every time period t until the projects succeeds. It is worth reiterating
that the investor does not observe neither the entrepreneur’s expenses, not the resulting experi-
mentation rates.
If the experiments are conducted at a continuous positive rate and the project is good, it may
eventually succeed at some random time T and produce the surplus. In this model, the surplus
consists of three components:
1. R, the sharable component: this part can be shared between the parties.
2. E, the entrepreneur’s individual component: this part is realized in full by the entrepreneur,
it cannot be shared with the investor.
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3. I , the investor’s individual component of the surplus: this component is realized privately
by the angel investor, it cannot be shared with the entrepreneur.
Thus when the project succeeds, the entrepreneur immediately gains E due to the project’s suc-
cess, the investor gets I , and the entrepreneur receives R, which she can share with the investor.
The event of success is public and it is impossible to hide the fact that the project had succeeded.
This interpretation allows the parties to have private valuations of the project success. If the
project is bad, time T = 8: the surplus will never be produced.
In practice, private valuations can be treated as externalities. It implies that the parties receive
some indirect benefits from the sole fact of the project success, the benefits not associated with
the sharable surplus it produces. For example, the investor may believe that the project is good
for the environment, or that it helps building the community. The investor may care about these
causes and value these effects at I ą 0. When the project succeeds, the investor benefits even
if she had not signed the contract with the entrepreneur. An example of the negative private
valuation may be the case when the entrepreneur believes that the project will produce negative
reputation effects valued at E ă 0. These effects are associated with the fact of the project
success, not with the share of the surplus the entrepreneur receives.
As per terms of the contract, the angel investor supplies the entrepreneur with the transfers,
γtc, every period t until the project succeeds. These transfers are observable and verifiable by a
third party, which means that if the investor signed the contract, he will want to adhere to its
terms. Otherwise, he would risk a crippling fine, which he wants to avoid at all costs.
Future benefits and costs are discounted at rate r1, and the rate is common for the parties. The
entrepreneur has an opportunity to save and borrow funds against the future expected stream of
payments at rate r, which is the same as the common discount rate. Thus the entrepreneur can
freely reallocate funds between different periods of time without any utility effects. For example,




= x ´ x = 0.
1Not to be confused with the rejection of the offer indicator, r.
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These are all the important components that affect the payoff functions.
The entrepreneur’s expected payoff at time t = 0 conditional on the offer acceptance is
πE (Z, a, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = E
[
e´rT (sTR + E) ´
ż T
0
e´rt (f (ϵt) + ϵtc ´ γtc) dt
]
,




e´rT (sTR + E)
]
.
It indicates that if success happens at time T , then the entrepreneur receives private surplus E
and share sT of the sharable surplus, R, as per the contract with the investor. This future benefit





e´rt (f (ϵt) + ϵtc ´ γtc) dt
]
.
It includes costs of effort exerted every period, f (ϵt), and monetary costs of experimentation ϵtc
minus the part that is covered by the transfers from the investor, γtc. The costs are discounted at
rate r and accumulated up to the moment of success, T .
The angel investor’s payoff is
πI (Z, a, (ϵt, t ě 0)) = E
[






Similarly to the entrepreneur’s payoff, there are expected benefits, which contain private surplus
I and the investor’s share of R, (1 ´ sT )R, and expected costs.
Equivalently (see Appendix B), the expected payoffs of the parties at the beginning of the
game, given the contract,Z , its acceptance, and experimentation path (ϵt, t ě 0), can be expressed
as





0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc] dt,





0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵt [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt.
This form of payoffs is computationally and algebraically convenient and despite being less in-
tuitive, it is still tractable. The expression inside the square brackets is the interim payoff. The
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first term inside the square brackets is multiplied by αtϵt, it means that there is uncertainty if
the success will be reached. The other terms inside the brackets are certain within time t and
reflect interim costs. The brackets are multiplied by the discount factor, e´rt, and by the factor
that reflects the fact that certain periods may not be reached because the project may succeed
prior to that, e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
2.5. The Economics of the Budget Constraint
The whole reason why the interaction between the entrepreneur and the angel investor happens
is because the entrepreneur does not have enough own funds to conduct the experiments. The
investor provides the funds to the entrepreneur according to the contract each period t at rate














It means that the expected sum of funds the entrepreneur receives must be higher than the ex-
pected sum she spends. The interpretation is easy, but the economics behind it require some
explanation.
In the simplest case, the entrepreneur would spend each time t, before the experiment suc-
ceeded, exactly the amount she is given. In this case, γt = ϵt for every t ď T , and the constraint
is trivially satisfied. When the credit market is developed and competitive, it may be possible for
the entrepreneur to have a less trivial budget constraint. It could be possible to reallocate funds
between the time periods by borrowing and saving.
An example of how I see this is practice is the following story. Prior to signing the contract
with the investor, no bank would lend money to the entrepreneur because the only thing the
entrepreneur has is a project, which is too risky for the credit institutions. However, when the
contract between the entrepreneur and the investor is signed, the situation changes. Given that
the investor promised to fund the project at rate γt until the project succeeds, a competitive credit
institution would now perceive the entrepreneur as creditworthy and would allow her to open a
credit line to borrow and save against this stream of future payments at the market rate, r.
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If at time t,
ϵtc ą γtc,
then the entrepreneur borrows from the bank. If
γtc ě ϵtc,
then she repays the loan or makes a deposit to finance the future expenses. Then the present





e´rt (γtc ´ ϵtc) dt
]
.
If it is greater than zero then the credit institution believes that the entrepreneur will be able to
repay the loan. If it is less than zero, then the bank will not expect to receive the loans back.
Assuming the existence of the competitive credit market implies that this expression should be
positive. It will act as the main budget constraint of the entrepreneur at phase one of the game.
2.6. Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. The prior that the project
is good, α0 is shared by the parties along the equilibrium path and off the equilibrium path. The
game can be said to be a game of imperfect information, where Nature moves first and determines
if the project is good or bad. This move is unobserved by the entrepreneur and the angel investor.
Nature always selects the project as “good” with probability α0 and “bad” with probability 1´α0.
The game is solved using backward induction. At phase two, when the offer is accepted, the
entrepreneur determines optimal sequence of experimentation rates, (ϵt, t ě 0) believing that the
project is good with probability α0. The shares and the funding schedules are fixed in the contract
at this point and are treated as parameters. At phase one, the investor expects the entrepreneur
to behave rationally in the future and produce a certain funding path based on the terms of the
contract. The investor observes the contract and decides if he wants to accept or reject it based
on his belief α0 and his expected payoff in case of acceptance. Finally, knowing which offers
the investors will accept or reject, and which experimentation path she will take in case of the
acceptance, the entrepreneur tries to make the best take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor.
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3. The First Best
3.1. Problem Statement
I look at the first best scenario from the perspectives of the social planner. The fundamental
uncertainty in this model is the uncertainty about the project. Nobody in this game, including the
social planner, has an opportunity to know if the project is good or bad. If it was not the case and
the social planner knew, somehow, the quality of the project, then the first best solution would be
trivial and not very useful. If the project is known to be bad, then there is no reason to experiment;
if the project is definitely good, then it must be worked on at a constant experimentation rate until
it succeeds. This is not a very practical benchmark.
The utility functions are transferable in the game, thus the social planner can easily com-
bine the payoff functions to produce the social expected payoff by adding the payoffs of the
entrepreneur and the investor together:


















0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵt (R + E + I) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt.
Notice that all the terms of the contract, Z , that is, the funding path, (γt, t ě 0), and the share
path, (st, t ě 0), disappear from the payoff function. From the perspectives of the social planner,
the terms of the contract are irrelevant. The only thing that matters for efficiency from the social
planner’s perspective is the experimentation path, (ϵt, t ě 0). If the social planner can make the
players follow the efficient experimentation path, then it does not matter what contract theywrite
as long as it induces the experimentation path that maximizes the combined social payoff.
To write the social planner payoff maximization problem in the form of a dynamic control
problem, I need to define one extra state variable (that will be shown to be redundant), the prob-
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ability that success will happen after time t,
Mt = P (T ą t) = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
Another state variable is the posterior probability that the project is still good at time t, αt, defined
as










The trajectories of the state variables are characterized by the equations of motion:
α̇t ”
dαt




Both equations of motion do not depend specifically on time t, so they are both autonomous.






e´trMt [αtϵt (R + E + I) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
(II.1)
3.2. The Solution
The solution to the social planner’s problem exists (see Appendix II.B.1), it is unique, and it can be
expressed in terms of a policy function, ϵ˚ (α), which solves the first order differential equation,
r
[
αR̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c
]









R̄ ” R + E + I .
The boundary condition ensures that the solution is unique, but it has an economic interpre-
tation as well. Since α is the belief that the project is good, then c
R̄
= α is the lower bound on
the belief level. If α ď α, then it is unreasonable to experiment. The interim payoff,
αϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ď 0
for any α ă c
R̄
and positive ϵ. It means that the belief in the project is so low that it does not
worth the effort. Given that the posterior belief can only decrease in time, if it does not worth it
to experiment now, it will never be.
To fully characterize the efficient solution path, I need the efficient policy function, ϵ˚ (α);
the original belief level, α0; and the law of motion for αt,
α̇t = ´αtϵ
˚ (αt) (1 ´ αt) .
Using these three components, I can produce the efficient experimentation paths, ϵ˚t .
3.3. Properties of the Efficient Solution
The efficient experimentation path is the benchmark experimentation path. If the entrepreneur
could follow it, then the social surplus would be maximized. This is the desirable outcome from
the perspectives of the social planner. As such, it is important to understand some of the main
properties of the efficient experimentation path.
The main properties of the efficient experimentation path are summarized in Proposition II.1
and pictured in Figure II.2.
Proposition II.1. The efficient experimentation path in dynamic experimentation models with con-
vex experimentation costs and funding by angel investors satisfies:
Some projects are not worth the risk : if α0 ď cR̄ , then the project is better left alone.
Staticity at the top : the experimentation rate for sure projects (α = 1) is stationary.
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Figure II.2. The Efficient Solution
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
Experimentation rate strictly decreases in time : the efficient policy function strictly increases in
α.
Experimenting never stops : experiments only stop if success happens, otherwise, experimentation
rate is always positive.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix II.B.2. I provide intuition for it here:
Some projects are not worth the risk : some projects are so bad that it is unreasonable to spend
any effort on them. Suppose that a project with α0 ď cR̄ were worked on with positive exper-
imentation rate. If the prior that the project is good, α0, is lower than cR̄ , then the posterior αt
will only decrease over time, it never goes up. Thus for every time period t, if ϵt ě 0, the interim
payoff from experimenting,
αtϵtR̄ ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ď
c
R̄
ϵtR̄ ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc = ´f (ϵt) ď 0.





0 ατ ϵτ dτ
[




so there is no point in trying to make the project with α0 ď cR̄ a success. Therefore, it must be
the case that for α ď c
R̄
, ϵ˚ (α) = 0.
Staticity at the top : for sure projects, with prior α0 = 1 ą cR̄ , posterior αt stays fixed no matter
what: αt = α0 = 1: if you are certain that the project is good, then no matter how many times




R̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ´ c
]
= f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ϵ˚ (1) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) .
This is no longer a differential equation, but just a simple ordinary equation that can be solved for
ϵ˚ (1), which is just a number. It stays strictly positive, finite, and constant for every time period.
Therefore, for sure projects the experimentation rate is static.






, experimentation rate increases
in α. Posterior belief αt strictly decreases over time given no success, so the efficient experimen-
tation rate, ϵ˚ (α), decreases in time.
The proof is by contradiction:
• the efficient experimentation rate is continuously differentiable;





= 0 and ϵ˚ (1) ą 1, provided that c
R̄
ă 1;






, refer to Figure II.2;






, then there must be at least one local maximum in this
interval;







• this is a contradiction to function ϵ˚ (α) decreasing on the given interval;







The efficient experimentation rate increases in the posterior belief level, α, and, consequently,
decreases in time.
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, the efficient policy func-
tion, ϵ˚ (α), is strictly increasing and is everywhere below critical function ϵ̄ (α) fromAppendix C.
The critical function is constructed in such a fashion to ensure that if it is followed, then the ex-
periments stop in finite time. Any function that is strictly below the critical function, but strictly






does not provide enough experimentation effort to stop in finite time.
Therefore, as the efficient policy function is everywhere below the critical function, efficient ex-
perimentation should not stop until the project succeeds.
4. The Equilibrium
The social planner’s solution establishes the ideal experimentation path for this game, the path
that allows to produce the highest social surplus. The actual equilibrium of the game will not
coincide with the efficient solution. The main reason for the inefficiency of the equilibrium is
the discrepancy between the entrepreneur’s ex ante and ex post incentives to conduct the ex-
periments. Prior to signing the contract the entrepreneur wants to maximize the social surplus
because she has full bargaining power in this game, but after signing the contract her incentives
will be affected by the need to share the surplus with the investor and by the stream of conditional
payments that she can loose if she succeeds too early.
I solve the game by backward induction. Players are sequentially rational. Thus the investor
at phase one has an idea of how the entrepreneur will work on the project given the offer she
proposes. Based on these expectations, the investor can accept or reject the offer. Then the en-
trepreneur, knowing which offers will be accepted and which rejected, can find the best contract
to offer to the investor. I begin solving the model form phase two, the experimentation phase.
Then I continue to phase one and discover the optimal offer that the entrepreneur is going to
make to the investor.
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4.1. Phase Two of the Game
The second phase of the game is the phase at which the entrepreneur conducts experiments after
signing the contract. The terms of the contract are set, the stream of payments conditional on no
success, (γt, t ě 0), and the evolution of shares, (st, t ě 0), are defined and are treated as fixed.
The entrepreneur can reallocate funds over time by borrowing and saving at rate r, which is





























0 ατ ϵτ dτ (ϵtc ´ γtc) dt ď 0.
It reflects the fact that the entrepreneur cannot expect to spend more on experiments than she
ever expects to receive from the investor. I will guess and verify in the description of phase one
that the budget constraint will be satisfied with equality, but the multiplier associated with it will
be zero. The intuition is simple: if the multiplier is positive there is an ex ante value in relaxing
the constraint, so there is an opportunity to change the contract and ask for more funds.
The entrepreneur’s problem at phase two is the maximization problem, which can be de-











e´rtMt (ϵtc ´ γtc) dt ď 0,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
(st, t ě 0) , (γt, t ě 0) given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
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ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0,
where Mt ” e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ . Appendix II.C.1 demonstrates that the problem with the binding bud-
get constraint is equivalent to the problem without the budget constraint, but with the higher
marginal monetary cost of experimentation, c. Therefore, to derive the solution, I can ignore the






e´trMt [αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc] dt
]
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
(st, t ě 0) , (γt, t ě 0) given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
This problem is solved in Appendix II.A. The solution is unique when functions st and γt are











exists. The equilibrium experimentation path at phase two is obtained from the first order differ-
ential equation,
r [αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c] = αt [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt) + γtc] + αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t, (II.2)
the law of motion for the posterior belief,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
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and two boundary conditions:





An important observation regarding (II.2) is that it is defined by two time paths, (st, t ě 0)
and (γt, t ě 0). Therefore, the same equilibrium experimentation path can be induced by differ-
ent combinations of these paths. It means that there exist some equivalence between various
contracts from the perspectives of the second phase of the game. At phase two, the entrepreneur
will be indifferent between these contracts.
Rearrange the terms in (II.2):
r [αtE ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c] = αt [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)] + αtR (ṡt ´ rst) + αtγtc ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t.
Define a virtual parameter,
ωt ” R (ṡt ´ rst) + γtc,
and differentiate it with respect to time:
ω̇t = R (s̈t ´ rṡt) + γ̇tc.
If for two different contracts ωt is the same for every period and shares, st, converge to the same
limit, s, then these two contracts are equivalent from the perspectives of the second phase of the
game.
Suppose, for example, that there is a contract with fixed shares and varying payments. There
exists a contract with fixed payments and varying shares that results in the same experimentation
path. Suppose that shares are fixed in the contract for every time period at the limit level, st = s.
Then




If I wanted to replicate the experimentation path induced by this contract using a contract with
varying shares and fixed payments, I would set
R (s̈t ´ rṡt) = γ̇tc
and would make sure that st Ñ s as time goes to infinity. This way, I would have two contracts,
one, with fixed shares and varying payments, and another, with fixed payments and varying
shares, that will provide equivalent incentives to the entrepreneur and will produce the same
experimentation path. There are other contracts that induce the same experimentation path as in
this example. Having such a flexibility in writing contracts is a convenient feature of this model.
4.2. Phase One of the Game
At phase one, both players expect that the entrepreneur will behave according to the differential
equation described above. I derive the solution for this phase of the game assuming sequential
rationality. It means that along the equilibrium experimentation path, the entrepreneur behaves
exactly as she is expected to behave and there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium.
The decision to accept or reject the contract by the investor is based on the terms of the
contract and the expectations of the investor regarding the funding path. Based on the common
belief that the project is good, α0, the terms of the contract,
Z = ((γt, st) , t ě 0) ,
and the experimentation path induced by this contract, (ϵ̂t, t ě 0), the investor will sign the con-





0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt ě 0.
The entrepreneur has all the bargaining power in this game, thus it is obvious that she will





0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt = 0.
The angel investor’s budget constraint binds.
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What is left to do is to find the optimal contract the entrepreneur offers to the investor. From











e´rtMt [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt = 0,
ż 8
0
e´rtMt [γtc ´ ϵ̂tc] dt = 0,
˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
Keep in mind that ϵ̂t is the induced experimentation path that depends on the terms of the con-
tract.






e´rtMtα̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] dt,
and combine this result with the objective function:
ż 8
0




e´trMt [α̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ ϵ̂tc] dt.
Thus when the first constraint binds, the objective function does not depend explicitly on the
terms of the contract. In fact, this objective function is exactly the same as the objective function
in the social planner’s problem, (II.1). It means that the entrepreneur captures all the surplus in
this game. Her ex ante incentives are to maximize the social surplus.
Unfortunately, the entrepreneur’s problem at phase one of the game is not equivalent to the
social planner’s problem. The entrepreneur needs to satisfy two constraints. The first constraint
is the investor’s participation constraint. I already argued that it will have to be satisfied with
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equality because then the entrepreneur captures the whole surplus in this game. The second
constraint is the budget constraint,
ż 8
0
e´rtMt [γtc ´ ϵ̂tc] dt = 0.
I argue that this constraint binds (see Appendix II.C.2). The intuition is simple. If the budget
constraint does not bind, it is possible to ask for less funds and lower share and keep the induced
experimentation rates intact. This way, the objective function will no be affected. However,
lower funding rates and lower shares will mean that the investor will be better off. The investor’s
budget constraint will no longer be binding. With both constraints not binding, the problem will
be similar to the social planner’s problem and the first best result will have to be possible. In
other words, when the budget constraint does no bind, it is possible to write a better contract.
Therefore, the budget constraint must be binding.
Suppose, however, that the budget constraint is binding but restricting at the second phase
of the game. As it was shown in Appendix II.C.1, in this case, there will be pure efficiency loss
equivalent to an increase in the marginal monetary cost of experimentation, c. Any shadow costs
incurred at the second phase of the game imply that the contract is specified in such a fashion
that a part of the generated surplus is lost. It is possible to write a better contract to avoid the
shadow costs at phase two (see the second argument in Appendix II.C.2). Therefore, the budget
constraint will not be restrictive at the second stage.
Now, that I have established that both constraints bind at phase one of the game, I can assign
multiplier λ to the investor’s participation constraint and multiplier µ to the budget constraint
to write the problem. Appendix II.C.3 is devoted to formulating the entrepreneur’s problem with
both constraints binding. The entrepreneur knows that at phase two she will experiment accord-
ing to (II.2) given two paths, (st, t ě 0) and (γt, t ě 0) described in the contract written at phase
one. Thus, at phase one she needs to solve (II.2) for ϵt and express it as a function of the shares and
funding paths and then use the result as a constraint in the phase one problem. Alternatively, she
can solve (II.2) for the share and control the induced experimentation path, (ϵ̂t, t ě 0), directly
together with (γt, t ě 0). Thus to satisfy the second phase incentives and induce experimentation
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rates (ϵ̂t, t ě 0), shares and funding rates at every time t must satisfy








f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ
´ f (ϵ̂τ ) + γτc
]
dτ .
Using this expression in the problem statement directly, I can reformulate the entrepreneur’s







Mt (λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t)
+ (1 ´ λ+ µ) γtc ´ (1 + µ) ϵ̂tc)
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
(
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc
)]
dt
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
I characterize the best solution and then compare the experimentation paths produced by the
best contract to the paths produced by two more restricting contracts: the contract that can be
written in the absence of the credit market and the dynamically renegotiable contract.
4.3. The Best Contract
I solve the entrepreneur’s problem in Appendix II.C.4. The solution consists of a first order non-
linear differential equation, (II.e), and one boundary condition, thus it is unique. I do not repro-
duce the solution here as the equations are rather long, however, I characterize the important
properties of the induced experimentation path and describe the main features of the best con-
tract. The main results are summed up in Proposition II.2 and shown in Figure II.3.
Proposition II.2. The best contract that the entrepreneur can propose to an angel investor in a dy-
namic experimentation model with convex effort costs and developed credit markets satisfies:
Funds are provided unconditionally : funding of the project should not stop if success happens.
Experimentation rates are inefficient : even the best contract does not provide enough incentives
to experiment at the efficient rate.
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Figure II.3. The Best Contract: Induced Experimentation Rates
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
Externalities that the project produces for the parties will be internalized : the experimentation
rates depend on the total size of the surplus the project generates upon success, not just on the en-
trepreneur’s share of it.
Some projects are not worth the risk : if α0 ď 2cR̄ , then the project will not be undertaken.
Experimenting never stops : experiments only stop if success happens, otherwise, experimentation
rate is always positive.
Proof. The proof is located in Appendix II.C.5. I provide the intuition for it here:
Funds are provided unconditionally : This is the direct result of solving the maximization prob-
lem at phase one of the game. The economic intuition is that funds that are provided over time
until the project succeeds create the unwanted incentives for the entrepreneur to delay the exper-
imentation in order to receive the funds in the future. It is best to avoid this practice and provide
the funds upfront. Unfortunately, it requires the existence of the developed credit market. How-
ever, given that when success happens the entrepreneur will receive a significant benefit, while
the money provided to conduct experiments are relatively insignificant, the negative effect of
having to rely on conditional funding is expected to be low.
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Experimentation rates are inefficient : The inefficiency results from the need to satisfy the bud-
get constraint. Only if the budget constraintmultiplier is zero, the experimentation path produced
by the best contract is the same as for efficient experimentation path.
Externalities that the project produces for the parties will be internalized : The private exter-
nalities which the parties receive when the project succeeds, E and I , only matter as the parts of
the total surplus, R̄ = R+E + I . As long as the total surplus is the same, the distribution of the
private and the sharable valuations of the project does not matter. This is an example of how the
externalities of the participants are internalized by the means of the contract.
Some projects are not worth the risk : If the prior belief that the project is good is lower than
2c
R̄
, then the posterior beliefs will only be lower than that in the future. This belief level is in-
sufficient to satisfy the participation constraints of the players and it is not enough to produce a
single experimentation session with the positive experimentation rates, let alone carry on with
experiments for some prolonged time. Therefore, some projects that should be worked on from








Experimenting never stops : For the experiments to only stop when the project succeeds and
otherwise continue indefinitely, the policy function must not increase abruptly at the point of
the lowest belief level. Following the logic described for the first best policy function, I show
that this is, indeed, the case for the policy function produced by the best contract. Therefore,
the experiments financed by the angel investors will be carried out until the success happens or
forever. The best contract has no expiration date.
4.4. Alternative Contracts
In order to understand the difference between the best contract and the other possible funding
schemes, I compare the outcomes of funding the project under the terms of the best contract
with the outcomes of funding the project by the means of two alternative contracts that the
entrepreneur can sign with the angel investor. The first alternative contract involves conditional
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payments. It is intended to serve as an example of the contract that can be written in the absence
of the developed credit markets or in the case when the entrepreneur failed to secure a credit line
and is unable to reallocate the funds over time. The second alternative contract is a renegotiable
contract. It applies to the cases when the entrepreneur has to work with the angel investors who
want to be able to quit financing the project at any moment in time and resume funding it some
time in the future. Technically, such a contract is equivalent to having no long term contract at
all and figuring out how to finance the project as the experiments go.
Consider the first alternative contract with the conditional payments. Suppose that there is
no way to reallocate the funds between the time periods. Then it must be the case that, for every
t,
γt = ϵ̂t,
and so the budget constraint is satisfied automatically. Everything else is identical to the general
problem of finding the equilibrium. The investor’s participation constraint must still bind,
ż 8
0
e´rtMt [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ ϵ̂tc] dt = 0.
I follow the logic of Appendix II.C.1, while keeping all γt = ϵ̂t andwrite themaximization problem







Mt (λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc)
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
(
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + ϵ̂tc
)]
dt
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
I solve this problem in Appendix II.C.6. The resulting differential equation and the boundary
condition that I produce look very similar to the equilibrium conditions derived for the best
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Figure II.4. The Contract with Conditional Funding
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
contract. Due to the complexity of these expressions, they are left in the Appendix. Figure II.4
shows the policy function, the experimentation path, and the belief evolution path produced by
the entrepreneur as the result of signing and following the contract with the payments conditional
on no success. The paths and the policy function depicted in the figure look somewhat similar to
the paths and the functions shown in Figure II.3, which demonstrates the experimentation rates
and beliefs produced by the best contract. However, the policy function is lower and the belief
evolution happens at a slower rate, so I can tell that the contract with the conditional funding will
be worse for the entrepreneur. Moreover, the best contract is not constrained by the requirement
that γt = ϵ̂t for every time t. Thus the entrepreneur can achieve more.
Now, consider the second alternative contract that the entrepreneur can write and sign with
the angel investor. This contract involves renegotiation of the contract terms that happens ev-
ery time period. The reasons why such a contract will be signed may be different: it may be
because the investor is unable to commit to the terms of a complicated contract or because the
entrepreneur wants to switch between different investors from time to time and thus needs the
contract with the possibility to exit without penalties. In any case, it is an interesting alternative
to consider. In a sense, this contract will be as good as having no long term contract at all.
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Figure II.5. The Renegotiable Contract
Policy Function Experimentation Path Posterior Belief
Given that the contract can be renegotiated at will, the entrepreneur will have to ask for
conditional funds:
γt = ϵ̂t.
She will also have to satisfy the immediate participation constraint of the investor:
α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc = 0,
for every time t. As the result, the budget constraint and the investor’s participation constraint
will be satisfied automatically. It is possible to derive the expression for the optimal share directly








or given that γt = ϵ̂t,
st =
α̂t (R + I) ´ c
α̂tR
.
Therefore, all the terms of the contract are known. What is left to do is to find ṡt:
ṡt =
˙̂αt (R + I)
α̂tR
´ ˙̂αt










The entrepreneur’s problem at stage one is solved. I can insert the expressions for st, ṡt, and γt
into the differential equation that characterizes the equilibrium experimentation path produced
at the second phase of the game, (II.2), directly and produce the condition that describes the
experimentation path for the renegotiable contract:
r [α̂t (R + E + I) ´ f
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ 2c] = α̂t [f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t)] ´ (1 ´ 2α̂t) ϵ̂tc ´ f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt.
The boundary condition is straightforward: given that it was established that even for the best
contract, no project with the prior, α0, less that 2cR will be worked on, it is obvious that the







is the boundary condition for the renegotiable contract.
It is obvious that following the terms of the renegotiable contract will lead to the outcomes
worse than for the best contract and for the contract with conditional payments. The reason
for this is that the problem of writing the renegotiable contract is even more constrained than
the problem of writing the contract with the conditional funding. However, the experimentation
paths and the policy functions produced by the renegotiable contract are very different from all
the paths I demonstrated before. Figure II.5 depicts the policy function, the experimentation path,
and the belief evolution path produced by such a contract.
It is interesting to note that for some belief levels the policy function lies even higher than the
efficient policy function, it means that the entrepreneur will experiment at a higher rate than it
is needed. This possibility of overexperimentation is a direct consequence of having the convex
effort costs and it is not something that can typically be found in the dynamic experimentation
literature. It shows the complexity of the experimentation rates that we can expect to find in the
presence of convex effort costs.
4.5. Comparison of the Contractual Outcomes
It is interesting to compare the outcomes of financing different projects using different contracts.
It is obvious that the best contract will stay the best and the renegotiable contract will perform
the worst in this environment no matter what. However, the question is how far is the distance
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Table II.2. Example Projects
Project Surplus, R + E + I Costs, c Discount Rates, r Prior, α0
A 20 2 0.05 50%
B 9 3 0.07 80%
C 15 3 0.5 70%
D 10 4 0.7 90%
between different contracts in terms of the social (and the entrepreneur’s) surplus. I calculate
the expected total value generated by following the terms of the three contracts presented in this
paper applied to four different projects described in Table II.2.
Project A promises relatively high return, the monetary costs are relatively low, the discount
factor indicates high patience, but the project can be good or bad with a fifty-fifty chance. This
project is a high-risk-high-return project with patient players. Project B promises low return,
costs are medium, patience is high, and the probability that the project is good is 80%. This is a
low-risk-low-return project with patient players. Project C can produce high surplus, the costs
are medium, the prior is good at the level of 70%, but the players are impatient. This project
can be called medium-risk-medium-return with impatient players. Finally, Project D has low
return, high costs, high chance of success, but impatient players. This is a low-risk-low-return
project with impatient players. For all the projects, the effort cost function, f (ϵ̂) is assumed to
be quadratic,
f (ϵ̂) = ϵ̂2.
The results of experimenting using different funding contracts are demonstrated in Table II.3.
The numbers represent the expected total surplus that the entrepreneur receives. Given that
the entrepreneur receives the whole surplus, the total expected surplus and the entrepreneur’s
portion are equivalent. Numbers in brackets are percentages relative to the benchmark efficient
outcome. The columns show the financing outcomes for the projects. The rows indicate the
contracts. The efficient contract is included for reference only.
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Table II.3. Financing Outcomes by Project and by Contract
Contract A B C D
Efficient 4.98 (100%) 2.36 (100%) 3.45 (100%) 2.05 (100%)
Best 4.88 (98%) 1.77 (75%) 3.24 (94%) 1.22 (60%)
Conditional 4.79 (96%) 1.25 (53%) 3.03 (88%) 0.77 (38%)
Renegotiable 4.69 (94%) 1.12 (47%) 3.01 (87%) 0.72 (35%)
There are no surprises—the best contract outperformed all the alternative contracts for all
the projects, and the conditional contract steadily produced higher surplus than the renegotiable
contract. The best contract performed exceptionally well in the cases of Projects A and C, but so
did the other contracts, producing more than 85% of the efficient surplus at worst. However, for
Projects B and D, the best contract outperformed the alternative contracts significantly, reaching
the way to efficiency 22 percentage points closer than the second best alternative. It looks like
the structure of the project matters less for the projects with high returns and it becomes very
important for the projects with low returns. Practically, it means that it could be advisable to
utilize unconditional payment schemes for all projects, but it especially beneficial for the projects
that involve relatively low returns.
Another observation is that the difference between the performance of the conditional and
the renegotiable contract is low for projects that involve low patience. It is also minimal for the
projects with high returns. Practically, it means that if the choice is between having a contract
with conditional payments and long term structure and the contract that is renegotiated every
period, then the difference between the contractual outcomes is going to be minimal if the parties
are impatient or if the project at hand yields relatively high returns. Given that the renegotiable
contract is much less complicated to write and follow, it can be more practical in these situations.




I develop a model of an interaction between the entrepreneur and the angel investor at early
stages of a startup development. The model includes convex effort costs, savings, and private
valuations of the project. I show that in the equilibrium the experiments are performed at sub-
optimal rates. Even if the entrepreneur has full bargaining power and is willing to maximize
the ex ante total surplus, the impossibility to commit to the efficient experimentation rates ex
post undermines all the efforts to achieve efficiency ex ante. The main reasons for inefficiency
are liquidity constraints: the entrepreneur needs to receive funds from the external sources. She
also needs to compensate the investors by offering them a share in a project surplus, which di-
rectly affects the ex post incentives. The projects are risky and the entrepreneur’s actions are
unobservable: these properties make it impossible to write the contracts contingent on anything
other than the event of success. I show that the efficient experimentation rates should decrease
in time and that the equilibrium experimentation only stops in the event of success. Otherwise,
the experiments continue forever.
I characterize the experimentation paths produced by the best contract that the entrepreneur
can propose to the investor and compare the funding outcomes of writing the best contract to
the outcomes of funding the projects under two alternative schemes: the conditional funding and
the renegotiable contract. I show that the best contract involves no conditional payments and it
is especially preferable in the situations when the project involves relatively low returns. When
choosing between the other two alternative contracts, the entrepreneur can sometimes prefer the
renegotiable contract due to its lack of complexity. It can be preferable in the situations when
the parties are impatient or when the project promises relatively high returns.
Dynamics, convex costs, and continuous time are employed to reveal the complexity of the
dynamic agency problem. I show that the experimentation paths and the policy function pro-
duced in such environments can have surprising properties, like in the case of the renegotiable




Funding Projects with Diminishing Marginal Returns
1. Introduction
1.1. Relevance of the Problem
The role of venture capital markets in the modern innovation-driven economy is undeni-
ably important. In 2013, venture-capital-backed companies accounted for 43% of all the public
companies founded since 1979 in the U.S. (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015). Among these public
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companies, venture-capital-backed enterprises also employed 38% of the employees (about 2% of
the total workforce), comprised 57% of the market capitalization (13% of the total U.S. market
capitalization), and, most importantly, were responsible for 82% of research and development ex-
penditures (21% of the total R&D expenditures in the U.S.). According to KMPG (Fortnum et al.,
2016), in 2015, global investments in venture capital amounted to $129.5 billion. In the U.S., this
number was almost $60 billion (PwC and NVCA, 2016). The dynamics of investments in venture
capital and the total number of deals in the U.S. market are presented in Figure III.1.
Given that venture capital plays such an important role, it is crucial to understand the theoret-
ical aspects of this market. In particular, it is important to know how new venture-capital-backed
companies are funded, what their optimal funding schedule should be, why funding may become
suboptimal, what affects the funding schedule, and what possible steps can be done to alleviate
the inefficiencies if they are present. Answers to these questions will shape the policy decisions
and may uncover new trends in the venture capital market. Theoretical models developed to
address these issues may be eventually used to analyze the actual behavior of investors and en-
trepreneurs based on empirical data.
1.2. ResearchQuestion
I study a model in which the investor provides funds to the entrepreneur to develop a promising
risky project with diminishing marginal returns to effort level. The aim is to characterize the
funding schedules that arise under three different scenarios ranked by decreasing amount of ob-
servability and verifiability of information. In the first scenario, the entrepreneur’s effort levels
and investment amounts are fully observable by the investor and verifiable by a third party. In
the second scenario, the entrepreneur’s actions are still observable by the investor, but are not
verifiable by a third party. In the third scenario, the entrepreneur’s actions are completely un-
observable: it is impossible to tell what the entrepreneur does with the funds provided by the
investor.
Themain research question is how the funding schedule depends on the information available
to the investor and on the parameters of the model, which include the total size of the surplus the
project generates upon success, the patience of the players represented by the discount factor,
103
their initial optimism about the project, and the marginal monetary costs of conducting experi-
ments.
1.3. Related Literature
The model I describe borrows from and extends upon several well-known and acclaimed papers
that together contribute to the body of dynamic agency and venture capital research. The liter-
ature on this topic is rich, and there are many important models, so the reference list I include
in this chapter covers only the most relevant literature, but does not list all the papers that were
developed over the years. For the more detailed history of the dynamic agency models and bandit
games in general, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2008).
The model by Bergemann and Hege (2005) was among the first to describe the interaction
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur using the bandit model framework. They
assumed that there is an entrepreneur who has a project, which may or may not succeed in the
future, but does not have capital to finance the actual research on the project. Every period, the
entrepreneur asks for the funds in exchange for a share of the possible surplus, and the investor
provides funds to the entrepreneur to conduct experiments. Experimenting is needed to find out
if the project is viable. In their paper, probability that the project succeeds linearly depends on
the amount of money spent on experiments. The main problem they specifically address is that
since the investor does not see what the entrepreneur is doing with the money, the entrepreneur
may decide to divert the funds and pretend to conduct experiments while actually shirking. The
authors showed that under certain parameter values the model may predict that the funds will
be provided at a constant rate, at a decreased rate (“frontloading”), or at an increased rate (“back-
loading”), but in any case, the funding schedule will be suboptimal.
Hörner and Samuelson (2013) later confirmed the findings of Bergemann and Hege (2005)
by analyzing essentially the same model in continuous time, but with the full bargaining power
given to the investor. They assumed that the probability of success of each experiment is given,
and the entrepreneur can only influence the continuous experimentation rate by delaying the ex-
perimentation. Their model revealed that the funding rate may increase or decrease in time under
Markovian decision-making assumption, and this fact prompted them to consider alternative in-
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terpretations of the model. One of the subsections of the paper specifically addresses Markov
equilibrium issues and proposes that non-Markovian strategies are a better alternative. In fact,
they state: “we believe that non-Markov equilibria better reflect, for example, actual venture capi-
tal contracts.”1 Indeed, their non-Markovian equilibria exhibit the intuitive “frontloading” feature
that we expect to find in the real world.
This chapter addresses the problem differently. I keep the simplicity, convenience, and empir-
ical appeal of the Markovian strategic environment, but instead of the linear effort costs used in
the previous papers, I assume convex per-period effort costs. This assumption is realistic because
in real-world environments improving the probability of success in a particular experiment is in-
creasingly hard, while reaching the probability of one (conditional on the project being good) is
usually prohibitively expensive. This critical modeling adjustment not only changes the outcomes
of the analysis, but it also requires implementing different solution techniques that I develop here
as well.
There are not many papers that consider convex cost environments in the dynamic agency
settings. Mason and Välimäki (2015) analyze the behavior of the dynamic agency model in the
presence of convex costs under the assumption that parties have dissimilar discount rates, but
they only consider projects that are certain to succeed. Another model that also analyzes the dy-
namic moral hazard problemwith convex effort costs is by Bhaskar (2013). He studies the optimal
contracting scheme between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent in the presence of
public signals and unobserved actions in two time periods. His paper also contains a discussion
about the problems that arise in the environments in which players make both continuous and
discrete choices and what role indifference has to play in such problems.
1.4. Main Contribution
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I demonstrate that in the presence of the convex
effort costs assumption, Markov strategies produce the desired and intuitive “frontloading” fund-
ing schedules in full information and observable but unverifiable information environments. In
the unobservable information environment, the funding rates may increase in the beginning for
1Hörner and Samuelson (2013), page. 634.
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some promising projects for a short time, but eventually the funding rates will become strictly
decreasing. This is both similar to and different from the results of Hörner and Samuelson (2013):
I show that for some projects, especially for the high surplus and impatient projects, the funding
rates may increase in the beginning if the parties are optimistic enough; however, I demonstrate
that the funding rates quickly become decreasing, so there is no strict “backloading” in this model.
Second, I develop a methodology of solving the dynamic agency models in continuous time
in the presence of the convex effort costs for the first-best case and for the two different equi-
libria cases. The manipulation with value functions developed here will be useful for possible
extensions of this model, some of which are also discussed.
1.5. Additional Results
In addition to the main results, I reveal that the simulations strongly suggest that the investors
will prefer the completely unobservable environment to the environment with observable but
unverifiable actions under the Markovian assumption. It means that if the investor can commit
not to monitor the activity of the entrepreneur, then he will be better off by not knowing what
the entrepreneur is doing with the money. This is because the unobservability strengthens com-
mitment: if the entrepreneur diverts the funds and the investor does not believe her, then he will
still provide the funds according to the equilibrium funding scheme. If, however, the diversion
by the entrepreneur is observable, then the investor will know that the experimentation did not
happen at the desired level, and so he will be more optimistic about the project than if he be-
lieved that the funds were actually spent on experiments. The unobservability makes the threats
of diverting the funds by the entrepreneur less credible.
I also characterize how the funding schedules depend on the parameters of the model. In
all the scenarios, being impatient is beneficial to both parties because it promotes early effort
application and discounts future experimentation opportunities heavily. The surplus to marginal
monetary costs ratio is another important driver of the funding rates. Not only does it positively
directly affects the funding rates at each time period, but it also allows projects with lower chances
of success to be funded: critical optimism level required to finance a project decreases in the
surplus to marginal costs ratio.
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1.6. Structure of the Chapter
The chapter continues with the description of the model, including the characterization of the
equilibrium concept and the strategies of the players. Then I move to describe the behavior
of the funding schedule in the first best scenario and how it is implementable in this model.
What follows in the characterization of the funding timeline in two equilibria cases. After that, I




The model is initially constructed in discrete time, and then it is extended to the continuous time
environment. I assume that the minimal length between any two decision points is the same and
equal to d ą 0. Essentially, I analyze the limiting case, when d Ñ 0. This technique ignores some
features of the continuous time that suggest a wider range of possible behavioral patterns of the
players, but since I am analyzing the Markov equilibria, this technique fits the research program
well.
The model is standard for the dynamic agency literature. There is an entrepreneur who has a
project. The entrepreneur believes that the project is good with the prior probability equal to α0.
To complete the project, the entrepreneur needs to conduct experiments—risky operations that,
conditional on the project being good, may lead to a success with probability ϵtd at a time period,
t, of length d or to a failure with the complement probability. If the experiment is successful, the
project is complete and it generates the surplus, R. If it is not successful, the entrepreneur may
decide to continue experimenting in the next period.
The biggest problem here is that bad projects never succeed, no matter how hard the en-
trepreneur tries and how many experiments she conducts. Therefore there is always a sense of
doubt when the experiment does not succeed: is it just because this attempt was unsuccessful, or
is it because the project is ultimately bad?
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Each time period, t, the entrepreneur can only conduct a single experiment. After each ex-
perimentation attempt, the entrepreneur updates her belief that the project is still good by the
means of the Bayes’ rule:
αt+d =
αt (1 ´ ϵtd)
1 ´ αt + αt (1 ´ ϵtd)
=
αt (1 ´ ϵtd)
1 ´ αtϵtd
.
This posterior belief, αt, can only decrease over time, reflecting the fact that the entrepreneur
becomes more and more pessimistic about the success chances of the project. The decline is
stronger the larger the ϵt is, indicating the trade-off between the higher chances of succeeding in
the current period or being more optimistic (and more incentivized) in the future.
The probability that the experiment is a success after exactly n trials, where n P N, is




(1 ´ αidϵidd) .
The distribution of random variable X resembles geometric distribution, however, it is different
since the probability of success per trial, αidϵid, may change between trials. Also, the probability
that the project never succeeds may be strictly positive for some projects:
P (X = 8) = 1 ´ α0 ě 0.
To conduct a single experiment, the entrepreneur has to exercise some effort and spend some
money. However, she has no funds of her own, so she seeks to obtain the external funding. In this
model, financing is available only from a single investor who shares the prior belief, α0, about
the chances that the project is good with the entrepreneur.
Each time period t, the investor offers to invest γtc in the project in exchange for share (1 ´ st)
of the surplus, R, which he will receive only if the project succeeds. Alternatively, the investor
can offer a complete contract that describes the funding path and the shares for each period, but
without any commitment assumptions, such a contract will perform just as well as no contract
at all, hence, it is not required.
Once the entrepreneur obtains the money, she can either spend it on an experimentation
attempt or divert the funds to her private needs. Depending on the scenario, the investor may
or may not observe how the money is spent, so every time he invests, there may be uncertainty
about whether the money he had given to the entrepreneur was actually spent experimenting.
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2.2. Renegotiation and Commitment
I assume that the players will not be able to commit to any contract that presupposes a possible
waste of the expected surplus. In particular, it will be hard to commit to stop providing funds at
time T if both players believe that it may be beneficial to continue funding the project beyond T
given it would not have succeeded by that time. It will also be impossible to implement contracts
with third-party payments as clearly it will be a potentially wasteful contract that both players
will want to renegotiate shall they actually reach the stage when they need to make side pay-
ments. Finally, it will be impossible to commit not to have any relationship after a certain event
for either party because if there is a potential surplus to share, then ex post, it will be reasonable
to continue with the experimentation.
The players will not commit to stop at time T . Committing to a particular stopping time, T ,
may be a good idea to enforce certain experimentation rates because the agent will not expect
to receive any surplus if the project is not a success until time T . Thus the entrepreneur will try
harder to reach a success because there will be less opportunities to reach success in the future.
However, if the project is still not a success at time T and the parties are still optimistic enough,
then it will be reasonable for them to renegotiate and continues with the experimentation. Thus,
the commitment to a stopping time is not viable.
The players will not write contracts that presuppose third-party payments. The mechanisms
with stage games and third party payments are good tools to overcome the problems that arise
in the environments with observable but unverifiable information (see Moore and Repullo, 1988).
The strength of these mechanisms is based on the fact that the parties ex ante agree to pay a
penalty to a third party if they disagree about their vision of the state the project ex post. Thus, the
mechanisms enforce truth-telling and commitment to the terms of the contract. Unfortunately,
such mechanisms are not “renegotiation proof” (see Hart and Moore, 1988), because if the parties
actually reach the stage when they need to make the third-party payments, they will want to
renegotiate and split the payments between themselves, as paying to a third party is a waste
of surplus. Hence, the mechanism breaks down and the parties will not be able to commit to a
subgame-perfect implementation with the third-party payments.
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It will also be very hard for the parties to commit to break up after a specific event for the
same reasons it will be hard to commit to a certain stopping time: as long as there is a surplus to
share, the parties are better off working on the project together.
2.3. Information Environments
I consider three environments based on the amount of information available to the investor and
to the public (or a third party). The simplest case is the perfect observability of the entrepreneur’s
actions by the investor and their perfect verifiability by a third party, which may be a judge or
a jury. It essentially means that the venture capitalist can write a contract contingent on the
entrepreneur’s actions, and shall there be a disagreement between the two, a judge or a jury will
be able to verify if the action had been indeed performed and what exactly had been done. It also
means that the entrepreneur and the investor share the beliefs about the project’s viability and
update their beliefs based on the same information. So they not only have a common prior, but
they also share a common posterior at each period in time.
The second information environment of interest is the case when the entrepreneur’s actions
are observable by the investor, but unverifiable by a third party. Such a situation results in the
practical impossibility of writing contracts contingent on the entrepreneur’s actions: shall the
dispute between the principal and the agent ensue, a judge or a jury will be unable to resolve it
since they cannot verify claims regarding the effort of the entrepreneur. This happens due to the
private nature of the relationship between the principal and the agent: even if the information
regarding the effort level becomes available to a third party, it will be provided by either the prin-
cipal or the agent. Hence it may be biased and not reflect the actual state of the world. However,
both the principal and the agent are equally informed about the state of the world, and so the
principal can make offers based on the commonly shared posterior belief that the project is still
good. It also potentially allows to implement the first best informally under the threat of revert-
ing to the suboptimal funding rates. The environments with observable but unverifiable states
have been studied extensively by Hart and Moore (1988), Green and Laffont (1988), Maskin and
Moore (1999), and many others. A traditional solution to overcome the unverifiability involves
truth-telling mechanisms with side payments based on the mechanism by Moore and Repullo
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(1988) that have a big problem of being non-renegotiation proof in general. Therefore, I do not
consider these mechanisms in this chapter.
The third, and the final environment I consider is the complete unobservability of the actions.
The only event that the investor can observe is the event of the success of the project. In such an
environment, not only action-contingent contracts are impossible, but the investor literally has
no idea what the entrepreneur is doing with the money, hence he can only provide the incen-
tives for the entrepreneur to actually experiment and hope that these incentives are sufficient. It
means that the entrepreneur updates her posterior beliefs that the project is good based on the
actual effort level, and the investor updates his posterior based only on what he believes had been
invested. Any deviation by the entrepreneur in such an environment is unobservable, and so no
punishment for not following the contract is possible.
2.4. Game Timing and Actions
The game is pictured in Figure III.2. At the beginning of every period t, the investor (I) offers the
entrepreneur (E) a share, st, and a sum of money, γtc. The share, st, is the share of the surplus,
R, that will be allocated to the entrepreneur if the project succeeds in period t, the investor gets
the rest. Every time period, the share and the sum of funds are renegotiated. The agreement is
for the current time period only. Next, the entrepreneur decides whether to accept or reject the
proposal. If she accepts, she then decides how much effort to exercise to conduct an experiment.
Figure III.2. Game Scheme
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Whatever money is not spent experimenting, gets diverted. If she rejects the proposal or if the
experimentation session fails, time advances to the next period, everyone updates their beliefs
that the project is still good, and everything starts over. The game ends if the project succeeds or
if the investor stops providing funds indefinitely.
2.5. Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept is Markov sequential in pure strategies. In particular, it means that the
players’ strategies are based on their current beliefs about the state of the world. This way, the
past history of the players’ actions is aggregated in a certain way to characterize the current
state. There may exist different interpretations of what it actually entails, so it must be specified
explicitly.
The investor’s offer of st and γt is based only on his belief that the project is still good, α̂t.
Therefore the investor’s strategy is just
α̂t ÞÑ (s (α̂t) , γ (α̂t))
defined for all possible beliefs about the state, α̂t. The investor updates his current beliefs about
the state based on his beliefs about the effort level the entrepreneur exercised in the previous
period and the previous period’s beliefs about the state of the world:
α̂t+d =
α̂t (1 ´ ϵ̂td)
1 ´ α̂tϵ̂td
.
This transition equation describes the evolution of state variable α̂t.
Along the equilibrium path, this belief is consistent with the actual probability that the project
is good. Given that the investor can never tell if the deviation on the entrepreneur’s side occurred,
the investor always believes that the entrepreneur’s posterior is α̂t.
The entrepreneur’s state is more complicated. First, the entrepreneur knows the true posterior
probability that the project is good, αt. Second, she also knows what the investor believes the
posterior belief is, α̂t, because they share the same prior and because she knows how the investor
forms beliefs. Third, she observes the current offer of st and γt, so the entrepreneur’s decision
regarding the effort level is based on three components:
αt, α̂t, (st, γt) ÞÑ ϵ (αt, α̂t, (st, γt)) .
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In the environments where the entrepreneur’s actions are observable, α̂t = αt, and so the en-
trepreneur’s strategy is less complicated:
αt, (st, γt) ÞÑ ϵ (αt, (st, γt)) .
The reasons to include the current period offers as the components of the entrepreneur’s space set
are dictated by the requirement of the sequential rationality: the actual experimentation happens
after the offer is accepted, so it can depend on the offers, as well as on the state variables.
A deviation in such a setting is simply a change in the way the players respond to the state
of the world. A one-shot deviation corresponds to deviating in response to one particular state
and leaving the rest of the strategy intact. For example, the entrepreneur may deviate at some
particular time t from the equilibrium strategy, ϵ˚˚ (αt, α̂t, (st, γt)), but then return to the equi-
librium play consistent with the new state variables’ evolution paths created by the deviation.
In particular, it means that once the entrepreneur deviated, she may begin diverting some of the
funds to her own needs forever, since the path of the state variables will be different from the
equilibrium path.
The one-shot deviation concept is complicated in continuous time as a payoff change at one
particular instant has no effect on the total payoff function, and yet Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman
equations allow one to treat these seemingly unimportant deviations as critical by concentrating
on particular instances of time, so it is possible to construct the best response functions pointwise
while keeping the rest of the strategies fixed.
Given the Markovian nature of the decision process, the offer acceptance stage of the game
is redundant: if the entrepreneur rejects the offer, the investor will credibly believe that nothing
would be invested, so he will update his believes about the state according to α̂t+d = α̂t and will
make the same offer at time t+ d as he had made at time t. From the entrepreneur’s perspective,
it means that she’s just wasted one period disagreeing and still got the same offer.
The problem of the uniqueness of the equilibria I describe below has not been addressed yet.
There may be additional equilibria in the environment with the unobservable actions.
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2.6. Payoffs
The interim utility functions are simple for both the principal and the agent. Experimentation
requires both effort and money, so a total cost to conduct a single experiment at time t is
ϵtdc+ fd (ϵt) d,
where ϵtdc is the monetary part of the cost (c being the marginal monetary cost) and fd (ϵt) d
is the cost of effort. Alternatively, there could be just one cost function, but I specifically keep
this form to be able to compare the results of my analysis to the ones obtained by Hörner and
Samuelson (2013) and Bergemann and Hege (2005). It also allows seeing how much has been
diverted.
The effort cost is represented by function fd, which is continuous, at least thrice differentiable,
and strictly convex and increasing, with fd (0) = 0. So every time the entrepreneur wishes to
exercise some effort ϵ ą 0, it will cost her fd (ϵ) d ą 0. One convenient property beside convexity
that I want to have is f 1d (0) = 0,2 but it is not required. The second property I need to state






There are several reasons to consider the convexity of the effort costs. First, it provides simple
and intuitive way to limit probability of success below one: the traditional models have used the
linear costs and so the authors had to introduce caps to the effort level. Second, this assumption
is natural: diminishing marginal returns are at the heart of many economic phenomena including
the experimentation outcomes. Even if the cost curve is “S”-shaped, still, we will be interested
in the part where additional effort brings less and less chances of success. Third, the traditional
approach to solving these models required considering trigger strategies that have a problem of
introducing the indifference, which means that mixed strategies become possible, as well as the
fact that the entrepreneur is indifferent between experimenting and diverting all the funds. It
makes the equilibria fragile and less realistic. Convex costs ensure that only a particular effort
2Here, and everywhere in the text, for some function g (x), g1 (x) means first derivative, g2 (x)—second, and so
on. For some x, ẋ indicates differentiation with respect to time, or dxdt . For some function h (x, y), h1 (x, y) means
partial derivative with respect to the first variable, h2 (x, y)—partial with respect to the second variable, h12 (x, y)—
partial derivative with respect to the first, and then to the second variable, and so on.
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level is optimal, other parameters fixed. Fourth, strategic experimentation models are solved in
discrete time, and then the continuous-time solution is produced as a limiting case, when the
length of the time between two periods becomes infinitely small. Using the convex costs and
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, I can solve continuous time models directly and produce
the same outcomes as if I used the limiting results obtained in the discrete case.
The entrepreneur’s benefit from experimenting in the current period is simply
αtϵtdstR + γtdc,
where αtϵtd represents the probability that the project will succeed in the current period given
the effort level of ϵtd and posterior probability that it is good αt; stR is the share of the surplus
the entrepreneur will get if the project is successful in the current period. Note that the benefit
includes γtdc—the funds provided by the investor. This is because the entrepreneur does not pay
for the experimentation out of her pocket, and so this advance is clearly her income. In the end,
the difference between the funds she received and the funds she actually spent experimenting,
γtdc ´ ϵtdc,
determines how much she diverted towards her personal consumption.
The venture capitalist provides funds to the entrepreneur. Alternatively, he could have used
the funds for his personal needs. Therefore, the cost of providing the funds is simply
γtcd.
The investor’s benefit is just
α̂tϵ̂td (1 ´ st)R,
where α̂tϵ̂td is the investor belief that the project will succeed at time t, and (1 ´ st)R is the
share of the surplus he would get if the outcome of the experimentation is favorable.
2.7. Players’ Problems
Every time period, after accepting the offer of γt and st, the entrepreneur needs to decide upon
the effort level, ϵt. Given a common discount factor of δ and the probability that the project will
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fail in the current period (1 ´ αtϵtd), the entrepreneur’s problem in a recursive form is
V (αt, α̂t) = max
ϵt
[αtϵtdstR ´ fd (ϵt) d+ γtdc ´ ϵtdc+ (1 ´ αtϵtd) δV (αt+d, α̂t+d)]
subject to the participation constraint,
V (αt, α̂t) ě 0,
ϵt ď γt,
and Bayesian updating of posterior beliefs αt and α̂t.
For the investor, the problem is a bit more complicated. He needs to make an offer of γt and
st to provide sufficient incentives for the agent to invest exactly as much as he believes she will
invest. If he believes that the experiment will fail with probability (1 ´ α̂tϵ̂td), then his problem
is
W (α̂t) = max
st, γt
[α̂tϵ̂td (1 ´ st)R ´ γtdc+ (1 ´ α̂tϵ̂td) δW (α̂t+d)]
subject to the participation constraint,
W (α̂t) ě 0,
and the incentive constraint,
ϵ̂t = argmax
ϵt
[α̂tϵtdstR ´ fd (ϵt) d+ γtdc ´ ϵtdc+ (1 ´ α̂tϵtd) δV (α̂t+d, α̂t+d)]
subject to
ϵ̂t ď γt,
and the evolution of posterior beliefs α̂. The incentive constraint indicates that along the equi-
librium path the investor forms rational beliefs about the future actions of the entrepreneur.
A consistent solution to these two problems together comprises an equilibrium because every
player best-responds to the other player’s action. The equilibrium is of the form of the policy
functions
γ (α̂) , s (α̂) , and ϵ (α, α̂) ,
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and consistent equilibrium beliefs of the investor, ϵ̂ (α̂) = ϵ (α̂, α̂). Off-equilibrium beliefs are
only required for the unobserved action environment and are simple: since the deviation by the
entrepreneur is non-detectable ex post and no information escapes the entrepreneur, then the
investor simply has the same belief for any possible deviation the entrepreneur can make.
2.8. From Discrete to Continuous Time
The process of transforming the problem in discrete time to the the problem in continuous time
is described in Appendix III.A. I keep all the variable names similar to their discrete-time coun-
terparts, though their meaning changes sometimes. For example, ϵtd used to mean probability
of success of a single experiment, now ϵt means the rate of effort, and as such, it is not bounded
from above (yet it still must be finite). Similarly, function fd had a property that fd (x) Ñ 8
as x Ñ 1
d
, but as d Ñ 0, function fd converged to f that is still strictly increasing, convex, and
satisfies all the other properties of fd, but now it only needs to converge to infinity as the effort
level goes to infinity.
The entrepreneur’s problem in continuous time can now be written as a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation:
rV (α, α̂) = max
ϵ
[αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α, α̂) + (1 ´ α)V1 (α, α̂))
´ α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ α̂)V2 (α, α̂)]
(III.1)
subject to the participation constraint:
V (α, α̂) ě 0
and
ϵ ď γ.
This is the continuous-time analogue of the Bellman equation, and it behaves similarly: it is
assumed that at every instance, the future path is optimal given the state variable, and so the
only thing left to do is to find the best behavior at every instance given the current state and
the influence current decision will have on the future optimal path. HJB equations allow to treat
instantaneous deviations in continuous time as if they were potentially profitable.
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In the similar fashion, the investor’s problem in continuous time is
rW (α̂) = max
s, γ
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ γc ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))] (III.2)
subject to the participation constraint,
W (α̂) ě 0,
and the incentive constraint,
ϵ̂ = argmax
ϵ
[α̂ϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ α̂ϵ (V (α̂, α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)V1 (α̂, α̂))
´ α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ α̂)V2 (α̂, α̂)] ,
ϵ̂ ď γ.
It is useful to have the expressions of both the value functions at time t in the infinite integral
representation form. For the entrepreneur, it becomes





t αθϵ(αθ, α̂θ) dθ [ατϵ (ατ , α̂τ ) s (α̂τ )R ´ f (ϵ (ατ , α̂τ ))
+ γ (α̂τ ) c ´ ϵ (ατ , α̂τ ) c] dτ .
(III.3)






t α̂θ ϵ̂(α̂θ) dθ [α̂τ ϵ̂ (α̂τ ) (1 ´ s (α̂τ ))R ´ γ (α̂τ ) c] dτ . (III.4)
Functions ϵ (αt, α̂t), s (α̂t), and γ (α̂t) are the policy functions, and ϵ̂ (α̂τ ) = ϵ (α̂t, α̂t).
Depending on the information environment at hand, these problems, value functions, and
policy functions will be adjusted. In the current formulation, they reflect the worst-case scenario,
in which the investor does not observe the entrepreneur’s actions, and in this sense, this is the
most general form of the problems that are solved below.
3. The First Best
3.1. Description
The first-best scenario is straightforward. Both parties observe the effort level produced by the
entrepreneur and this information is easily verifiable in the court. This implies the possibility
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to make offers contingent on the effort level, not just on the event of the success of the project.
I will first describe the social planner’s solution to this problem and then I will discuss how to
implement the first best funding scheme in the actual full-information environment.
Appendix III.C is devoted to deriving of the combined value function and other essential
steps of the solution. Since the utilities are transferable, combining the value functions under the
assumption that there is no disagreement regarding the state of the world (represented by the
posterior belief that the project is still good, αt, at every time instance t) will produce a value
function that can be manipulated directly from the perspectives of the social planner.
The social planner’s problem is simply
rV (α) = max
ϵ
[αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α) + (1 ´ α)V 1 (α))] .
Participation constraint is not required: setting ϵ (α) = 0 everywhere guarantees that the value
function is at least zero.
The first order condition is
αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c ´ α [V 1 (α) (1 ´ α) + V (α)] = 0,
or
f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) + c = αR ´ α [V 1 (α) (1 ´ α) + V (α)] .
The second-order condition is satisfied always. Function ϵ˚ (α) is the first-best policy function.
Each time instance, the process of finding the optimal funding rate is presented in Figure III.3. The
interpretation is simple: f 1 (ϵ)+c is the marginal cost of applying the effort, αR is the immediate
marginal benefit, while α [V (α) + (1 ´ α)V 1 (α)] is the opportunity cost representing the trade
off between the higher possible success rate now and the resulting increased pessimism tomorrow.
Similar patterns arise in the other information environments.
Multiplying both sides of the first order condition by ϵ˚ (α) and combining it with the HJB
equation yields
rV (α) = f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) . (III.5)
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Figure III.3. Instantaneous Efficient Funding Rate
Marginal Benefits
Marginal Costs
Differentiating the both sides with respect to α produces
rV 1 (α) = f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) . (III.6)
These are important equilibrium conditions that together with the first order condition are
sufficient to characterize the efficient funding path.
3.2. Main Results
The main results of analyzing the first best scenario are summarized in Proposition III.1 and
pictured in Figure III.4.






, and if the effort cost
function is strictly convex, then the efficient funding rate strictly decreases over time until the project
succeeds or indefinitely. Sure projects with the prior of 1 are funded at a constant rate until success
happens. Projects with the prior lower than c
R
are never funded.
Proof. The intermediate components of the proof are located in Appendix III.C. Here, only the
intuition is described. First, I show that the efficient policy function ϵ˚ (α) is bounded and strictly
increasing.
It is easy to conclude that if α ď c
R
, then there is no reason to fund the project as even the
intermediate benefit becomes lower than the intermediate cost for any positive effort level every
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Figure III.4. The First Best Solution
Policy Function Funding Path Posterior Belief
instance of time t. So for all α ď c
R
, ϵ˚ (α) = 0, and for all α ą c
R
, ϵ˚ (α) ą 0 because the project
is still promising.
To see that ϵ˚ (α) is strictly increasing for all α ą c
R
, simply observe that if V 1 (α) ą 0, then
rV 1 (α) = f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0,
which is only possible when
ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0.
The intuition for why V 1 (α) ą 0 is simple: for any α‘t ą αt, there exist some (possibly
suboptimal) effort level ϵ‘t that guarantees that just following ϵ‘t provides higher social utility
than V (α).






because when α = c
R





will not worth the costs:
ϵc ď f (ϵ) + ϵc.
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To see that the funding rate is bounded from above, combine (III.5) and (III.6) with the first
order condition and produce an ordinary differential equation,
r (αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α
[
f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) (1 ´ α) + f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α)
´ f (ϵ˚ (α))] = 0.
This ODE produces the efficient policy function, ϵ˚ (α), when solved given some particular func-






Consider α = 1, the highest possible probability that the project is good, the sure case. Then
the ODE becomes
f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) (r + ϵ˚ (1)) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) = r (R ´ c) ,
which is just an equation that has a unique finite solution, ϵ˚ (1), because the expression on the
left-hand side of it is strictly increasing in ϵ. Therefore, function ϵ˚ (α) is strictly increasing and
bounded.
It means that every time instance, as long as α ą c
R
, the project will be funded.
Second, I show that the efficient funding rate strictly decreases indefinitely over time if
f2 (x) ą 0 for all x ě 0 and prior α0 ą cR .
Given (III.a),
α̇t = ´αtϵ
˚ (αt) (1 ´ αt) ă 0,
it is obvious that αt decreases in time as long as αt ą cR . Since ϵ
˚ (αt) is strictly increasing in αt,
then it is strictly decreasing in time:
ϵ̇˚ (αt) = ϵ
˚1 (αt) α̇t = ´αtϵ
˚ (αt) (1 ´ αt) ϵ
˚1 (αt) ă 0.
What is left to do is to show that funds are provided indefinitely if the effort cost function is
strictly convex. To do so, I establish a Lemma.
122
Lemma III.1. If policy function ϵ (α) satisfies
• integrability on [α, 1],
• ϵ (α) ą 0 for α P (α, 1],
• ϵ (α) = 0,
• and ϵ1 (α) ă 8,
then the projects with prior α0 ą α are funded indefinitely.
Proof of the Lemma can be found in Appendix III.B. The intuition for why it works is simple.
I construct a critical policy function such that if an actual policy function is almost everywhere
strictly bellow this critical function, then funding never stops. If it is not, then funding stops in
finite time.








































Therefore, the efficient funding rate strictly decreases continuously and indefinitely over time.
3.3. Discussion
The main result of the analysis of the first best environment is that projects with the prior high
enough to get started will be funded either until they are successful or indefinitely at a strictly
decreasing rate.
Under the full information environment, the first best outcome is implementable. Since the
entrepreneur’s actions are observable and verifiable, the contingent contracting is possible. Con-
sider a contract in which the investor provides funds to the entrepreneur each period t according
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to the efficient policy function ϵ˚ (αt). If the entrepreneur does not spend everything on exper-
iments and diverts a portion of the funds, then she must pay a crippling fine to the investor.
However, if she complies, then she might receive a share of the surplus, st, if the project is a
success at time t.
To see why the first best outcome is possible in such a scenario, observe that the investor
holds full bargaining power, therefore, he will make the entrepreneur break even each period:




Diverting the funds is a very bad idea as this action is observable, verifiable, and severely pun-
ishable, so the entrepreneur always invests the amount she is told to invest. Hence






This is the optimal share. Insert it into the investor’s problem and allow him to adjust the funding
rate to see if the efficient rate is optimal in this case:













rW (α) = max
ϵ
[αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ γc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))] ,
which is exactly the problem the social planner was solving, so it must have the same solution,
the same policy function, ϵ˚ (α).
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4. The Equilibrium: Observable but Unverifiable Effort
4.1. Description
In this environment, the entrepreneur’s actions are observable by the investor, but it is pro-
hibitively complicated to verify them in the court. It may be due to the nature of the job the
entrepreneur is doing: the complexity of experiments may be indescribable to the outsiders, or
because despite that both the parties perfectly observe the state, nobody else in the world does,
and so the only way to get the information about the entrepreneur’s actions is through the in-
vestor or the entrepreneur, and both of them may have their own version of the story.
In such an environment, contingent contracting is practically impossible: if the entrepreneur
decides to divert the funds, there will be no way to verify that. Thus, the only contingency
possible is on the event of success (or alternatively, on no success). This is exactly how offering
a share of surplus st and transfer γt at time t works: stR will be paid to the entrepreneur only if
the project is a success, while transfer γt is intended to cover her costs.
One potential contract may include the clause that if the entrepreneur ever diverts the funds,
no funds will be provided in the future ever again, but this threat is not credible as long as there
are no better alternatives and as long as there is a potential surplus to extract in the relationship.
The investor is stuck with the entrepreneur. Therefore, a better contract may rely on the grim
trigger strategy that reverts to the worst possible outcome described here.
Let us consider the entrepreneur’s problem. The state is observable, so the beliefs of both
players are consistent and there is no hidden information. The problem is fully described and
solved in Appendix III.D.
Since αt = α̂t for every t, then (III.1), the entrepreneur’s problem, is just:
rV (α, α) = max
ϵ
[
αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ αϵ
(





The participation constraint will not bind: the entrepreneur can, at least, always divert the funds.
The resulting value function is






2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) + γ1 (α) c.
The investor will always want to be on the entrepreneur’s equilibrium path. Suppose not,
then if at some time t the investor decides to provide less funds, say
γt ă ϵ
˚˚ (αt) ,
then the entrepreneur will have to spend only γtc on experimentation. Given the concavity of her
objective function, she will want to invest as close to ϵ˚˚ (α) c as possible. So this is not the best
decision on the investor’s side: he could have offered a lower share, st, and achieved the same
outcome (use Figure III.3 as a reference to see why it works, as the decision process is similar
enough).




This decision will not influence ϵ˚˚ (α), as γt does not affect the instantaneous first order condi-
tion, and so the entrepreneur will still invest ϵ˚˚ (α) c. The difference
γtc ´ ϵ
˚˚ (α) c
will be diverted. This is a clear waste from the perspectives of the investor.
Therefore, the investor will always want to satisfy
γt = ϵ
˚˚ (α) .
Consider now the investor’s problem. Use (III.2) and the entrepreneur’s first order condition
as an incentive constraint, keeping in mind that γ = ϵ along the desired path:
rW (α) = max
s, ϵ
[αϵ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))]
subject to
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ) ´ c ´ α
(






and the participation constraint.
Ignore the participation constraint for now and express the problem in the Lagrangian form:
rW (α) = max
s, ϵ
[
αϵ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))
+ λ
(
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ) ´ c ´ α
(





There are two first order conditions: first, with respect to ϵ,
α (1 ´ s (α))R ´ c ´ α (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α)) ´ λf2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) = 0,
and second, with respect to s,
´αϵ˚˚ (α)R + λ (α)αR = 0.
From the second condition, it is obvious that
λ (α) = ϵ˚˚ (α) ,
and so it yields
rW (α) = f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 , (III.8)
which is positive for all positive ϵ, hence the participation constraint is not binding. Also,
rW 1 (α) = f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 ϵ˚˚1 (α) + 2f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) .
These last two expressions together with the first order conditions are important steps in the
solution that make it possible to characterize the equilibrium funding rate in this environment.
4.2. Main Results
The main results of finding the optimal funding rate in the observable but unverifiable effort
environment are characterized in Proposition III.2 and shown in Figure.






, and if the effort cost
function is strictly convex, then the equilibrium funding rate in the environments with observable





Figure III.5. Observable but Unverifiable Effort Environment
Policy Function Funding Path Posterior Belief
Proof. Intermediate steps of the proof can be found in Appendix III.D. Only the intuition is de-
scribed here. I first show that the funding rate is everywhere inefficient. Suppose, on the contrary,
it were efficient or even higher than efficient, that is, suppose that for some α,
ϵ˚˚ (α) ě ϵ˚ (α) .
Then it must be the case that value function (III.7) together with value function III.8 are higher
than the combined social value (III.5) in the case of the first best:
rV (α, α) + rW (α) = f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + ϵ˚˚ (α) c
ą f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) = rV (α) ,
which is impossible, hence ϵ˚˚ (α) ă ϵ˚ (α) everywhere and funding schedule is inefficient.
Second, I show that function ϵ˚˚ (α) is bounded and it is strictly increasing. Consider the
ordinary differential equation
r (αR ´ c) ´ [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c] (r + αϵ˚˚ (α)) + αf (ϵ˚˚ (α))
= α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α)
[




which is the condition that describes the equilibrium funding path in the case of observable but
unverifiable effort and produces ϵ˚˚ (α) when solved, given some particular function f (¨) with
f (0) = 0 and f 1 (0) = 0.
The lowest posterior belief is 2c
R
—twice as high as the lowest posterior in the first best case.
Given an equal share of 1
2
, this belief level makes the investor break even:






R ´ ϵc = ϵc ´ ϵc0,
while making the entrepreneur stop experimenting:













Insert ϵ˚˚ (α) = 0 to the ODE to find the desired lowest possible α, which still makes it
possible to agree on continuing with the project:
r (αR ´ 2c) = α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) c.
The left-hand side of this expression is positive only if α ě 2c
R
, the right-hand side is positive
always when funding rate increases. Therefore, there is always a room for agreement as long as
α ě 2c
R
, which implies α = 2c
R
. This is the lower bound.
To get the upper bound, consider α = 1. Then the ODE becomes
r (R ´ c) = [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (1)) ϵ˚˚ (1) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (1)) + c] (r + ϵ˚˚ (1)) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (1)) ,
and it has has a unique solution ϵ˚˚ (1), which is an upper bound.
Therefore, function ϵ˚˚ (α) is bounded if it increases everywhere between 2c
R
and 1.






, suppose that it does not.







ODE with respect to α and assume ϵ˚˚1 (α) = 0, then assume the same for the ODE itself and
combine the two to produce
r
α
[(1 ´ α) (f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c) + c]
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= α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚2 (α)
[
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + 3f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c
]
.
The left-hand side of the expression is strictly positive, so the right-hand side must be positive
as well, so ϵ˚˚2 (α) ą 0, which implies that all the extreme points that can be found for function
ϵ˚˚ (α) are local minima. This is impossible: either there is one local minimum without any local
maxima, but then it means that the function is negative somewhere; or there must be at least
one local maximum due to the smoothness of the function (as a solution to the ODE), which
contradicts the finding that all the extreme points are local minima.
Therefore, function ϵ˚˚ (α) strictly increases everywhere on the interior of the range. So




˚˚ (αt) (1 ´ αt) ϵ
˚˚1 (αt) ă 0.







The only thing left to do is to show that funding never stops. Function ϵ˚˚ (αt) is bounded























= 0 ă 8.
Hence, all the conditions of Lemma III.1 are satisfied and funding never stops.
Therefore, if the prior is less than one, but higher than 2c
R
, the funding rate in the observable
but unverifiable action environment is always inefficient and it decreases indefinitely it time
conditional on no success.
4.3. Discussion
This Markovian solution does not employ the properties of the infinite time that both the players
may use to their advantage: a Folk theorem could possibly be used to come up with a better
outcome. However, the characterized solution can be used as the lowest equilibrium benchmark
to which the players can revert if they fail to implement a better solution. The actual property and
characterization of the strategies that implement a better outcome is beyond the purpose of this
chapter as it relies on non-Markovian equilibria concepts. However, the intuition is simple: the
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investor will promise a better share and provide more funds to the entrepreneur as long as he sees
that no deviation happened in the past. If the entrepreneur deviates, then the play immediately
reverts to the Markov equilibrium described above.
5. The Equilibrium: Unobservable Effort
5.1. Description
Finally, let us consider the environment in which the entrepreneur’s actions are completely un-
observable by the investor. In this setup, providing incentives to the principal to stay on the
equilibrium funding path will be of grave importance for the investor. Appendix III.E is devoted
to the development of the problem and to the characterization of the equilibrium conditions.
In this environment, the only contingency possible in contracts is the contingency on the
event of success or the lack thereoff. Share st offered by the investor each period exploits this
possibility as stR is paid to the entrepreneur only if the project succeeds.
Start with the entrepreneur’s problem. She received the offer, accepted it, and needs to decide
upon her effort level. She believes that the probability that the project is good is α and she knows
that the investor believes that this probability is α̂. She solves
rV (α, α̂) = max
ϵ
[(αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc+ γc) ´ αϵ (V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂))
´ V2 (α, α̂) α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂)] .
The corresponding first order condition is
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)] = 0.
The second order condition is satisfied automatically.
Now that the investor knows that the entrepreneur’s best response depends on the investor’s
offer schedule, he can solve his problem having the entrepreneur’s first order condition as a
constraint:
rW (α̂) = max
s, ϵ̂
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ̂c ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))]
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subject to
α̂sR ´ f 1 (ϵ̂) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α̂, α̂) (1 ´ α̂) + V (α̂, α̂)] = 0,
and the participation constraint that I will ignore for now.
In the Lagrangian form, the problem becomes
rW (α̂) = max
s, ϵ̂
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ̂c ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))
+ λ (α̂sR ´ f 1 (ϵ̂) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α̂, α̂) (1 ´ α̂) + V (α̂, α̂)])]
There are two first order conditions. The first one, with respect to ϵ̂:
α̂ (1 ´ s (α̂))R ´ c ´ α̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂)) ´ λf2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) = 0,
and the second one, with respect to s:
´α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)R + λ (α̂) α̂R = 0.
From the second condition
λ (α̂) = ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) .
Hence
rW (α̂) = f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 ,
which is positive for positive funding rates, hence no need for the explicit participation constraint,
and
rW 1 (α̂) = f3 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) + 2f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) .
So the investor’s value function increases in the state variable if the funding schedule increases
in the state variable.
5.2. Main Results
I establish the main results for the unobservable effort environment in Proposition III.3 and
demonstrate in Figure III.6. This environment is more complicated than the first-best and the
observable but unverifiable effort environments. However, it is possible to establish that the
funding rate will eventually be strictly decreasing over time. At the beginning, however, it is
possible that the project will be funded at an increasing rate.
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Figure III.6. Unobservable Effort Environment
Policy Function Funding Path Posterior Belief






and if the effort cost
function is strictly convex, then the equilibrium funding rate in the environments with unobservable
effort eventually becomes strictly decreasing in time and then funding strictly decreases until the
project is successful or indefinitely. Projects with the prior lower than 2c
R
are never funded.
Proof. Some important steps of this proof can be found in Appendix III.E.
I begin by showing that the policy function, ϵ̂˚˚, is bounded. The lower bound is the same as
in the environment with the observable but unverifiable effort. The intuition is simple: as long
as there exist a surplus to extract and a share that allows the investor and the entrepreneur to
consider experimentation, then there will be a possibility to write contracts. When α = 2c
R
, the
optimal share is s = 1
2
, and the level of investment is zero. This is the lower bound.
Finding the upper bound is more complicated in this environment, but it exists. The second-
order ordinary differential equation that yields function ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)when solved, given some function
f (¨), degenerates to
r (R ´ f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (1)) ´ f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (1)) ϵ̂˚˚ (1) ´ 2c)
´
[




when α̂ = 1. This is the same result as in the observable but unverifiable case, so ϵ̂˚˚ (1) = ϵ˚˚ (1).
Thus, function ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) connects two points with finite values, it has finite first derivatives between
these two points, and it is a solution to the ordinary differential equation, so it must be bounded
above as well. If it strictly increases in α̂, then the upper bound is obvious, ϵ̂˚˚ (1), otherwise, it
is located somewhere on the interior of the range.
Second, I show that ϵ̂˚˚1 (α) ă 8. Divide both sides of the differential equation that produces












































Third, I show that the project will be funded indefinitely. Function ϵ̂˚˚ is bounded and contin-







Funding is positive everywhere on the interior of this interval as the project is viable and there is










ă 8. Therefore, all the requirements for
Lemma III.1 are satisfied, and so the project is funded indefinitely or until success is achieved.





= 0, it must be the case that there exist some belief
α̂‘, such that for all α̂ ď α̂‘, ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) ą 0. It means that when the belief level of α̂‘ is reached, the
funding rate begins to decrease in time indefinitely.
5.3. Discussion
The fact that the funding ratemay be increasing can be explained if we consider the entrepreneur’s
incentives:
αsR ´ α [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)] = f
1 (ϵ˚˚) + c.
Consider an example, in which f (x) = x2,R = 20, c = 2, and r = 0.05. The equilibrium funding
rate and the share schedules for this example are demonstrated in Figure III.7. Notice that for α
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Figure III.7. An Example of the Policy Function with a Decreasing Region
close to one, the shares, which are offered to the entrepreneur, increase with α (decrease with
time). Hence as the time passes, αsR decreases. In such circumstances, for the funding rate to
increase in time, it must be the case that the opportunity cost α [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)]
decreases fast, which is exactly what happens when the entrepreneur becomes more pessimistic
given high initial level of optimism. The investor exploits this decrease in the opportunity cost
to his advantage: now he can offer higher funding rates for a lower level of optimism, α.
6. Comparative Statics
6.1. Change of Parameters
It is interesting to understand how the funding paths depend of the parameters of the model.
The main parameters of the model are the discount rate, r, the total surplus of size R, and the
marginal monetary cost of effort, c. I consider four different cases:
1. Patient players (r is low), high surplus (R
c
is high);
2. Impatient players (r is high), high surplus;
3. Patient players, low surplus (R
c
is low);
4. Impatient players, low surplus.
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Figure III.8. Comparative Statics: Low Surplus, Patience (Top) and Impatience (Bottom)
Policy Function Funding Path Posterior Belief
These four cases are presented in Figures III.8 and III.9. The left-hand sides of the figures
demonstrate how funding rates depend on the level of optimism. The middle parts depict the
funding rates. The right-hand sides show how the posterior beliefs evolve over time. The top
portions of the figures show the “patient” cases, while the bottom parts—the “impatient.” Notice
that everywhere the “unobserved” policy function is higher than the “observable but unverifiable”
policy function.
The patience measure significantly affects the funding path. If the players are impatient,
they begin experimenting at the high funding rate, which quickly decreases over time. The most
profound this effect is for the first-best funding rate. Since all the funding rates are higher for the
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Figure III.9. Comparative Statics: High Surplus, Patience (Top) and Impatience (Bottom)
Policy Function Funding Path Posterior Belief
impatient players, it means that impatience allows completing the projects faster. Being patient
means relying more on the potential success in the future.
The second component that affects the funding rates tremendously is the profitability rate, R
c
,
which is high for the high-surplus projects and low for the low-surplus projects. A decrease in
the surplus size shifts policy functions to the right, which means that the projects now require
much higher level of optimism to be worked on. The decrease in the surplus size also changes
the slope of the functions making them flatter, which means that the funding rates become lower
everywhere. This effect is especially pronounced for the equilibria environments: having a low
surplus means that the funding rates become vanishingly small.
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The high-surplus projects that have a prior close to one demonstrate funding rates that will
increase in time at the beginning, and will become strictly decreasing as the time goes on. This
effect, however, is not significantly pronounced in these examples. More research is needed to
determine the exact conditions when the funding rates may be increasing at the beginning.
6.2. Time
The traditional implication that projects are abandoned too early should be taken carefully. What
it essentially means is that projects are underfunded, not that the time spent on projects is sub-
optimal in general.
Notice that in the presence of the convex effort costs, it takes longer to reach a certain level
of pessimism as compared to the first best. In the end, it actually looks like entrepreneurs and
investors spend too much time working on projects while applying too little effort.
6.3. Ignorance is Bliss
An interesting outcome of the numerical analysis is that the policy function in the environment
with unobservable effort tends to be everywhere higher (for every α) than the policy function in
the environment with the observable but unverifiable effort. The explanation for this is simple: if
the entrepreneur diverts, but the investor does not observe the deviation, then the entrepreneur
becomesmore optimistic andwill be willing to invest more than the investor supplies. It is not the
case in the situation with the observable but unverifiable actions: the entrepreneur can divert the
funds and later effectively force the investor to pay more because the investor will clearly observe
that the state has not changed as much as he anticipated, and so he will be more optimistic, and
more ready to invest, as well.
In this sense, the ignorance of the state is the device that allows the investor to commit to
providing funds at a certain rate without paying attention to the signals that come from the
entrepreneur. Surprisingly, the investor will prefer to be uninformed. Thiswill make some threats
by the entrepreneur non-credible: even if she actually diverts, the investor will not believe her.




7.1. Venture Capital Markets
This chapter, as well as many previous papers, traditionally deals with bilateral funding schemes,
with a single investor and a single entrepreneur. If there is a continuity of entrepreneurs with
different projects, and a continuity of investors with different attitude towards risk, then there
are many questions a model with convex costs could answer.
The questions to ask are: which projects will get funded and how the funding schedule will
unroll; will projects be abandoned earlier in such a setting; is the first-best result possible if the
outside options are high; will the problem of observable but unverifiable environment be solved
by negatively screening slackers, and many other interesting questions.
7.2. Hazard Rates
Another model to consider is the model in which the current probability of success of the project
depends on the accumulated effort. Thus, there will be two states: the probability that the project
is still good, and the accumulated effort. In this environment, Markov strategies will be richer,
and the range of potential funding functions wider.
In particular, it will be interesting to find if there are projects that nobody wants to undertake
because they require too much initial accumulated effort to become promising. Discovering the
hazard rate functions that produce the funding rates which are locally increasing in time and
characterizing the set of such functions would be a good starting point.
8. Conclusions
I develop a solution technique and characterize the Markov sequential equilibria of the dynamic
agency model with convex effort costs and three information environments. I demonstrate that
the funding rates eventually become strictly decreasing in time. I show that patience and surplus
size play important roles in how the shape of the funding function looks like and I characterize
some promising extensions to the model.
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Common Appendices
A. Probability of No Success
Define time T to be the time when the project succeeds. If it never succeeds, then T = 8. Begin
by defining the probability of reaching no success by time t:
P (T ą t) = 1 ´ α0 + α0e´
şt
0 ϵτ dτ .
Then the probability that the project is still good at time t conditional on no success so far is










The time-derivative of probability αt is
dαt
dt ” α̇t = ´ϵt
 α0e´ şt0 ϵτ dτ






















= ´ϵt (1 ´ αt) .
Thus







ϵτ (1 ´ ατ ) dτ .
Now, go back to the probability of no success by time t and produce:















































0 ατ ϵτ dτ
= e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
Therefore,
P (T ą t) = 1 ´ α0 + α0e´
şt
0 ϵτ dτ = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
B. Payoffs and Expectations
Begin by formulating the probability distribution of the random time the project succeeds. Given
that
P (T ą t) = e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ ,
the cumulative distribution function of random variable T , the time when the project succeeds,
is
F (t) = P (T ă t) = 1 ´ e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .
Thus the probability density function of random variable T is
p (t) = αtϵte
´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ .




































e´rtktp (T ) dtdT .











































0 ατ ϵτ dτkt dt.

































0 ατ ϵτ dτ [αtϵtvt ´ kt] dt.
This expression can be used to derive the particular payoff functions of the players.
C. Evolution of Beliefs and Critical Experimentation Rate
This appendix is devoted to the development of the critical experimentation rate that is used to
determine if experimentation ever stops. The idea behind this is that if the actual experimentation
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rate is everywhere below the critical experimentation rate then the experiments are conducted
for infinitely many periods of time. I want to know if αt ą α approaches lower bound α asymp-
totically as time advances or in finite time. That is, I would like to know if for some t, and for all
really small ∆ ą 0,
|α̇t∆| ď |αt ´ α| ,
or since αt ě α everywhere where we are interested in it to be, and α̇t ď 0,
α̇t∆ ě α ´ αt.
Substitute the expression for α̇t:









α (1 ´ α)∆
.
If some experimentation policy function ϵ (α) is everywhere below function ϵ̄ (α), then αt ap-
proaches α asymptotically in time, that is, the experimentation never completely stops.
Notice that




ϵ̄ (α) = 8,
and everywhere in-between, this function can be made as large as we please by simply chang-
ing ∆.
Therefore, if policy function ϵ (α) is bounded and continuous, then it is below function ϵ̄ (αt)
everywhere on (α, 1]. The only problematic point is α = α.
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The first derivative of the critical function at α is
ϵ̄1 (α) =
1
α (1 ´ α)∆
ă 8.
It can be made as large as we please by changing ∆, but it will still remain finite. So if a policy
function has a vertical tangent at α, then it cannot be everywhere below ϵ̄ (α). Hence, finite
derivative of a policy function at α is crucial.





I.A. The Generalized Control Problem
I present and solve the problem of finding the optimal experimentation path in the case when the
entrepreneur needs to reach a certain belief level by time T2 from time T1.










ατ ϵτ dτ (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) dt
]
subject to α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt)





0 ατ ϵτ dτ = e´
şT1








ατ ϵτ dτ ,























e´rtM̄t (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) dt
]
subject to α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
˙̄Mt = ´αtϵtM̄t
and αT1 , αT2 given,
M̄T1 = 1.
(I.a)
Assign Lagrange multipliers λt and µt to the first and the second constraints, respectively, and











αT1 , αT2 given,
M̄T1 = 1.





e´rtM̄t (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) ´ λtαtϵt (1 ´ αt) ´ µtαtϵtM̄t + λ̇tαt + µ̇tM̄t
]
dt






Ht = e´rtM̄t (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) ´ λtαtϵt (1 ´ αt) ´ µtαtϵtM̄t.
The necessary conditions are
BHt
Bϵt
= e´rtM̄t (αtsR ´ f














e´rt (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) ´ µtαtϵt
]
;
laws of motion of the state variables αt and M̄t,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) and
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˙̄Mt = ´αtϵtM̄t;
and the boundary conditions of the state variables.
Define
λt ” e
´rtλ̄t, so λ̇t = ´re´rtλ̄t + e´rt ˙̄λt,
µt ” e
´rtµ̄t, so µ̇t = ´re´rtµ̄t + e´rt ˙̄µt.
Using these new costate variables, rewrite the first three necessary conditions:
M̄t (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) ´ λ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) ´ µ̄tαtM̄t = 0,
´ ˙̄λt + λ̄tϵt (1 ´ 2αt) = M̄tϵtsR ´ µ̄tϵtM̄t ´ rλ̄t,
´ ˙̄µt + µ̄tαtϵt = αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ´ rµ̄t.
Differentiate the first condition with respect to time:
˙̄Mt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) + M̄t (α̇tsR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
+ αt (1 ´ αt)
[
´ ˙̄λt + λ̄tϵt (1 ´ 2αt)
]






plug the second condition into it:
˙̄Mt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) + M̄t (α̇tsR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
+ αt (1 ´ αt)
[
M̄tϵtsR ´ µ̄tϵtM̄t ´ rλ̄t
]







˙̄Mt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) ´ M̄tf
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t ´ rαt (1 ´ αt) λ̄t + αtM̄t [´ ˙̄µt + µ̄tαtϵt] = 0.
Plug the third necessary condition into it:
˙̄Mt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) ´ M̄tf
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t ´ rαt (1 ´ αt) λ̄t
+ αtM̄t [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ´ rµ̄t] = 0.
Simplify:
αtM̄t [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)] ´ M̄tf
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t ´ r
[




Finally, use the first necessary condition in the last term to produce:
r (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) = αt [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)] ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t.
Notice that M̄t was canceled out. Given that M̄t ą 0 for any t, this can be done without any
problems.
Therefore, the solution to the generalized control problem is represented by the system of











1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
and boundary conditions,
αT1 , αT2 given.
Assume, and verify individually for each particular problem, that ϵt ą 0 for all t between T1
and T2. Then, given that αt monotonically decreases in time, and that time t does not directly
influence any equation in the system that characterizes the optimal paths, it is enough to have
just one state variable αt that uniquely characterizes the state at time t. Define the policy function
that presents control variable ϵ as a function of state varibale α as ϵ (α). Then
ϵt ” ϵ (αt) , ϵ̇t = ϵ1 (αt) α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ϵ1 (αt) .
I can now combine two differential equations, drop time subscripts, and produce the first or-
der nonlinear ordinary differential equation that characterizes every solution to the generalized
problem in terms of policy function ϵ (α):
ϵ1 (α) = ´
f 1 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α) ´ f (ϵ (α))
(1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α)
+ r
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ (α)) ´ c
α (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α)
. (I.b)
Recall that f2 (x) ą 0 for all x and that f (¨) is twice continuously differentiable. It means
that the right hand side of the expression above is continuously differentiable in ϵ and continuous
in α (ignoring its effect on ϵ) for α P (0, 1). If there exist a boundary condition ϵ (α) = ϵ, then
according to Picard–Lindelöf theorem the solution to the differential equation above in terms of
policy function ϵ (α) is unique.
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I.B. The Efficient Solution
I.B.1. Existence and Uniqueness





e´trMt [αtϵtR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
To write it in the form of the generalized problem, (I.a), solved in Appendix I.A, I set
T1 = 0, T2 = 8,
αT1 = α0, M̄t = Mt, @t,
s = 1.




and set αT2 = α8. Given these assumption, as well as the assumption that experimentation rates
will stay positive for all t, I know that all the solutions to the social planner’s problem in terms
of policy functions must satisfy
ϵ˚1 (α) = ´
f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α))
(1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α)
+ r
αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c
α (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α)
,
which is a form of equation (I.b) for given assumptions. I can rewrite the differential equation
without fractions:
r [αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c]
= α [f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) + (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α)] .
(I.c)
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From Appendix I.A, I know that the solution to this differential equation is unique if I manage to
establish one boundary condition of the form
ϵ˚ (α) = ϵ.
To produce the boundary condition, observe that there exists the lowest belief level of α such




αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc =
c
R
ϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = ´f (ϵ) ď 0,
which means that the immediate benefits of experimenting are negative for any positive exper-
imentation rate. Posterior belief α can only decrease in time, so if I still decide to experiment
ignoring the loss, then in the future I will reach α ă α. My immediate benefits from experiment-
ing will be
αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ă αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = ´f (ϵ) ď 0.
Therefore, if the belief level of α is reached then there is no reason to carry on with experiments,
because it will only cause losses. Notice that it is not the case if α ą c
R
. Suppose that α = α+ δ,
where δ ą 0 is very small. Then
αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = (α + δ) ϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = δϵR ´ f (ϵ) ,
and it is always possible to find ϵ to keep this expression positive. Therefore, the boundary con-
dition exists and it is





There is only one solution to the social planner’s problem in terms of policy functions. I can also
establish that for the social planner’s problem, α8 = cR . This condition is verified in the next
Appendix.
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I.B.2. Properties of the Efficient Experimentation Path
The important properties of the efficient experimentation path are:
Staticity at the top : the experimentation rate for sure projects (α = 1) is stationary. For belief
level α = 1, differential equation (I.c) degenerates to equation
r [R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ´ c] = f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ϵ˚ (1) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) .


















In this case, efficient experimentation level ϵ˚ (1) is stationary, monotone, and strictly positive
provided that R ą c (so that c
R
ă 1). Hence, sure projects must be worked on at the constant
efficient experimentation rate, ϵ˚ (1), until success happens.






, the experimentation rate in-
creases in α, but since thr posterior belief, α, strictly decreases over time given no success1, the
experimentation rate decreases in time. If ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0, it means that
ϵ̇˚ (α) = α̇ϵ˚1 (α) = ´αϵ˚ (α) (1 ´ α) ϵ˚1 (α) ă 0.
Imagine that, on the contrary, that is not the case. Solutions to the first order differential equations





= 0 and ϵ˚ (1) ą 0, given c
R
ă 1, experimentation
rate ϵ˚ (α) must continuously increase somewhere for α between c
R
and 1. So, for it to ever
decrease, function ϵ˚ (α) must have at least one extreme point. Suppose there is such a point.
Pick some α̂, differentiate both sides of (I.c) with respect to α and assume that ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0:
rR = f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α̂)) + α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) .
Next, plug ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0 into (I.c) directly:
r [α̂R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ´ c] = α̂ [f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α̂))] .
1Recall that dαdt ” α̇ = ´αϵ (1 ´ α) ă 0.
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Combine these two conditions together:
rR =
r [α̂R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ´ c]
α̂
+ α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) ,
and simplify:
r
f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) + c
α̂
= α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) .






, ϵ˚ ě 0, f 1 (¨) ě 0, and f2 (¨) ą 0, it must be the case that
ϵ˚2 (α̂) ą 0
when ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0. It means that all the extreme points that can be found along the efficient
experimentation path must be local minima. It is only possible if ϵ˚ (α) first strictly decreases











= 0, and experimentation
rates cannot be negative. I reached a contradiction. Therefore, there are no extreme points and
function ϵ˚ (α) strictly increases in α, and so it strictly decreases over time.
Experimenting never stops : despite that experimentation rate strictly decreases over time, ex-






efficient policy function ϵ˚ (α) is everywhere below critical function ϵ̄ (α) from Appendix C and







• function ϵ˚ (α) is a solution to an ordinary differential equation, it is continuous;











= 0 to ϵ˚ (1) ă 8, so it is
bounded.








r [αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c] ´ αf 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) + αf (ϵ˚ (α))























Therefore, the efficient experimentation rate strictly decreases indefinitely over time until the
project is a success or forever. This confirms the assumption that for all t ě 0, ϵ˚t ą 0, thus αt
uniquely characterizes the state.
I.C. The Equilibrium with the Binding Budget Constraint
I.C.1. Phase Two of the Game







e´trMt [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
]




α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
P, s given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.














subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
P, s given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,





e´tr dt = 1
r
,













e´tr (λrP ´ λϵtc+Mt [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc]) dt
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
P, s given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
I use the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle to solve this problem. Assign Lagrange multipliers

















Assume that limits limtÑ8 αt ” α8 ă 0 and limtÑ8 Mt ” M8 ă 0 exist. Integrate by parts µtα̇t












[µ̇tαt + ν̇tMt] dt ´ [µ8α8 ´ µ0α0] ´ [ν8M8 ´ µ0] .
Define Hamiltonian function
Ht = e´tr (λrP ´ λϵtc+Mt [αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc]) ´ µtαtϵt (1 ´ αt) ´ νtαtϵtMt.
The necessary conditions are
BHt
Bϵt
= e´tr (´λc+Mt [αtsR ´ f














e´tr (αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc) ´ νtαtϵt
]
;
laws of motion of the state variables αt and Mt,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) and
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt;
and the boundary conditions of the state variables.
Define
µt ” e
´rtµ̄t, so µ̇t = ´re´rtµ̄t + e´rt ˙̄µt,
νt ” e
´rtν̄t, so ν̇t = ´re´rtν̄t + e´rt ˙̄νt.
Using these new costate variables, rewrite the first three necessary conditions:
´λc+Mt [αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c] ´ µ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) ´ ν̄tαtMt = 0,
´ ˙̄µt + µ̄tϵt (1 ´ 2αt) = MtϵtsR ´ ν̄tϵtMt ´ rµ̄t,
´ ˙̄νt + ν̄tαtϵt = αtϵtsR ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc ´ rν̄t.
Differentiate the first condition with respect to time:
Ṁt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) +Mt (α̇tsR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)






Using Appendix I.A as a guideline, I produce:
αtMt [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)] ´ Mtf
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t ´ r [αt (1 ´ αt) µ̄t + ν̄tαtMt] = 0.
Finally, insert the first necessary condition into the last term:
r [´λc+Mt (αtsR ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c)] = αtMt [f













1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)] ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t.
written in the policy function form, it becomes:
r
[












this differential equation can be written as
r
[






= α [f 1 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α) ´ f (ϵ (α)) + (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α) ϵ1 (α)] .
Comparing it to the differential equation that describes the equilibrium experimentation rate
when the budget constraint does not bind,
r [αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ (α)) ´ c] = α [f 1 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α) ´ f (ϵ (α)) + (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ (α)) ϵ (α) ϵ1 (α)] ,






, the policy function corresponding to the binding budget
constraint will be lower than the policy function when the budget constraint does not bind. This









The effect of having a binding constraint is similar to having an increase in the marginal cost
of experimentation c for every level of α ď α0. According to Appendix I.D.2, it means that the
policy function associated with the binding budget constraint will be below the policy function
with no constraint.
I.D. Comparative Statics
I.D.1. Policy Function Effects
I show that, given two different policy functions—one is everywhere higher than the other—the
total expected revenue from experimenting is higher for the former than for the later.
I begin by showing that given two continuously differentiable policy functions, ϵ (α) and
ϵ̂ (α), such that for all α,
ϵ (α) ą ϵ̂ (α) ,
the total expected revenue from experimentation generated by using policy function ϵ (α) is
higher than the expected revenue generated by adhering to policy function ϵ̂ (α). If it is so,










0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ α̂tϵ̂tR dt,
whereαt and ϵt are the time-paths of the posterior beliefs and the experimentation rates produced
by the first policy function, ϵ (α), and α̂t, ϵ̂t are the respective time-paths produced by the second













0 ατ ϵτ dτ dt
= ´ e´tre´
şt











0 ατ ϵτ dτ dt





0 ατ ϵτ dτ dt.
From Appendix A, I know that
e´
şt
0 ατ ϵτ dτ = 1 ´ α0 + α0e
´
şt












0 ατ ϵτ dτ dt











= 1 ´ (1 ´ α0) r
ż 8
0














































































0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ α̂tϵ̂tR dt,
it is enough to confirm that




































It means that the belief evolution path associated with the “lower” policy function always stays
above the belief evolution path associated with the “higher” policy function. Simply put, the
experimenting agent stays relatively more optimistic longer when faced with the lower policy
function.
Given that the prior is α0, at t = 0,
αt = α̂t = α0,
however, the time-derivatives of the posterior believes for two policy functions are different:
´α̂tϵ̂ (α̂t) (1 ´ α̂t) = ´α0ϵ̂ (α0) (1 ´ α0) ą ´α0ϵ (α0) (1 ´ α0) = αtϵ (αt) (1 ´ αt) .
Due to continuity of the belief evolution paths, it means that for some small t̄ ą 0, for all t P (0, t̄),
α̂t ą αt
because αt decreases faster than α̂t.
Suppose that for some t1 ą t̄, this inequality reverses. Due to continuity it means that there
must be some point at which belief levels coincide. Suppose that this happens exactly at t = t̄:
α̂t̄ = αt̄.
However, then the time-derivatives of the posterior beliefs at t = t̄ will be different again:
´α̂t̄ϵ̂ (α̂t̄) (1 ´ α̂t̄) ą ´αt̄ϵ (αt̄) (1 ´ αt̄)
simply because for α̂t̄ = αt̄,
ϵ̂ (α̂t̄) ă ϵ (αt̄) .
Due to continuity, it means that there must be some t ă t̄, such that for all t P (t, t̄),
αt ą α̂t.
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This will contradict the fact that for all t P (0, t̄),
α̂t ą αt,
therefore, t̄ with the desired properties does not exist and α̂t is everywhere strictly above αt for
t ą 0. I established that a higher policy function implies higher total expected revenue from
experimenting.
I.D.2. Parameter Changes Effects
There are four important parameters that affect a policy function: total surplusR, marginal mone-
tary cost of experimenting c, discount coefficient r, and prior probability that the project is good
α0. There is another parameter that affects the movement of a policy function, which is itself
affected by the changes in these main parameters, equilibrium share s˚˚. Thus any parameter
change must be analyzed together with the resulting change in share s˚˚.













This constraint was binding prior to the increase in the surplus size. Remember that the en-
trepreneur is ex ante indifferent to the size of the share, it only affects the budget constraint and
the ex post incentives to experiment. So suppose that the entrepreneur adjusts s such that sR
does not change after the increase in R. It means that the ex post incentives of the entrepreneur
are the same: she will experiment according to the same policy function as before the change in
R, so path ϵ˚˚t is unaffected. However, sR staying the same implies that (1 ´ s)R increases as
R raises. Then the left had side of the budget constraint expands while the right hand side stays
constant due to unaffected policy function. The constraint no longer binds. As it was argued
in the description of the first phase of the game with non-binding budget constraint, when the
constrain does not bind, Entrepreneur wants to raise share s to improve the ex post incentives to
experiment. Therefore, as R moves up, sR increases as well.
Consider two policy functions ϵ˚˚ (α) and ε˚˚ (α), the first one is associated with surplus
R and the second—with surplus R̂, R̂ ą R. Share ŝ corresponds to surplus R̂ and share s—to
surplus R. Therefore, ŝR̂ ą sR. Now, consider a point where a policy function is zero. Given
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, which means that policy function ε˚˚ (α) intersects horizontal axis to
the left of ϵ˚˚ (α). Policy functions are continuous and strictly increasing, so it must be the case
that for some α̂, for all α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ą ϵ˚˚ (α). Suppose that for α̂, ε˚˚ (α̂) = ϵ˚˚ (α̂) = x. Then
it must be the case that (see (I.3))
ε˚˚1 (α̂) = r
α̂ŝR̂ ´ f 1 (x) ´ c ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
ą r
α̂sR ´ f 1 (x) ´ c ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
= ϵ˚˚1 (α̂) .
By intermediate value theorem, there must exist some small δ ą 0, such that
ε˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) ě ϵ˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) .
However, given the assumption that for α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ą ϵ˚˚ (α), it would imply that
ε˚˚ (α̂) ą ϵ˚˚ (α̂) .
There two policy functions never intersect. It means that ε˚˚ (α) must be everywhere above
ϵ˚˚ (α). Increasing surplus R shifts policy curve upward.
Second, using similar logic, it is easy to conclude that increasing the marginal monetary cost
of experimentation, c, shifts the policy curve downward. Consider a hike in c. Suppose the
policy function shifts upward or stays same as before the change. An increase in c coupled with
nondecreasing rates of experimentations will result in the budget constraint no longer being
satisfied. To improve the situation, the entrepreneur will have to decrease share s. Thus share
will decrease.
Now, consider two policy functions: ϵ˚˚ (α), which is associated with costs c and share s;
and ε˚˚ (α), which corresponds to surplus ĉ ą c and share ŝ ă s. Consider the point where a




, so the point where policy function
ε˚˚ (α) is zero is to the right of the point where ϵ˚˚ (α) = 0. It can not be to the left of it, it will
imply that the policy function for higher cost is everywhere above the policy function for the
lower cost, which is impossible. Efficient policy functions are continuous and strictly increasing,
so it must be the case that for some α̂, for all α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ă ϵ˚˚ (α). Suppose that for α̂,
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ε˚˚ (α̂) = ϵ˚˚ (α̂) = x. Then it must be the case that
ε˚˚1 (α̂) = r
α̂ŝR ´ f 1 (x) ´ ĉ ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
ă r
α̂sR ´ f 1 (x) ´ c ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
= ϵ˚˚1 (α̂) .
By intermediate value theorem, there must exist some small δ ą 0, such that
ε˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) ď ϵ˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) .
However, given the assumption that for α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ă ϵ˚˚ (α),
ε˚˚ (α̂) ă ϵ˚˚ (α̂) .
It means that policy function ε˚˚ (α) is everywhere below ϵ˚˚ (α). Thus increasing marginal
monetary costs c shifts policy curve downward.
Third, an increase in the discount rate, other things equal, means that the distant future costs,
which are high compared to the distant future benefits, will be given a lower weight. At the same
time, future benefits, which are closer to time zero and are high compared to the costs, will be
given higher weight. In other words, the budget constraint will become more relaxed. Addition-
ally, since increasing r improves experimentation rates for high belief levels disproportionately
more than experimentation rates for lower belief levels, the experimentation rates closer to time
zero will increase and so the budget constraint might become even more relaxed. This will result
in the possibility of increasing the share, which the entrepreneur will use. So as the result of the
discount rate hikes the equilibrium share will increase.
Again, pick two policy functions, ϵ˚˚ (α) and ε˚˚1 (α), associated, respectively, with discount
rates r and r̂ ą r. The discount rate alone does not affect the point where policy functions are
equal to zero, but since share ŝ associated with function ε˚˚1 (α) is higher than share s associated




. Thus policy function ε˚˚ (α) intersects horizontal axis to
the left of ϵ˚˚ (α). Policy functions are continuous and strictly increasing, so it must be true that
for some α̂, for all α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ą ϵ˚˚ (α). Again, suppose that for α̂, ε˚˚ (α̂) = ϵ˚˚ (α̂) = x.
Then it must be true that
ε˚˚1 (α̂) = r̂
α̂ŝR ´ f 1 (x) ´ c ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
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ą r
α̂sR ´ f 1 (x) ´ c ´ α̂f 1 (x)x+ α̂f (x)
α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (x)x
= ϵ˚˚1 (α̂) .
By intermediate value theorem, there exist some tiny δ ą 0, such that
ε˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) ě ϵ˚˚1 (α̂ ´ δ) .
Given the assumption that for α ă α̂, ε˚˚ (α) ą ϵ˚˚ (α), it means that
ε˚˚ (α̂) ą ϵ˚˚ (α̂) .
Thus policy function ε˚˚ (α) is everywhere above ϵ˚˚ (α). Increasing discount coefficient r shifts
policy functions upward.
Finally, starting with a higher prior means that the entrepreneur will need more capital to
carry on with experiments at a higher rate longer. At the same time, it implies the possibility
to conduct experiments at high experimentation rates and receive higher expected surplus. So
the share may go in any direction depending on the parameters of the model, it may increase
or decrease as the prior goes up, but eventually, it will decline to exactly one-half as the prior
reaches 2c
R
. Therefore, the effect of the change in the prior belief that the project is good on the
policy functions is ambiguous.
I.E. Audited Reporting in Crowdfunding
It is easy to show that committing to reach aggregate efficient levels of experimentation every
reporting period is inefficient. Since the optimal experimentation path from the system of differ-
ential equations is
ϵ̇t = αt




1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
while the efficient path is described by
ϵ̇˚t = αt
f 1 (ϵ˚t ) ϵ
˚






1 (ϵ˚t ) ´ c
f2 (ϵ˚t )
,
then the two paths can only be the same if s = 1. This is impossible because when the share
equals one, the investors will not benefit from the project at all, and thus will not be willing to
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donate anything. The entrepreneur needs to offer something to the backers in return for their
contributions. Therefore, periodic audited disclosure does not restore full efficiency.
Periodic audited disclosure, however, can be Pareto improving when the entrepreneur com-
mits to reach the same posterior belief levels as in the efficient case over equally displaced inter-
vals of time. Consider the entrepreneur’s maximization problem at phase one of the basic game,






















1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
α0, α1 (s) , α2 (s) , α3 (s) , . . . given.
In this formulation, it looks different from (I.2) because it directly includes the solution from the
second phase of the game, but in fact, it is the same problem. The second constraint describes
the law of motion for the experimentation rates that will be followed by the entrepreneur at the
phase two, and α1 (s), α2 (s), α3 (s), and so on, are the belief targets that will be reached along
the basic equilibrium experimentation path depending on the share, s, if the entrepreneur follows
the experimentation path produced at the second phase of the game. In the basic case, there is
no way to change these belief targets directly as they depend of the share.






















1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
α0, α˚1 , α˚2 , α˚3 , . . . given.
164
It is exactly the same problem as in the one right above it, with the same laws of motion, and
the same budget constraint; the only difference is the belief targets. In this problem, the belief
targets are controlled directly and they coincide with the first best beliefs.
In this sense, the constraints in the second problem are more relaxed as the belief targets
in the basic problem are deterministic and cannot be manually controlled. Having the manual
control over the belief targets and knowing the first best belief levels, it is obvious that manually
setting the belief targets at the first best levels will bring the value of the objective function closer
to the first best value. Recall the the objective function for the first best problem and for the two
problems above are exactly the same. It is possible that there exists a better solution, but it is
definitely better to be able to control the belief levels manually and set the closer to the first best
levels than to be unable to control them at all and have them constrained by the parameters of
the model.
To sum up, by committing to the truthful audited disclosure of the aggregate experimentation
rates at the efficient levels, the entrepreneur ensures that the path for the posterior beliefs is closer
to the efficient path than it is without the commitment. Truthful disclosure is Pareto enhancing




II.A. The Generalized Control Problem
This is the generalized problem of finding the optimal experimentation path given paths (γt, t ě 0)









0 ατ ϵτ dτ (αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc) dt
]
subject to α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt)
st, γt given @t,
and α0, α8 given.





0 ατ ϵτ dτ ,









e´rtMt (αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc) dt
]
subject to α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt
and α0, α8 given,
M0 = 1.
(II.a)
Assign Lagrangemultipliers λt and µt to the first and the second constraints, respectively, assume

























λtαtϵt (1 ´ αt) ´ µtαtϵtMt + λ̇tαt + µ̇tMt
]
dt ´ [λ8α8 ´ λ0α0] ´ [µ8M8 ´ µ0] .
Define Hamiltonian function
Ht = e´rtMt (αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc) ´ λtαtϵt (1 ´ αt) ´ µtαtϵtMt.
The necessary conditions are
BHt
Bϵt
= e´rtMt (αt (stR + E) ´ f


















laws of motion of the state variables αt and Mt,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) and
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt;
and the boundary conditions of the state variables.
Define
λt ” e
´rtλ̄t, so λ̇t = ´re´rtλ̄t + e´rt ˙̄λt,
µt ” e
´rtµ̄t, so µ̇t = ´re´rtµ̄t + e´rt ˙̄µt.
Using these new costate variables, rewrite the first three necessary conditions:
Mt (αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) ´ λ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) ´ µ̄tαtMt = 0,
´ ˙̄λt + λ̄tϵt (1 ´ 2αt) = Mtϵt (stR + E) ´ µ̄tϵtMt ´ rλ̄t,
´ ˙̄µt + µ̄tαtϵt = αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc ´ rµ̄t.
Differentiate the first condition with respect to time:
Ṁt (αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) +Mt (α̇t (stR + E) + αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
+ αt (1 ´ αt)
[
´ ˙̄λt + λ̄tϵt (1 ´ 2αt)
]





plug the second condition into it:
Ṁt (αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) +Mt (α̇t (stR + E) + αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
+ αt (1 ´ αt)
[
Mtϵt (stR + E) ´ µ̄tϵtMt ´ rλ̄t
]






Ṁt (αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) +Mt (αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
´ rλ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) + αtMt [´ ˙̄µt + µ̄tαtϵt] = 0.
Plug the third necessary condition into it:
Ṁt (αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c) +Mt (αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t)
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´ rλ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) + αtMt [αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc ´ rµ̄t] = 0.
Simplify:
αtMt [f




λ̄tαt (1 ´ αt) + µ̄tαtMt
]
= 0.
Finally, use the first necessary condition in the last term to produce:
r [αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c] = αt [f
1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt) + γtc] + αtṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵt) ϵ̇t. (II.b)
Notice that Mt was canceled out. Given that Mt ą 0 for any t, this can be done without any
problems.
Therefore, the solution to the generalized control problem is represented by the system of








1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt) + γtc
f2 (ϵt)
´ r
αt (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
and boundary conditions,
α0, α8 given.
Recall that f2 (x) ą 0 for all x and that f (¨) is twice continuously differentiable. It means
that the right hand sides of the equations in the system above are continuously differentiable in ϵ
and continuous in α for α P (0, 1). Assume that st and γt are continuously differentiable as well.
Given that α0 is known, it is enough to assume that ϵ8 = 0 (instead of α8 given) to have the
uniques solution according to the generalized version of the Picard–Lindelöf theorem.
II.B. The Efficient Solution
II.B.1. Existence and Uniqueness





e´trMt [αtϵt (R + E + I) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc] dt
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subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.






Then I know that the solution to the problem is unique and it follows the system of differential







f 1 (ϵt) ϵt ´ f (ϵt)
f2 (ϵt)
´ r
αt (R + E + I) ´ f
1 (ϵt) ´ c
f2 (ϵt)
,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) .
Notice that nothing in the system depends on time explicitly and that αt strictly decreases in
time for all strictly positive ϵt. It means that αt uniquely characterizes the state. I can rewrite
this system in terms of the policy function, assuming that ϵt = ϵ (αt):
r
[
αR̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c
]
= α [f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) + (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α)] ,
(II.c)
where R̄ = R + E + I , and the boundary condition,
ϵ˚ (α) = 0.
To produce the boundary condition, observe that there exists the lowest belief level of α such




αϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc =
c
R̄
ϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = ´f (ϵ) ď 0,
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which means that the immediate benefits of experimenting are negative for any positive exper-
imentation rate. Posterior belief α can only decrease in time, so if I still decide to experiment
ignoring the loss, then in the future I will reach α ă α. My immediate benefits from experiment-
ing will be
αϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ă αϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = ´f (ϵ) ď 0.
Therefore, if the belief level of α is reached then there is no reason to carry on with experiments,
because it will only cause losses. Notice that it is not the case if α ą c
R̄
. Suppose that α = α+ δ,
where δ ą 0 is very small. Then
αϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = (α + δ) ϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc = δϵR̄ ´ f (ϵ) ,
and it is always possible to find ϵ to keep this expression positive. Therefore, the boundary con-
dition exists and it is





There is only one solution to the social planner’s problem in terms of policy functions.
II.B.2. Properties of the Efficient Experimentation Path
The important properties of the efficient experimentation path are:
Staticity at the top : the experimentation rate for sure projects (α = 1) is stationary. For belief
level α = 1, differential equation (II.c) degenerates to equation
r
[
R̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ´ c
]
= f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) ϵ˚ (1) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) .


















In this case, efficient experimentation level ϵ˚ (1) is stationary, monotone, and strictly positive
provided that R̄ ą c (so that c
R̄
ă 1). Hence, sure projects must be worked on at the constant
efficient experimentation rate of ϵ˚ (1) until success happens.
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, the experimentation rate in-
creases in α, but since the posterior belief, α, strictly decreases over time given no success1, the
experimentation rate decreases in time. If ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0, it means that
ϵ̇˚ (α) = α̇ϵ˚1 (α) = ´αϵ˚ (α) (1 ´ α) ϵ˚1 (α) ă 0.
Imagine that, on the contrary, that is not the case. Solutions to the first order differential equations





= 0 and ϵ˚ (1) ą 0, given c
R̄
ă 1, experimentation
rate ϵ˚ (α) must continuously increase somewhere for α between c
R̄
and 1. So, for it to ever
decrease, function ϵ˚ (α) must have at least one extreme point. Suppose there is such a point.
Pick some α̂, differentiate both sides of (II.c) with respect to α and assume that ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0:
rR̄ = f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α̂)) + α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) .
Next, plug ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0 into (II.c) directly:
r
[
α̂R̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ´ c
]
= α̂ [f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α̂))] .




α̂R̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ´ c
]
α̂
+ α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) ,
and simplify:
r
f 1 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) + c
α̂
= α̂ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚ (α̂)) ϵ˚ (α̂) ϵ˚2 (α̂) .






, ϵ˚ ě 0, f 1 (¨) ě 0, and f2 (¨) ą 0, it must be the case that
ϵ˚2 (α̂) ą 0
when ϵ˚1 (α̂) = 0. It means that all the extreme points that can be found along the efficient
experimentation path must be local minima. It is only possible if ϵ˚ (α) first strictly decreases











= 0, and experimentation
rates cannot be negative. So there are no extreme points and function ϵ˚ (α) strictly increases in
α and strictly decreases over time.
1Recall that dαdt ” α̇ = ´αϵ (1 ´ α) ă 0.
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Experimenting never stops : despite that experimentation rate strictly decreases over time, ex-






efficient policy function ϵ˚ (α) is everywhere below critical function ϵ̄ (α) from Appendix C and







• function ϵ˚ (α) is a solution to an ordinary differential equation, it is continuous;











= 0 to ϵ˚ (1) ă 8, so it is
bounded.










αR̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c
]
´ αf 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) + αf (ϵ˚ (α))


























Therefore, the efficient experimentation rate strictly decreases indefinitely over time until the
project is a success or forever. This confirms the assumption that for all t ě 0, ϵ˚t ą 0, thus αt
uniquely characterizes the state.
II.C. The Equilibrium
II.C.1. Binding Budget Constraint











e´rtMt (ϵtc ´ γtc) dt = 0,
α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
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(st, t ě 0) , (γt, t ě 0) given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.







e´trMt [αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵtc+ γtc] dt+ ν
ż 8
0
e´rtMt (γtc ´ ϵtc) dt
]
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
(st, t ě 0) , (γt, t ě 0) given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,







e´trMt [αtϵt (stR + E) ´ f (ϵt) ´ ϵt (1 + ν) c+ γt (1 + ν) c] dt
]
subject to: α̇t = ´αtϵt (1 ´ αt) ,
Ṁt = ´αtϵtMt,
(st, t ě 0) , (γt, t ě 0) given,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1,
ϵt ě 0, @t ě 0.
Thus the problem with the binding budget constraint is equivalent to the problem without any
budget constraint but with a higher marginal monetary cost of experimentation, c. The more stiff
the budget constraint is, the costlier it is to conduct experiments.
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II.C.2. Incentives to Experiment and Conditional Payments
First, I argue that the budget constraint binds. Suppose it does not. Recall that the incentives to
experiment at stage two depend on
ωt = R (ṡt ´ rst) + γtc.
If the budget constraint does not bind, it is possible to decrease γt for every period by multiplying
it by some number g ă 1, which is very close to one. Then it will be possible to induce the same
experimentation path as before the change by setting










Since the objective function at phase one depends only on the experimentation path and does
not depend on shares or funding rates directly, this change will not make any difference for the
entrepreneur.





0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt = 0.
The effects of changing the funding rate by multiplying it by g ă 1 everywhere while adjusting























0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ
[





The investor’s participation constraint will no longer bind. However, it was established that the
investor’s participation constraint must bind. The contradiction has been reached. Therefore, the
budget constraint must bind as well.
Second, I argue that at the second stage the budget constraint does not bind. Suppose it does.
Then the experimentation rates are determined by
r [α̂t (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ c (1 + ν)]
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= α̂t [f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc (1 + ν)] + α̂tṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt,












´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) ´ c
]
= α̂tṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt + α̂t [f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc] .
Therefore, for every belief level, the shares can be decreased by α̂tγt+r
rα̂tR
cν , which will not affect the
experimentation path and thus the objective function at stage one. However, if every share can be
decreased, then the investor’s participation constraint will no longer be binding as his share will
increase for every belief level, other things equal. The investor’s participation constraint must be
binding in equilibrium. This is a contradiction. Therefore, the budget constraint at phase two is
not restrictive.
II.C.3. Phase One Problem Statement











e´rtMt [α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] ´ γtc] dt = 0,
ż 8
0
e´rtMt [γtc ´ ϵ̂tc] dt = 0,
˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
Experimentation path ϵ̂t depends on the funding rates and the shares.
Assign multiplier λ to the first constraint and multiplier µ to the second constraint. Rewrite















e´rtMt [γtc ´ ϵ̂tc] dt
]
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,








e´trMt [α̂tϵ̂t (stR + E) ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ (1 + µ) ϵ̂tc+ (1 ´ λ+ µ) γtc
+ λα̂tϵ̂t ((1 ´ st)R + I)] dt
]
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
Treat λ and µ as numbers for now. The behavior of the entrepreneur at phase two of the game
is determined by differential equation (II.2). Written in terms of induced experimentation rates,
it becomes
r [α̂t (stR + E) ´ f
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ c] = α̂tṡtR ´ f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt + α̂t [f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc] .
This differential equation is hard to solve for ϵ̂t, but it can be solved for st. Rearrange the terms:
d
dt (stR + E) = r (stR + E) ´ r





´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f (ϵ̂t) ´ γtc.
This is a first order linear differential equation. The solution is







f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) + c
α̂τ
+
f2 (ϵ̂τ ) ˙̂ϵτ
α̂τ




where k is some constant. Define
gτ ” ´r
f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) + c
α̂τ
+
f2 (ϵ̂τ ) ˙̂ϵτ
α̂τ
´ f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + f (ϵ̂τ ) ´ γτc,
then





Pick some time T ą t and express





= erTk + erT
ż t
0










stR + E = e





In theory, the experiments can continue without bound if the project remains unsuccessful. Thus
when T Ñ 8, then, assuming that the share is bounded,










f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) + c
α̂τ
+
f2 (ϵ̂τ ) ˙̂ϵτ
α̂τ













































e´r(τ´t) (r ´ ϵ̂τ (1 ´ α̂τ ))












f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ




This expression characterizes the part of the surplus that the entrepreneur should receive if ex-
periments succeed at time t to follow the experimentation path (ϵ̂t, t ě 0) given funding path
(γt, t ě 0). In other words, instead of controlling the shares and the funding rates that induce
experimentation path (ϵ̂t, t ě 0), the entrepreneur can control the experimentation path directly
while setting the shares according to (II.d) each time period.






e´trMt [α̂tϵ̂tstR (1 ´ λ) + α̂tϵ̂t (λR + E + λI) ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ (1 + µ) ϵ̂tc
+ (1 ´ λ+ µ) γtc] dt
]
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.







λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t)
+ (1 ´ λ+ µ) γtc ´ (1 + µ) ϵ̂tc





f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ





subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
Notice that one of the control variables got changed from the share path to the experimentation
path.








f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ














f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ














f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ






e´rt (1 ´ Mt)
[
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc
]
dt.








Mt (λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t)
+ (1 ´ λ+ µ) γtc ´ (1 + µ) ϵ̂tc)
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
(
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + γtc
)]
dt
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
This is the general statement of the phase one problems of the entrepreneur. I provide two solu-
tions to it. The first solution is the “absolute” solution with unconditional payments. The second
solution is for the situation when the conditional payments are exactly equal to the amount of
funds the entrepreneur needs each period.
II.C.4. The Best Contract
First thing to notice about the phase one problem statement is that conditional payments γt do
not affect the laws of motion of the state variables and enter the objective function as simple
terms every period. Hence I can infer that one of the necessary conditions, for every period t,
will be simply
e´rt [Mt (1 ´ λ+ µ) c+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt) c] = 0,
or just




and multipliers stay constant, this condition can only be satisfied if ϵ̂t = 0 at all times. This can-
not be a solution. Otherwise, this condition will not be satisfied. However, there is an important
inference to be made. Suppose that this condition is satisfied at time t. Then the entrepreneur will
want infinite funding rate prior to t and no funding after that. It means that just by moving fund-
ing closer to time zero, the entrepreneur creates an opportunity to relax the budget constraint.
Recall that the terms of the contract do not explicitly affect the objective function at phase one.
What matters is the experimentation rate. There is a tradeoff between the experimentation rate
and funding, which can be seen in (II.d). The economics behind it is simple: conditional payments
create incentives to delay experiments because they are only received in the case of failure. They
provide incentives to fail and must be countered by higher conditional rewards. Thus it is optimal
to move all the funds to time zero.
Therefore, the best contract does not have conditional payments. The funding is either pro-
vided upfront or unconditionally over time. Unconditional funding means that the entrepreneur
will receive funds independent of the future success of the project. This way, the entrepreneur
treats the funding scheme as something given after the contract is signed. It is just her ownmoney
now, the only way they affect the experiments is by keeping the budget constraint binding.





where P is the present value of all the unconditional funds the entrepreneur will receive in the










0 α̂τ ϵ̂τ dτ α̂tϵ̂t [(1 ´ st)R + I] dt = P .
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Using the expression for P from the budget constraint in the participation constraint and in the
objective function, it is possible to simplify the problem and remove funding rate (γt, t ě 0) and
multiplier µ from the set of control variables.
The next important observation is that given that there will be no conditional funding in the
future, funding rate γt no longer influences the experimentation rate at the second phase of the
game. Thus, (II.d) degenerates to








f 1 (ϵ̂τ ) ϵ̂τ + rc
α̂τ
´ f (ϵ̂τ )
]
dτ .








Mt (λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc)
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
(





subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
This is a dynamic control problem. It is best approached from the perspectives of Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle.
Assign multipliers νt and ξt to the first and the second constraint from this problem, respec-





e´trMt [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[


















e´trMt [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
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+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[




´ νtα̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ´ ξtα̂tϵ̂tMt + ν̇tα̂t + ξ̇tMt
]
dt+K ,
where K is some constant term, which does not affect the maximization problem.
The Hamiltonian function for this problem is
Ht = e´trMt [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[




´ νtα̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ´ ξtα̂tϵ̂tMt.
The necessary conditions are:
BHt
Bϵ̂t
= e´trMt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]




= ´e´trMtλϵ̂t (R + E + I) + e
´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t




= ´e´tr [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ)
[





as well as laws of motion and the boundary conditions.
Define
νt ” e
´rtν̄t, ñ ν̇t = ´re´rtν̄t + e´rt ˙̄νt,
ξt ” e
´rtξ̄t, ñ ξ̇t = ´re´rtξ̄t + e´rt ˙̄ξt.
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Using these new costate variables, rewrite the necessary conditions:
Mt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]
´ ν̄tα̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ´ ξ̄tα̂tMt = 0,
´ ˙̄νt + ν̄tϵ̂t (1 ´ 2α̂t) = Mtλϵ̂t (R + E + I) ´ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t
´ ξ̄tϵ̂tMt ´ rν̄t,
´ ˙̄ξt + ξ̄tα̂tϵ̂t = [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
´ (1 ´ λ)
[





Differentiate the first condition with respect to time:
Ṁt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+Mt
[
λ ˙̂αt (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ˙̂ϵt + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt
]
´ Ṁt (1 ´ λ)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[










+ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) [´ ˙̄νt + ϵ̂tν̄t (1 ´ 2α̂t)] ´
˙̄ξtα̂tMt ´ ξ̄t ˙̂αtMt ´ ξ̄tα̂tṀt = 0.
Combine it with the second necessary condition and simplify:
Ṁt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+Mt
[
(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ˙̂ϵt + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt
]
´ Ṁt (1 ´ λ)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[










´ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t
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´ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) rν̄t + α̂tMt
[
´ ˙̄ξt + ξ̄tϵ̂tα̂t
]
= 0.
Next, combine this result with the third necessary condition:
α̂tMt
[
λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)






+Mt [(1 ´ λ) f
3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[













α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ν̄t + α̂tMtξ̄t
]
= 0.
Now, combine it with the first necessary condition and divide both sides by Mt:
α̂t
[
λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)






+ [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt

















= r [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]




f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]
.




















λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)







+ [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt

















= r [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]




f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t)
]
.
Notice that λ = 1 produces the first best solution. This is because I moved all the payments to
t = 0, establishing
M0µ+ (1 ´ λ) = 0,
where M0 = 1. This way, when λ = 1, the budget constraint multiplier, µ = 0, indicating that
the entrepreneur does not need funds at all. In the actual equilibrium I, therefore, expect λ ą 1.
To have the unique solution, I need to establish the boundary condition. Assign ϵ̂t = 0 and
ϵ̇t = 0 and find α that satisfied the equilibrium condition:
r [λα (R + E + I) ´ λc] + rc (1 ´ λ) + rc (1 ´ α) (1 ´ λ)
α0 ´ α
α (1 ´ α0)
= 0,
or
α2 [(R + E + I)λ (1 ´ α0) + c (1 ´ λ)] ´ αc [2α0 + λ (1 ´ 3α0)] + α0c (1 ´ λ) = 0.
Thus the lower bound on belief level is
α =
c [2α0 + λ (1 ´ 3α0)] +
?
1 ´ α0 ¨
b
λ2 (1 ´ α0) c2 ´ 4α0 (1 ´ λ)
[
λR̄c+ (1 ´ 2λ) c2
]
2R̄λ (1 ´ α0) + 2c (1 ´ λ)
,
where R̄ = R+E+I is the total social surplus produced at the moment the experiment succeeds.
This is the lower bound on the entrepreneur’s belief level.
II.C.5. Properties of the Best Contract
Important properties of the best equilibrium contract and the experimentation path induced by
the best contract are:
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Funds are provided unconditionally : this is the result of trying to solve the entrepreneur’s
problem derived in Appendix II.C.3 by directly controlling for the funding rate. It produces nec-
essary condition
Mtµ = λ ´ 1,
which must be satisfied for every t. This is impossible to do as Mt decreases over time given
positive experimentation rates. However, this condition hints that by reallocating funds to the
earlier periods the entrepreneur can benefit as it will allow her to relax one or both of the con-
straints and thus improve her payoffs. Therefore, the entrepreneur is better off if she moves all





or equivalently, asks for any other unconditional funding scheme, which guarantees the present
value of P . In terms of multipliers it means that
µ = ´ (1 ´ λ) ,
because M0 = 1. Unconditional payments mean that the entrepreneur receives funds no matter
what, even if the project succeeds. This way, the money is treated as given, and it does not affect
the entrepreneur’s second-phase decisions to experiment, which become entirely driven by the
shares.
Experimentation rates are inefficient : this follows directly from analyzing the differential equa-
tion that describes the equilibrium experimentation path. Rewritten in terms of the equilibrium
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policy function, ϵ̂ (α̂), it is
α̂
[
λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf (ϵ̂ (α̂)) + (1 ´ λ)
(1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) (ϵ̂ (α̂))2 ´ rc
α̂
]
+ (1 ´ α̂) (1 ´ λ)
α0 ´ α̂
1 ´ α0
f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) (ϵ̂ (α̂))2 ´ rc
α̂
´ α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + (1 ´ 2λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))] ϵ̂1 (α̂)




f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + 2f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂





λα̂R̄ + (1 ´ λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ´ λc
]




f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + f 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂





µ = ´ (1 ´ λ) = 0,
which means that the budget constraint is no longer binding, (II.e) degenerates to
α̂ [f 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ̂ (α̂))] + α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂1 (α̂) = r
[
α̂R̄ ´ f 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ´ c
]
,















It means that the only way to have the efficient experimentation path is to have no budget con-
straint. However, the entrepreneur needs funds. That is why she asks the investor to participate.
Therefore, the best experimentation path is inefficient.
Externalities that the project produces for the parties will be internalized : there are two pa-
rameters that describe the externalities in this model, E, and I . The entrepreneur’s externality,E
is received by the entrepreneur in full conditional on the project success. Similarly, the investor
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receives I when the project succeeds. Despite that these parts of the surplus are not sharable
per se, given transferable utilities it is possible to write a contract in such a way that these exter-
nalities will be internalized. In fact, this is exactly what happens in the best equilibrium as the
funding path, (II.e), and the boundary condition, (II.f), do not depend onE and I individually and
only depend on the total surplus,
R̄ = R + E + I .
As long as the total surplus is the same, the distribution of the externalities and sharable part R
does not matter.
Some projects are not worth the risk : if α0 ď 2cR̄ , then the project will not be undertaken. Sup-
pose that there is no opportunity to work on the project in the future, so that current incentives
to experiment are the highest as there will be no second change to succeed. For the project to be
worked on at phase two, it must be the case that
α̂0ϵ̂0 (s0R + E) ´ f (ϵ̂0) ´ ϵ̂0c ě 0.





For the investor to fund such a project it must be the case that
α̂0ϵ̂0 [(1 ´ s0)R + I) ´ ϵ̂0c ě 0,
or




Thus for the opportunity for such a share to exist, it must be the case that










R + I + E
.
189
Otherwise, the parties will not be able to agree even on a single experiment, let alone the whole
continuum of future experimentation sessions.
Experimenting never stops : experiments only stop if success happens, otherwise, experimen-
tation rate is always positive.
Take the policy function, (II.e), and write is as
ϵ̂1 (α̂)
[
´α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + (1 ´ 2λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))]




f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + 2f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂




λα̂R̄ + (1 ´ λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ´ λc
]




f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + f 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂




λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf (ϵ̂ (α̂)) + (1 ´ λ)
(1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) (ϵ̂ (α̂))2 ´ rc
α̂
]
´ (1 ´ α̂) (1 ´ λ)
α0 ´ α̂
1 ´ α0









X (α̂) ” r
[
λα̂R̄ + (1 ´ λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ´ λc
]




f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + f 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂




λf 1 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) ´ λf (ϵ̂ (α̂)) + (1 ´ λ)
(1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) (ϵ̂ (α̂))2 ´ rc
α̂
]
´ (1 ´ α̂) (1 ´ λ)
α0 ´ α̂
1 ´ α0




Y (α̂) ” ´α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + (1 ´ 2λ) f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))]




f3 (ϵ̂ (α̂)) ϵ̂ (α̂) + 2f2 (ϵ̂ (α̂))
α̂




It was determined in Appendix C that, for a normally behaving policy function, it is enough to
establish that the policy function has a finite derivative at the boundary level of belief, α, for the




ϵ̂1 (α̂) ă 8.








I will get the indeterminacy because ϵ̂ (α) = 0. Hence, I use the L’Hôpital’s rule and differentiate
the numerator and the denominator with respect to α̂ and then assign α̂ = α to the results. The
derivative of the numerator valued at α is
X 1 (α) = r
[
λR̄ ´ (2λ ´ 1) f2 (0) ϵ̂1 (α)
]













The derivative of the denominator valued at α is
Y 1 (α) = α (1 ´ α) f2 (0) ϵ̂1 (α)
[
λ+ (λ ´ 1)
(2α0 ´ α) (1 ´ α)












´ (2λ ´ 1)
]










α (1 ´ α)
[
λ+ (λ ´ 1) (2α0´α)(1´α)
α(1´α0)
] .
Having ϵ̂1 (α) = 8 is inconsistent with this expression. So it must be the case that the policy
function has a finite derivative at the boundary belief level. Thus the experiments continue until
success happens of forever.
II.C.6. The Contract with Conditional Funding
The maximization problem the entrepreneur is facing at phase one of the game when the project
is financed conditionally on no success over time and the investor provides exactly the amount







Mt (λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc)
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+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
(
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + ϵ̂tc
)]
dt
subject to: ˙̂αt = ´α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ,
Ṁt = ´α̂tϵ̂tMt,
α0 given, α0 P [0, 1] ,
M0 = 1.
This is a dynamic control problem. I will solve it using the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
Assign multipliers νt and ξt to the first and the second constraint from this problem, respec-





e´trMt [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t











It looks remarkably similar to the Lagrangian produced for the problem of finding the induced
experimentation path under the terms of the best contract. The only difference is the inclusion
of the ϵ̂tc term on the second line. I can jump straight to writing the Hamiltonian:
Ht = e´trMt [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + ϵ̂tc
]
´ νtα̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ´ ξtα̂tϵ̂tMt.
From this point, it is clear what the the necessary conditions are:
BHt
Bϵ̂t
= e´trMt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]




= ´e´trMtλϵ̂t (R + E + I) + e
´tr (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t
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= ´e´tr [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
+ e´tr (1 ´ λ)
[
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + ϵ̂tc
]
+ ξtα̂tϵ̂t,
as well as laws of motion and the boundary conditions.
Define
νt ” e
´rtν̄t, ñ ν̇t = ´re´rtν̄t + e´rt ˙̄νt,
ξt ” e
´rtξ̄t, ñ ξ̇t = ´re´rtξ̄t + e´rt ˙̄ξt.
Using these new costate variables, rewrite the necessary conditions:
Mt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]
´ ν̄tα̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ´ ξ̄tα̂tMt = 0,
´ ˙̄νt + ν̄tϵ̂t (1 ´ 2α̂t) = Mtλϵ̂t (R + E + I) ´ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t
´ ξ̄tϵ̂tMt ´ rν̄t,
´ ˙̄ξt + ξ̄tα̂tϵ̂t = [λα̂tϵ̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ f (ϵ̂t) ´ λϵ̂tc]
´ (1 ´ λ)
[
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂t
´ f (ϵ̂t) + ϵ̂tc
]
´ rξ̄t.
Differentiate the first condition with respect to time:
Ṁt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+Mt
[
λ ˙̂αt (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ˙̂ϵt + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt
]
´ Ṁt (1 ´ λ)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]
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+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[










+ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) [´ ˙̄νt + ϵ̂tν̄t (1 ´ 2α̂t)] ´
˙̄ξtα̂tMt ´ ξ̄t ˙̂αtMt ´ ξ̄tα̂tṀt = 0.
Combine it with the second necessary condition and simplify:
Ṁt [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]
+Mt
[
(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ˙̂ϵt + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ˙̂ϵt
]
´ Ṁt (1 ´ λ)
[
f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[










´ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
f 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + rc
α̂2t
´ α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) rν̄t + α̂tMt
[
´ ˙̄ξt + ξ̄tϵ̂tα̂t
]
= 0.
Next, combine this result with the third necessary condition:
α̂tMt
[
λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)






+Mt [(1 ´ λ) f
3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt
+ (1 ´ λ) (1 ´ Mt)
[













α̂t (1 ´ α̂t) ν̄t + α̂tMtξ̄t
]
= 0.
Now, combine it with the first necessary condition and divide both sides by Mt:
α̂t
[
λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)






+ [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt


















= r [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]




f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]
.















λf 1 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf (ϵ̂t) + (1 ´ λ)






+ [(1 ´ λ) f3 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + (1 ´ 2λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t)] ˙̂ϵt

















= r [λα̂t (R + E + I) + (1 ´ λ) f
2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t ´ λf
1 (ϵ̂t) ´ λc]




f2 (ϵ̂t) ϵ̂t + f
1 (ϵ̂t)
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂t) + c
]
.
Again, λ = 1 produces the first best solution.
To establish the boundary condition and have a unique solution, I assign ϵ̂t = 0 and ϵ̇t = 0
and find α that satisfied the equilibrium condition:
r [λα (R + E + I) ´ λc] + rc (1 ´ λ) + rc (1 ´ λ)
α0 ´ α
α (1 ´ α0)
= 0,
or
α2λR̄ (1 ´ α0) ´ αc (λ+ α0 (1 ´ 2λ)) + c (1 ´ λ)α0 = 0.
Thus the lower bound on belief level is
α =
c [λ+ α0 (1 ´ 2λ)] +
b
c2 (λ+ α0 (1 ´ 2λ))
2
´ 4λR̄ (1 ´ α0) c (1 ´ λ)α0
2λR̄ (1 ´ α0)
.




III.A. From Discrete to Continuous Time
I begin with some important observations regarding the effort level. Since, in discrete time, I
interpret ϵtd as the probability that the experiment conducted at time t succeeds and since I don’t
want the probability of one or higher to be feasible, the property that I need to satisfy for all t is
ϵtd ă 1.





fd (ϵt) d = 8.
Therefore, when d Ñ 0, fd Ñ f , and so
lim
ϵtÑ8
f (ϵt) = 8,
which means that as the effort cost function in continuous time, I can use any function that is
strictly increasing on R+, strictly convex, with all the other required properties inherited from
function fd.
Now, suppose that all the maximization problems are solved and we are describing the value
functions in terms of the equilibrium values of the state and control variables:
V (αt, α̂t) = αtϵtdstR ´ fd (ϵt) d+ γtdc ´ ϵtdc+ (1 ´ αtϵtd) δV (αt+d, α̂t+d) ,
W (α̂t) = α̂tϵ̂td (1 ´ st)R ´ γtdc+ (1 ´ α̂tϵ̂td) δW (α̂t+d) .
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These functions can be represented in the simplified form:
Vt = vtd+ (1 ´ αtϵtd) δVt+d,
Wt = wtd+ (1 ´ α̂tϵ̂td) δWt+d,
where
Vt ” V (αt, α̂t) , vt ” αtϵtstR ´ fd (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc,
Wt ” W (α̂t) , wt ” α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ st)R ´ γtc.




[αtϵtstR ´ fd (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc] = αtϵtstR ´ f (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc.
Since the two value functions now look similar enough, I will work with the first one and then
will deal with the second one analogously.
Begin by expanding the value function:
Vt = vtd+ δ (1 ´ αtϵtd) vt+dd+ δ
2 (1 ´ αtϵtd) (1 ´ αt+dϵt+dd) vt+2dd+ . . .
Since
αt+d =
αt (1 ´ ϵtd)
1 ´ αtϵtd
,
it is clear that
1 ´ αtϵtd =
αt (1 ´ ϵtd) (1 ´ αtϵtd)




(1 ´ ϵtd) ,
and that






(1 ´ ϵt+dd) =
αt
αt+2d











(1 ´ ϵt+jdd) ,
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and so










(1 ´ ϵt+jdd) vt+id.
































































































dθ´limdÑ0(τ´t) ln(1+rd)d +lnαt´lnατ .
Using the L’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
dÑ0











ln (1 + rd)
d




= (τ ´ t) r.
























1 ´ ατ ϵτd
= ´ατ ϵτ (1 ´ ατ ) .
Therefore,
α̇τ = ´ατ ϵτ (1 ´ ατ ) . (III.a)
Since ˙lnx = ẋ
x




= ´ϵτ (1 ´ ατ ) .
Now, lnατ can be calculated by using the integrals:
lnατ = lnαt +
ż τ
t
˙lnαθ dθ = lnαt ´
ż τ
t
ϵθ (1 ´ αθ) dθ.



























t αθϵθ dθvτ dτ . (III.b)






















































t αθϵθ dθvτ dτ +
e´hr´
şt+h
t αθϵθ dθVt+h ´ Vt
h
= 0.
Take limits as h Ñ 0. With the aid of the L’Hôpital’s and the Leibniz rules, I produce
rVt = vt ´ αtϵtVt + V̇t.
Now, it is possible to restore the entrepreneur’s value function:
rV (αt, α̂t) = αtϵtstR ´ f (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc ´ αtϵtV (αt, α̂t) +
dV (αt, α̂t)
dt
= αtϵtstR ´ f (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc ´ αtϵtV (αt, α̂t) + V1 (αt, α̂t) α̇t + V2 (αt, α̂t) ˙̂αt
= αtϵtstR ´ f (ϵt) + γtc ´ ϵtc ´ αtϵt (V (αt, α̂t) + (1 ´ αt)V1 (αt, α̂t))
´ α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ α̂t)V2 (αt, α̂t) .
Notice that I used (III.a) here for both αt and α̂t.
Finally, I can drop the subscripts and write a maximization problem in the form of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rV (α, α̂) = max
ϵ
[αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α, α̂) + (1 ´ α)V1 (α, α̂))
´ α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ α̂)V2 (α, α̂)]
subject to the participation constraint.
Let us restore the investor’s value function in a similar fashion:
rW (α̂t) = α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ st)R ´ γtc ´ α̂tϵ̂tW (α̂t) +
dW (α̂t)
dt
= α̂tϵ̂t (1 ´ st)R ´ γtc ´ α̂tϵ̂t (W (α̂t) + (1 ´ α̂t)W
1 (α̂t)) .
In the form of the HJB equation, the investor problem becomes
rW (α̂) = max
s, γ
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ γc ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))]




[α̂ϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ α̂ϵ (V (α̂, α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)V1 (α̂, α̂))
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´ α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ α̂)V2 (α̂, α̂)] .














t α̂θ ϵ̂(α̂θ) dθ [α̂τ ϵ̂ (α̂τ ) (1 ´ s (α̂τ ))R ´ γ (α̂τ ) c] dτ ,
where functions ϵ (αt, α̂t), s (α̂t), and γ (α̂t) are the policy functions (they will be different for
different information environments), and ϵ̂ (α̂τ ) = ϵ (α̂t, α̂t) given that the incentive constraint
is satisfied.
III.B. Evolution of Beliefs and Critical Funding Rate
This appendix is devoted to the development of the critical funding rate that is used to determine if
the funding ever stops. The idea behind this is that if the actual funding rate is everywhere below
the critical funding rate then the funds are provided indefinitely conditional on no success.
First, I describe the evolution of αt in continuous time. We know that
αt+d =















αt (1 ´ ϵtd) (1 ´ ϵt+dd)






i=0 (1 ´ ϵt+idd)
1 ´ αt + αt
śj´1
i=0 (1 ´ ϵt+idd)
.
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i=0 (1 ´ ϵt+idd)












































































Second, I develop the critical funding rate. It is done in full in Appendix C.
III.C. The First Best Scenario
To begin solving the first best case, I first derive the combined, or social, value function. Given
the transferability of utilities, a simple sum of the value functions produces the desired result.
The social planner does not need to worry about the incentives and individual participation as if
there is a positive expected surplus to gain, sharing it will not be an issue. I denote the combined
value function as V (αt). It depends only on state variable αt, as in the first best environment
α̂t = αt for every t.
Since
V (α) = V (α, α) +W (α) ,
I will use (III.1) and (III.2) to produce
rV (α) = rV (α, α) + rW (α)
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= αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α, α) + (1 ´ α)V1 (α, α)) ´ αϵ (1 ´ α)V2 (α, α)
+ αϵ (1 ´ s)R ´ γc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))
= αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ´ αϵ [V (α, α) +W (α) + (1 ´ α) (V1 (α, α) + V2 (α, α) +W
1 (α))]
= αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α) + (1 ´ α)V 1 (α)) ,
and so as a HJB equation, the first-best problem becomes
rV (α) = max
ϵ
[αϵR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (V (α) + (1 ´ α)V 1 (α))] .
The first order condition is
αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c ´ α [V 1 (α) (1 ´ α) + V (α)] = 0,
where function ϵ˚ (α) is the first-best policy function.
The second order condition
´f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ď 0
is satisfied for all ϵ ą 0.
Multiplying both sides of the first order condition by ϵ˚ (α), expressing
αϵ˚ (α)R ´ ϵ˚ (α) c ´ αϵ˚ (α) [V 1 (α) (1 ´ α) + V (α)] = f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ,
and combining it with the HJB equation yields
rV (α) = f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)) .
Since it must be true for any α, differentiating the both sides of this expression with respect to α
produces
rV 1 (α) = f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚1 (α) ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚1 (α)
= f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) .
Notice that if V 1 (α) ą 0, then ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0 for any positive ϵ˚ (α) because f2 (x) ą 0 if x ą 0
(strict convexity).
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To show thatV 1 (αt) ą 0, it is useful to write the value function in the form similar to (III.b). In








˚(αθ) dθ [ατ ϵ
˚ (ατ )R ´ f (ϵ
˚ (ατ )) ´ ϵ
˚ (ατ ) c] dτ .
Notice that it is reasonable to continue funding the project while the expression in square
brackets is positive, that is, while
αtϵ
˚ (αt)R ´ f (ϵ
˚ (αt)) ´ ϵ
˚ (αt) c ě 0,
or




Posterior beliefs can only decreasewhile experimentation continues, so for some criticalα, ϵ˚ (α) =
0, and so















—this is the level of optimism at which the funding must stop. Any project with the prior lower
than this will not be even considered. Therefore, for any α ď α,
V (α) = 0.
Now, for some α‘t ą αt ą α (where α‘t is just some arbitrary number, not a derivative), for




ϵ˚ (ατ ) .
Since initial ϵ‘t ă ϵ˚ (αt), and since




ϵ˚ (αt) (1 ´ α‘t)
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= ´αtϵ
˚ (αt) (1 ´ α‘t)
ą ´αtϵ
˚ (αt) (1 ´ αt)
= α̇t,
then every subsequent α‘τ ą ατ for τ ě t, and so every ϵ‘τ ă ϵ˚ (ατ ).
This way, if the belief that the project is still good, α‘t is higher than αt, then we can do better































˚(αθ) dθ (ατ ϵ








˚ (ατ )R ´ f (ϵ
˚ (ατ )) ´ ϵ
˚ (ατ ) c) dτ
= V (αt)
because for every τ ě t, ϵ‘τ ă ϵ˚ (ατ ), and so
´f (ϵ‘τ ) ´ ϵ‘τc ą ´f (ϵ˚ (ατ )) ´ ϵ˚ (ατ ) c.
Therefore, when α‘t ą αt ą α,
V (α‘t) ą V (αt) ,
and so when α ą α,
V 1 (α) ą 0.
The main implication of this is
rV 1 (α) = f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0,
which is possible only if ϵ˚1 (α) ą 0 because for α ą α, ϵ˚ (α) ą 0 and so f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ą 0.
Express V (α) from (III.5) and V 1 (α) from (III.6) and plug these to the first order condition:
r (αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α
[
f2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ϵ˚1 (α) (1 ´ α) + f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α)
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´ f (ϵ˚ (α))] = 0.
This is just an ordinary differential equation, which produces an optimal policy function ϵ˚ (α)
when solved given some particular function f (¨).






so this efficient policy function is bounded from below. To see if it’s bounded from above, consider
α = 1, which is the most optimistic belief possible. The ODE becomes
r (R ´ c) ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) (r + ϵ˚ (1)) + f (ϵ˚ (1)) = 0,
or
f 1 (ϵ˚ (1)) (r + ϵ˚ (1)) ´ f (ϵ˚ (1)) = r (R ´ c) ,
which has a unique solution since expression
f 1 (ϵ) (r + ϵ) ´ f (ϵ)
is equal to zero when ϵ is zero, and it strictly increases in ϵ for all other positive values of ϵ because
its derivative with respect to ϵ,
f2 (ϵ) (r + ϵ) + f 1 (ϵ) ´ f 1 (ϵ) = f2 (ϵ) (r + ϵ) ,
is strictly positive given strict convexity of f .Therefore function ϵ˚ (¨) is bounded and strictly
increasing from zero to ϵ˚ (1).
It is important to see that all its derivatives are finite. Rearrange terms of the ODE and express
ϵ˚1 (α) =
r (αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α (f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)))
αf 2 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) (1 ´ α)
.






, the derivative of the policy function is finite, as function ϵ˚ (α) is
bounded, and f (x) is at least thrice continuously differentiable. However, it is not clear the








ϵ˚1 (α) = lim
αÑ c
R
r (αR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α (f 1 (ϵ˚ (α)) ϵ˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚ (α)))



























III.D. Observable but Unverifiable Effort
This appendix is devoted to the solution of the problem within the “observable but unverifiable
effort” framework.
Begin with the entrepreneur’s problem. Since αt = α̂t for every t, (III.1) becomes
rV (α, α) = max
ϵ
[
αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) + γc ´ ϵc ´ αϵ
(





The participation constraint is not binding: the entrepreneur can always choose to divert the
funds, so γtc is her guaranteed income. To provide enough incentives for her to experiment, she
must expect to do better than that.
The first order condition is
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ c ´ α
(





where ϵ˚˚ (α) is the policy function for the observable but unverifiable effort environment. The
second order condition
´f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ď 0
is satisfied for all ϵ ě 0.
Multiply the both sides of the first order condition by ϵ˚˚ (α) and rearrange:
αϵ˚˚ (α) sR ´ ϵ˚˚ (α) c ´ αϵ˚˚ (α)
(




= f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) .
Combining this with the HJB equation yields






2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚1 (α) ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚1 (α) + γ1 (α) c
= f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) + γ1 (α) c.
Plug this, together with the expression for the value function, into the first order condition:
r (αs (α)R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α
[
f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) (1 ´ α)
+ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + γ (α) c+ γ1 (α) c (1 ´ α)] = 0.
This is the ordinary differential equation that produces a policy function, ϵ˚˚ (α), given some
particular function f (¨).
The investor will want to be on the entrepreneur’s optimal path: the entrepreneur does not
have the funds of her own, so if at some time t the investor decides to provide less funds, say
γt ă ϵ
˚˚ (αt) ,
then the entrepreneur will have to invest only γt. Given the concavity of her maximization prob-
lem she will want to invest as close to ϵ˚˚ (α) as possible. However, this is not the best decision
on the investor’s side: he could have offered a lower share, st, and achieved the same outcome.
Suppose, he suddenly decided to offer more funds:
γt ą ϵ
˚˚ (α) .
This decision will not affect ϵ˚˚ (α), as γt does not affect the instantaneous first order condition,
and so the entrepreneur will still invest ϵ˚˚ (α). The difference
γt ´ ϵ
˚˚ (α)
will be diverted, which is waste from the perspectives of the investor.




and so the incentive constraint implies
r (αs (α)R ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ c) ´ α
[
f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) (1 ´ α)
+ f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + ϵ˚˚ (α) c+ ϵ˚˚1 (α) c (1 ´ α)
]
= 0.
Rearrange and express s (α)
s (α) =
(f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c) (r + αϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ αf (ϵ˚˚ (α))
αrR
+
α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) (f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c)
αrR
.
This is everything it is possible to know about the entrepreneur’s optimal path at this stage.
Now I can solve the investor’s problem. Use (III.2) and the entrepreneur’s first order condition as
an incentive constraint, keeping in mind that γ = ϵ along the desired path:
rW (α) = max
s, ϵ
[αϵ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))]
subject to
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ) ´ c ´ α
(





Express the problem in the Lagrangian form:
rW (α) = max
s, ϵ
[
αϵ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵc ´ αϵ (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α))
+ λ
(
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ) ´ c ´ α
(





There are two first order conditions: with respect to ϵ,
α (1 ´ s (α))R ´ c ´ α (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α)) ´ λf2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) = 0,
and with respect to s,
´αϵ˚˚ (α)R + λ (α)αR = 0.
From the second condition, it is obvious that
λ (α) = ϵ˚˚ (α) ,
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and so if I use this fact and multiply both sides of the first condition by ϵ˚˚ (α) to produce
αϵ˚˚ (α) (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ˚˚ (α) c ´ αϵ˚˚ (α) (W (α) + (1 ´ α)W 1 (α)) = f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 ,
I can just plug this expression directly into the HJB equation to conjure
rW (α) = f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 .
Therefore,
rW 1 (α) = f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 ϵ˚˚1 (α) + 2f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) .
Combine this, together with the the expression for the value function, with the first order condi-
tion number one to produce
r (α (1 ´ s (α))R ´ f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ´ c)
´ α
[
f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + (1 ´ α)
(
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 ϵ˚˚1 (α)
+ 2f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) ϵ˚˚1 (α)
)]
= 0.





(f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c) (r + αϵ˚˚ (α)) ´ αf (ϵ˚˚ (α))
r
´
α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) (f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c)
r




f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + (1 ´ α)
(
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 ϵ˚˚1 (α)




r (αR ´ c) ´ [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c] (r + αϵ˚˚ (α)) + αf (ϵ˚˚ (α))
= α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α)
[
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + 3f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c
]
,
which is an ODE that produces ϵ˚˚ (α) when solved given some particular function f (¨).
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For the unique solution to this ODE to exist, I need to define the boundary condition. Plug
ϵ˚˚ (α) = 0 to the ODE to find the desired lowest possible α, which still makes it possible to agree
on continuing with the project:
r (αR ´ 2c) = α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚1 (α) c.
The left-hand side of this expression is positive only if α ě 2c
R
, the right-hand side is positive
always: ϵ˚˚1 (α) ă 0 would be impossible since ϵ˚˚ (α) = 0. Therefore, there is always a room
for agreement as long as α ě 2c
R
, which implies α = 2c
R







To get the upper bound, consider α = 1:
r (R ´ c) = [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (1)) ϵ˚˚ (1) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (1)) + c] (r + ϵ˚˚ (1)) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (1)) , (III.c)
which has a unique solution.






. To see why, suppose there are ex-






. If they actually exist it can only mean that
the function must decrease somewhere. Differentiate the ODE with respect to α and assume
ϵ˚˚1 (α) = 0:
rR ´ [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c] (r + ϵ˚˚ (α)) + f (ϵ˚˚ (α))
= α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚2 (α)
[
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + 3f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c
]
,
use the same assumption of ϵ˚˚1 (α) = 0 for the ODE itself:
r (αR ´ c) ´ [f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c] (r + αϵ˚˚ (α)) + αf (ϵ˚˚ (α)) = 0,
or









and plug it into the derivative of the ODE:
r
α
[(1 ´ α) (f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) + c) + c]
= α (1 ´ α) ϵ˚˚2 (α)
[
f3 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) (ϵ˚˚ (α))2 + 3f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α)) ϵ˚˚ (α) + c
]
.
The left-hand side of the expression is strictly positive, so the right-hand side must be too, how-
ever, it can only be possible if ϵ˚˚2 (α) ą 0, which implies that all the extreme points that can be
found for function ϵ˚˚ (α) are local minima. However, this is impossible: either there is at least
one local minimum without local maxima, but then it means that the function can have negative





= 0; or there must be at least one local maximum due to the
smoothness of the function, which is at odds with having local minima only.
Therefore, function ϵ˚˚ (α) strictly increases everywhere on the interior of its range.
III.E. Unobservable Effort Environment
This appendix is devoted to the characterization of the equilibrium in the unobservable effort
environment.
Begin by considering the entrepreneur’s problem expressed in the for of HJB equation:
rV (α, α̂) = max
ϵ
[(αϵsR ´ f (ϵ) ´ ϵc+ γc) ´ αϵ (V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂))
´ V2 (α, α̂) α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂)] .
The corresponding first order condition is
αsR ´ f 1 (ϵ˚˚) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)] = 0.
The second order condition is satisfied automatically.
The envelope condition is
rV1 (α, α̂) = ϵ
˚˚ (α, α̂) s (α̂)R ´ ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)]
´ αϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)V11 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) ´ V12 (α, α̂) α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) .
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Differentiate both sides of the first order condition with respect to α:
s (α̂)R ´ f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂) ´ [V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V (α, α̂)]
´ αV11 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) = 0
and plug the result into the envelope condition:
rV1 (α, α̂) = f
2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂) ´ V12 (α, α̂) α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) .
Now, differentiate both sides of the first order condition with respect to α̂:
αs1 (α̂)R ´ f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂) ´ α [V12 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) + V2 (α, α̂)] = 0,
express V12 (α, α̂)
V12 (α, α̂) =
αs1 (α̂)R ´ f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂) ´ αV2 (α, α̂)
α (1 ´ α)
,
and insert it into the envelope condition as well:
rV1 (α, α̂) = f
2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂)
´
αs1 (α̂)R ´ f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂) ´ αV2 (α, α̂)
α (1 ´ α)
α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) .
Rearrange:
´α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂)V2 (α, α̂) = (1 ´ α) f
2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂)
´ α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) s1 (α̂)R +
α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂)
α
´ (1 ´ α) rV1 (α, α̂) ,
and insert the result into the HJB equation together with the first order condition:
r [V (α, α̂) + (1 ´ α)V1 (α, α̂)] = f
1 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) + γ (α̂) c
+ (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂) ´ α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) s
1 (α̂)R
+
α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂)
α
.
From the first order condition, it is clear that
V (α, α̂) + V1 (α, α̂) (1 ´ α) = s (α̂)R ´








f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) + c
α
]
= f 1 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ´ f (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) + γ (α̂) c
+ (1 ´ α) f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂) ϵ˚˚1 (α, α̂) ´ α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) s
1 (α̂)R
+
α̂ϵ̂ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ˚˚ (α, α̂)) ϵ˚˚2 (α, α̂)
α
.
The principal will always provide the agent with the sum that he expects her to allocate towards
experiments. The argumentation for this is the same as provided for the observable but unverifi-
able case.





f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) + c
α̂
]
= f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) + ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) c
+ (1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) ´ α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) s1 (α̂)R.
(III.d)







1 (α̂, α̂) + ϵ
˚˚
2 (α̂, α̂) .
Rewrite the IC constraint in the form:
´α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂) s1 (α̂) = rs (α̂) ´ r









f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ´
1
R
ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) c ´
1
R
(1 ´ α̂) f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) .
Notice that
´α̂tϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t) (1 ´ α̂t) s
1 (α̂t) = ṡt,
and define
ht ” ´r
f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂t)) + c
α̂t
´ f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂t)) ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t) + f (ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t)) ´ ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t) c,
gt ” ´ (1 ´ α̂t) f
















e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ ,







e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ


















e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ
]





e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ .









e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ .


















e´rτ (hτ + gτ ) dτ .
Let us take a closer look at the second term inside the integral:
ż 8
t
e´rτgτ dτ = ´
ż 8
t
e´rτ (1 ´ α̂τ ) f
2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ ) ϵ̂






α̂τ (1 ´ α̂τ ) f
2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ ) ϵ̂





























˚˚ (α̂τ ) (1 ´ α̂τ )
)
f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) dτ
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= ´e´rt





e´rτ (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ ) (1 ´ α̂τ ) ´ r)



















f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) + c
α̂τ
´ f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ ) + f (ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ )) ´ ϵ̂









e´rτ (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ ) (1 ´ α̂τ ) ´ r)








f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ´ ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ )
(



























f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ´ ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ )
(

























f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂τ )) ´ ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂τ )
(










kt ” f (ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t)) ´ ϵ̂
˚˚ (α̂t)
(




















This expression describes the share that satisfies the incentive constrain conditional on the
funding path.
Now that the investor knows what the entrepreneur’s optimal path is expected to be based
on the investor’s offer schedule, he can solve his problem having the entrepreneur’s first order
condition as a constraint. Use (III.2) to state the problem:
rW (α̂) = max
s, ϵ̂
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ̂c ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))]
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subject to
α̂sR ´ f 1 (ϵ̂) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α̂, α̂) (1 ´ α̂) + V (α̂, α̂)] = 0,
and the participation constraint that I will ignore for now, but verify that it is satisfied once the
optimality conditions are set.
In the Lagrangian form, the problem becomes
rW (α̂) = max
s, ϵ̂
[α̂ϵ̂ (1 ´ s)R ´ ϵ̂c ´ α̂ϵ̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))
+ λ (α̂sR ´ f 1 (ϵ̂) ´ c ´ α [V1 (α̂, α̂) (1 ´ α̂) + V (α̂, α̂)])]
There are two first order conditions. The first one, with respect to ϵ̂:
α̂ (1 ´ s (α̂))R ´ c ´ α̂ (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂)) ´ λf2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) = 0,
and the second one, with respect to s:
´α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)R + λ (α̂) α̂R = 0.
From the second condition, I immediately get
λ (α̂) = ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) .
Use this result in the first condition, rearrange the terms, and multiply both of its sides by ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂):
α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (1 ´ s (α̂))R ´ ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) c ´ α̂ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (W (α̂) + (1 ´ α̂)W 1 (α̂))
= f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 .
Hence
rW (α̂) = f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 ,
which is positive for positive funding rates, hence no need for the explicit participation constraint,
and
rW 1 (α̂) = f3 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) + 2f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂) .
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Plugging these results back into the first first order condition, I obtain
r (α̂ (1 ´ s (α̂))R ´ f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ´ c)
´ α̂
[
f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 + (1 ´ α̂)
(
f3 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂)
+ 2f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ϵ̂˚˚1 (α̂))] = 0.
(III.e)
Funding rate is bounded below if it eventually decreases:
lim
tÑ8
ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂t) = 0.




















































So, s (α̂) = c
α̂R

















This is the lower bound.
To combine the two conditions into one, first, differentiate III.e with respect to α̂ and express
s1 (α̂); second, plug this result together with III.e into III.d to produce the second order differen-
tial equation that can be solved for the optimal unobserved funding rate, given some particular
function f (¨):




f 1 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) ´ f (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) + f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 + ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) c
]
+ (1 ´ α̂)
[
f2 (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂)) (ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂))2 + ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) c
]
´ α̂ (1 ´ α̂)
[




α̂2ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂)2
r
[




α̂2ϵ̂˚˚ (α̂) (1 ´ α̂)2
r
[
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